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Pcisible Ideas

Frederick
Sontag

$3.75

"One of the best presentations I
have seen of the development of the
idea of divine perfection."

CYRIL RICHARDSON,
Union Theological Seminary

DIVINE
PERFECTION

possible ideas of God

Frederick Sontag

PART ONE of the book presents a
compact and clear history of philo-
sophical and theological thinking on
the subject of divine perfection. Be-
ginning with Plato and Aristotle,
this section describes the develop-
ment of the idea of God through
the centuries down to the reform-
ers and Hegel.

PART TWO develops a modern point
of view toward the nature of God.
Dr. Sontag lucidly reassesses past at-
titudes in order to show their inter-
relationships and their meaning for
the present and the future.

No. 0745A 0162

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Sontag

Divine perfection possible ideas

of God

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DIVINE
PERFECTION

DIVINE

PERFECTION

possible ideas of God

BY FREDERICK SONTAG

HARPER & BROTHERS

PUBLISHERS

NEW YORK

DIVINE PERFECTION

Possible Ideas of God

Copyright 1962 by Frederick Sontag
Printed in the United States of America

All rights in this book are reserved.
No part of the book may be used or reproduced
in any manner whatsoever without written per-
mission except in the case of brief quotations
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49 East 33rd Street, New York 16 3 N. Y.

A-M

Library of Congress catalog card number: 62-7301

For

CN.S. and M.B.S.

PREFACE

What should a man do if he finds himself outside and unable to
identify with any of the major philosophical and theological trends
of his time? If he should happen to be interested in speculative
and constructive work, then to turn to and concentrate upon any
one historical figure or era is too confining and misses the aim. For
any constructive effort every previous theory is relevant, although
all not equally so. To make every major theory (although not all
of history a la Hegel) your training ground what a fantastic but
necessary procedure!

British thought, both positivistic and analytic, is highly special-
ized, often doctrinaire, and sometimes provincial. Admirable as its
aims and methods may be at points, it seems unsuited to specula-
tive efforts. It may criticise them effectively, but it appears unable
to create them. On the other hand, German thought has been so
fruitful that its products are hard to avoid. Yet from the critical
thought of Kant to the towers of Hegel and the humanism of
Feuerbach and Nietzsche, it seems to have spent its creative energy.
To stir its fire will renew the heat of any mind which has a specula-
tive bent; but, if it is time for a change, this seems hardly the place
to turn.

If one of our problems is the modern split between philosophy
and theology, then to leap with others onto the existentialist band-
wagon might appear to be the answer. In existentialism we have at
once a philosophical, theological, and literary movement, plus a
revival of classical ontological problems. Yet for all this, it is hard
to remember that existentialism actually is of nineteenth-century

7

8 PREFACE

origin. Its literary flowering and public attention are recent, but its
basis lies before our time. Furthermore, it avowedly aims at a
radical break with its immediate past, if not with the past as a
whole. What seems most needed today is new theorizing on funda-
mental problems, theorizing which seems to be from the tradition
rather than against it. We cannot go back; somehow we must bring
all past metaphysical and theological writing to us and enlist its
aid toward constructing contemporary theories.

At Stanford University, where I first saw the light and was con-
verted to the use of the philosophic method, my thanks must go to
Lawrence Kimpton, John Mothershead (who first made me anxious
to read all previous philosophy), John Reid, and Jeffery Smith. Out-
side philosophy's door, Graham DuShane and Virgil Whitaker
taught me what a teacher did and still could do. Those were exciting
postwar days for a product of the California public schools.

I was told, and it was true, that nowhere outside New Haven
would it be so possible or so fruitful to work both in theology and
in philosophy. In my own era as a graduate student at Yale this
seemed uniquely true. As a trio of teachers, Brand Blanshard,
Robert Calhoun, and Paul Weiss were and are and probably will
be an unbeatable combination. Whatever clarity and directness are
here, Blanshard may take credit for if he will. A love of classical
theories and a desire to reproduce them without distortion both
are from Calhoun, although they are not equal to him. Sheer
speculative construction and daring, a confidence in one's own the-
ories these no one could fail to learn from Weiss. Philosophy was
as it ought to be there, so that my debt in this essay is to the whole
Department, including, of course, Julian Hartt (with whom I first
worked on the problem of this essay) and Albert Outler at the
Divinity School. The students there taught too, by making you feel
that you were in the right competition. Those years produced a
dedication to philosophy as an instrument, an openness to every
past and present theory, as well as the beginning of an interest in
the subject of this essay.

PREFACE 9

Nine years as a teacher of philosophy to Pomona College students
made me into a writer. The faculty and the College as a whole
provide a uniquely free and congenial atmosphere, and the students
encourage you by finding speculation natural and traditional ques-
tions both relevant and urgently to be dealt with. Actually, the
draft of this essay was completed in New York City, in a small room
in Butler Library, provided for me by the generosity of the Columbia
University Department of Philosophy, while I was across Broadway
as a Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Union Theological Seminary
during 1959-1960. Although I had taken seminars in theology at
Yale, I had never actually been in or been a part of a Seminary
before, and that year at Union must stand as one of my most in-
structive and fruitful. The faculty and students were more than
generous to a philosophical Philistine, but they must also bear part
of the responsibility for orienting my philosophical writing toward
theological problems.

John Bennett, Remhold Niebuhr, Cyril Richardson, and Daniel
Williams were all kind enough to read the draft of this essay in
detail and must not go without public thanks. I have profited from
their comments and conversation, even if the manuscript may not
reveal it. Without the secretarial office at Union the rough draft
would not have been done. Without Mrs. Carol Ehman the final
draft would not have been done nearly as well. Through all of
this my wife patiently read and corrected what she protested she
did not understand. If the reader's experience is otherwise, no little
credit is due to her.

Claremont, California F.S.

November, 1961

CONTENTS

PREFACE 7

PART ONE

SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 17

1. PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 22

2. PLOTINUS AND THE PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS 27

3. AUGUSTINE AND ANSELM 36

4. AQUINAS AND OGKHAM 43

5. MEISTER EGKHART AND NICOLAS CUSANUS 53

6. SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ 59

7. KANT AND HEGEL 69

PART TWO

SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS
RELATED TO PERFECTION

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 83

8. INFINITY AND UNITY 87

9. FORM AND TRANSCENDENCE 98

10. ACTUALITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY 104

11. POWER AND MOTION 112

11

12 CONTENTS

12. SIMPLICITY AND DIVISION 117

13. FREEDOM AND VOLITION: A CONCLUSION 126

14. EXTENSION OF CONCLUSIONS 136

SELECTED READINGS 147

ADDITIONAL SOURCES 149

INDEX 151

DIVINE
PERFECTION

PART ONE

SEVEN

TYPES

OF

DIVINE
PERFECTION

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE

In our own time not only philosophers but also theologians often
seem unwilling to speak directly, clearly, and (most important)
simply about the nature of God. This was not always so, and it need
not be so in the future. Much, of course, has been written about the
difficulty of arriving at any certain knowledge of the Divine nature.
However, theoretical difficulties do not seem to have diminished
interest in the subject. How can we develop further the widespread
contemporary interest in theology without a constant attempt to
delineate the nature of God as precisely as possible and in technical
and philosophically adequate terms?

To some it may seem strange to assert that there is currently little
direct discussion about the Divine nature, when everywhere these
days one hears a great deal about God and about religious concepts.
Yet much talk about religion or extended discussion about God's
action, however comprehensive it may be, is not the same as meta-
physical and systematic investigation of the Divine attributes. And
such metaphysical elaboration is important precisely because we
are not always clear or in agreement as to how God acts or as to the
role He plays in any particular religion. Disagreements at this level,
as classical theology knew full well, often rest upon a fundamental
diversity in the way in which we conceive God's nature and His
attributes.

A systematic inquiry, then, need not attempt to arrive at a single,

17

18 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

definitive, and universally acceptable description of the basic qualities
which constitute a conception of God, but it should aim to clarify
the basis of our disagreement over God's actions by setting forth the
varying concepts of God's nature as metaphysically conceived (i.e.,
by a description of the interrelating basic attributes of such a pri-
mary nature) . In this way we might see why, in virtue of His nature,
God is conceived to act in one way by some and in another way by
others. And it is possible to avoid the epistemological problems
which have made theologians and metaphysicians intellectually shy
in the presence of the task of describing God. For if we view such an
enterprise not as one providing conclusive knowledge, but rather as
an undertaking which will enable us to see more clearly why we
differ theologically and metaphysically, then we can discuss the
attributes of Divinity calmly, clearly, and directly, without either
blasphemy or unsupportable claims to the possession of certain
knowledge.

Why should we not treat a theory about the Divine nature merely
as a theory and then as theoreticians explore its consequences, along
with its alternatives, without forming any special attachments? If
we argue tenaciously on the practical level and seem certain of the
basis for our knowledge there, why not theorize with equal ease on
the abstract level also? In this way we can explore the following
thesis: That our disagreements over the details of theology and
metaphysics actually stem from our employment of fundamentally
different concepts about the nature of the First Principle. Perhaps
today we are once again ready to put first things first and to begin
all philosophical theology and metaphysics, not with a theory of
knowledge, but, as such clasical writers as Spinoza did, with the
development of a theory about the Divine nature.

In any such construction as this, one of the first questions which
must be dealt with is: What differentiates the Divine nature from
any other nature? and the answer to this will always involve the
formulation of a concept of perfection. For the Divine is divine only
if it embodies qualities of perfection in a degree different from the
human, or if it does so in a way fundamentally incapable of ac-

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 19

tualization within our natural order. Those who deny the existence
of any First Principle, or of God, often do so because of an implicit
rejection of the concept of a level or levels of existence higher and
more perfect than that capable of realization within nature. Thus,
the first task of the theologian is to make clear what it is for him that
constitutes such unique qualities of perfection, i.e., what attributes
serve to make the Divine divine and to set it apart forever from the
natural order as prior because of its perfection.

The first part of this book simply attempts to set forth seven re-
lated theories about the nature of Divine perfection. The assumption
is that disagreements on a fundamental metaphysical level can be
shown to lie behind differences both in the conception of God and
in questions about His actions toward men and the natural world.
If we wish to come to understand God or, perhaps more ac-
curately, to understand the basis for our differences of opinion about
the way in which God acts we can do no better (so this brief book
asserts) than to begin by attempting to sketch the various possible
concepts of perfection. Having done this, we may then see more
clearly the difficulties and the advantages which flow from the in-
corporation of one of these influential concepts into the construction
of a systematic theory about God's attributes and actions.

How many in number are the possible concepts of Divine perfec-
tion? Such a question is unanswerable except to say that the history
of both metaphysics and theology tells us that there is at least more
than one and that, if we limit ourselves to only those types which
differ from each other fundamentally, then the possible variations
(and thus the possible sources of basic disagreement) are really
rather few in number, and the alternatives are actually not quite so
numerous as one might suppose. The future, of course, may disclose
the formation of additional basic types of Divine perfection, but the
potential reorganization and the fruitful exploration which would
be made possible by such a discovery does not concern the present,
except to lend excitement to the future.

One of the great virtues of exploring the question of Divine per-
fection is that it is at once a philosophical and a theological problem.

20 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

By no means is all of philosophy of interest to theologians or vice
versa. Yet in a day in which philosophy and theology can and often
do grow far apart, it is important to revive areas of equal interest to
both disciplines. Of course, theology can hide under its skirts as
many diverse pursuits as can philosophy, so that such a question as
possible concepts of Divine perfection will tend to interest only the
systematic theologians and the metaphysically inclined philosophers.
However, such classical, constructive attempts are something which
need encouragement in both fields. The question of the character-
istics of Divine perfection has the happy advantage of uniting phi-
losophers and theologians as equals in its exploration.

What does the notion of perfection as a metaphysical character-
istic of the Divine nature have to do with the moral or religious use
of the same term? Such an interrelating of similar moral or religious
concepts is excluded from the scope of this inquiry, except to note
that in recent generations much more attention has been paid to the
ethical and to the religious than to the metaphysical. It just might
be that the latter may prove to be the more fundamental. The aim
of this book, then, is simply to set forth seven sets of theories of
Divine perfection which seem to the writer to be both distinctive in
kind and rich in consequence rich metaphysically, theologically,
and ethically. This will be done in Part I. In Part II six central pairs
of metaphysical concepts will be considered which are crucial to the
varying concepts of perfection.

This investigation will be at once historical and systematic. Phi-
losophy and theology are no more and no less than what philos-
ophers and theologians have written which means that no
philosopher or theologian can escape a study of the primary sources
and still understand his discipline. In this sense no constructive work
can ignore history. While the aim here is to set forth certain concepts
of perfection which are systematically distinct, it would be a false
attempt if it were not done through the medium of historical figures.
Otherwise the systematic types, though interesting and possible,
simply might not shed any light on what philosophy is or has been,
but only on what it might be. On the other hand, a strong systematic

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 21

interest prevents the types of Divine perfection outlined here from
fitting the historical writings in every detail. The types of perfection
presented will be generated out of historical material and applied to
certain writers, but they will of necessity fit none of them with precise
historical accuracy. The individual nature of philosophical and theo-
logical writing requires this slight distortion if the systematic purpose
is to be accomplished. Such a blending and reworking of historical
material is precisely the activity from which all creative metaphysics
and theology derive their energy and their inspiration.

P L AT O

AND

ARISTOTLE

What is perfect is often said to mean what is complete or what
has attained its end. Such a concept of perfection can easily be said
to have dominated most of classical philosophy. Certainly this is true
for both Plato and Aristotle. Plato's famous doctrine of the Forms
has often been interpreted exclusively as an epistemological doctrine,
which merely reflects the interest that has dominated modern
thought. Actually, within the Platonic dialogues the Forms seem to
be much more a standard of ontological perfection, giving simplicity
and order to the world of sense and thus rendering it intelligible.
The Forms serve as the model for the construction of the world in
the Timaeus, to which the world-maker looks for his pattern.

For Aristotle form has an equally important place and similarly
serves as a standard of perfection, although the concept of form is
less universal and more closely embodied in the physical world, from

22

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 23

which the individual mind abstracts it to gain knowledge. Form
indicates completion, definiteness, limit, intelligibility, and exemp-
tion from motion. Aristotle's only deviation from Plato here is in
the ontological status which he gives to form and in the conception
of the process by which we come to know such an object. Essentially,
however, both of these influential figures are united in their use of
the properties of "form" to connote perfection.

Although form is the primary example of perfection for Plato, it
is easy to see other characteristics of perfection at work in his dia-
logues. The guiding control of reason, the acquisition of knowledge
of basic principles, the search for beauty, and the love or desire for
increased knowledge all of these are mentioned time after time.
Transcendence is barely hinted at as a necessary aspect of perfection
(notable exceptions: the description of the Good in the Republic
and in the Philebus] .

Virtue, of course, is one of Plato's main concerns, and this ex-
presses itself theologically in the protest which appears in the first
part of the Republic against the popular representations of the gods
as indulging in human wickedness. Plato clearly links Divine per-
fection to moral virtue and in turn to stability of nature and lack of
radical change in characteristics. Divinity requires unchangeableness
of nature and a moral example of trustworthiness. Plato excludes
motion as being an imperfection, though not as strongly as Aristotle
does. The soul is the source of all motion; and in a way the soul also
exemplifies perfection for Plato, although it does so in a secondary
manner. On the whole, the eternal and changeless character of form
stands as Plato's major criterion of perfection. It remains for
Plotinus to pick up Plato's stress upon soul as an important on-
tological principle and then attempt to reconcile this with the
motionless nature of perfection in a way in which Plato never did.

Control is another aspect of perfection which Plato stresses many
times. Perhaps it is the major underlying theme of the Republic.
The improvement of men and nations depends upon the union of
abstract principles with practical power, with the philosopher-king
standing as the symbol of rational control. The world-maker in the

24 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

Timaeus exemplifies this ideal control in a supreme sense, forcing
into submission and to useful purpose the essentially chaotic ele-
ments in the receptacle. A world perfect in its self-maintainance is
the end result of this kind of rational, controlled exercise of power.

Motion can never be completely excluded from the definition of
perfection for Plato, since in the Parmenides the One which is be-
yond being is rejected as the dominant ontological principle. Instead,
Plato settles for a continuous tension between absolute unity and sheer
plurality. This yields the principle of definite number, and it indi-
cates the ultimate, yet limited, pluralism inherent within Plato's on-
tological principles. Mixture thus becomes the guiding concept for
perfection in the good life, as delineated in the Philebus. Guided by
rationality and controlled by a preference for limitedness, mixture
seems to be close to Plato's last word on the attributes of perfection.
Either a world-maker or an individual man does the best he can
with the material that is given to him without choice. He uses the
power of rationality (guided through a knowledge of the interrela-
tion of the Forms) to control, unify, and limit the ingredients in
consonance with a concept of harmony and beauty,

Aristotle shows an even stronger preference for the limited and
the complete as the very conditions for intelligibility and thus for
perfection. Intelligibility and perfection both mean to be without
matter, since matter entails division and motion, due to its incom-
pleteness. To have completion means to have attained an end in
harmony with the realization possible for that species. Development,
motion, and seeking imply the lack of an attained end, and this
characterizes what is as yet imperfect. In the Metaphysics, perfection
in a being of the kind represented by the unmoved mover means not
thinking about material (i.e., moving and thus imperfect) objects.
Thought having its own completed thought as it object is the de-
scription of the unmoved mover's perfect state. Despite Aristotle's
famed stress upon the centrality of the concrete individual in the
process of knowledge, where ontological perfection is concerned his
conception is on the whole quite abstract and free from motion.

It is in the concept of necessity that Aristotle differs perhaps most

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 25

fundamentally from Plato. To be such that it could not be other-
wise, that is, to be necessary this concept guides Aristotle in his
logical work and becomes crucial to his delineation of perfection.
Like Plato, he fully and freely recognizes the non-rational and the
accidental elements in all of nature. Like Plato also, however, he
looks not to all of nature for knowledge, but only to a part of it; and
this part Aristotle particularly stresses as the necessary, that which
alone is reducible to definite concept. Plato does not favor capricious-
ness in any sense, but his important principles of love and beauty
offer in their attractiveness to the mind a kind of counterpart to the
guidance Aristotle finds in that which cannot be other than it is,
i.e., the necessary in nature and in thought.

Aristotle's strongest w T ords are reserved for the rejection of in-
finity or unlimitedness, since for him it means incompleteness, in-
determinacy, and thus the impossibility of rational comprehension.
Aristotle limits his extended discussion only to the question of the
possibility of a material infinite, but it is no less clear that all kinds
of infinity are for him the antithesis of perfection. He admits fully
the importance and the difficulty of the question of whether or not
an actual infinite exists. He finally accepts the reality of a potential
infinite and of an actual infinity in the sense of perpetual circular
motion, since it has a limitation and a sense of continued completion.
Plato says little about the question of infinity, except to indicate his
possible receptiveness by including it as one of the basic principles
responsible for the origin of all things as he describes them in the
Philebus. In the Sophist, Plato does posit power as the fundamental
characteristic of all being, a principle which is not so hostile to
actual infinity. On the whole, however, Plato clearly agrees with
Aristotle in seeing limitation as reason's primary characteristic and
as the factor responsible for beauty, harmony, and thus, perfection.

Strangely enough, it is Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics,
who stresses contemplation as being an activity that is akin to
divinity and as an end sufficient in itself. For all his supposed love of
abstract thought, Plato closely ties all perfect thought to a controlled
direction of the world's daily activities. Aristotle also stresses the

26 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

virtue of such practical wisdom, but that which is most god-like is
that knowledge and contemplation which is sufficient in itself. The
goal of thought seems to be such self-sufficiency as the unmoved
mover has in his own self-reflective thought, and this concept is of
major importance both for Aristotle's delineation of perfection and
for many who come after him.

Like Plato, Aristotle rejects unity as a dominant feature of per-
fection. Since there is no radical distinction between perfection as
it applies to ontological construction, to divinity, or to the rational
part of man, unity in all three realms is reduced to merely the neces-
sary element of order and limitation. Plato's Forms are plural, as are
Aristotle's although those of both are limited in number. In the
metaphysics of neither man can ontological first principles be re-
duced to one, or even ranked in strict order of importance according
to any single and dominant concept. Limitation is important to both
men, but Divine perfection retains an ultimately plural, if never-
theless definite, character.

One of the most influential concepts for all later thinking about
Divine perfection is Aristotle's distinction between actual and poten-
tial and his unhesitating preference for the actual. This preference is
easy to understand in light of the prevailing concepts of perfection,
since potentiality involves change, time, motion, and incompleteness.
It is hardly too much to say that Aristotle took the actual as his
principal criterion for perfection, finding its epitome in the unmoved
mover, whose very existence it is necessary to posit in order to find
full actuality completely embodied. Later theologians agree over-
whelmingly, and almost unconsciously, in making actuality one of
the primary characteristics of Divine perfection. Potentiality comes
to be ruled out of the Divine nature because of its opposition to
actuality; and change, time, motion, and incompleteness are left to
represent a lack of perfection. Although Plato does not use Aris-
totle's terms, he tends to share Aristotle's preference here without
real difference.

Since motion is linked with time, change, and incompleteness, rest
comes to be preferred and to represent perfection, not so much for

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 27

its own sake but because it indicates a state of actuality. Eternity, as
the absence of temporality, not mere indefinite extension of time,
also shares this derived preference. Aristotle links time with motion,
and motion with incompleteness, so that removal from direct par-
ticipation in time becomes necessary to preserve pure actuality in any
being that is to be called fully perfect. Thus, the specific terms in
which Aristotle conceives perfection, and with which Plato does not
essentially disagree, come to be linked firmly together and to define
perfection for centuries to come.

2

P L O XI N U S

AND THE

PSEUDO-DION YSIUS

If Plato can be said to hint at times at the necessity for con-
ceiving of the Divine as transcendent, it is safe to say that Aristotle
does not see this necessity at all. It might be said that Aristotle re-
jects the existence of an actual infinite principally because of its
quality of transcending intellection. He never speaks of the un-
moved mover in a way that suggests anything other than an actual
(i.e., pure) representation of the principles which are active within
the natural order. Plato only suggests, but never develops, the con-
cept of Good as transcending being and intellection. Aristotle cannot
even go as far as a hint, but instead he rejects all transcendence and
equates the ontologically perfect with what is amenable to full
rational comprehension.

Although the Pre-Socratics are full of transcendental elements, it
is really through the Enneads of Plotinus and the writings of the

28

PLOTINUS AND THE PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS 29

Pseudo-Dionysius that western metaphysics and theology have come
to think seriously of perfection's transcendence of being and reason.
Such transcendence becomes not only compatible with, but even
necessary to, any conception of Divine perfection. This comes about
primarily through the emphasis given to unity as a central character-
istic of anything worthy of being called perfect.

However, neither Plotinus nor Dionysius should be thought of as
recommending the transcendence of being and of rationality as
characteristic of perfection simply for the sake of transcendence.
Especially in Plotinus, the element of transcendence of both the
natural and the intelligible orders has its roots in Parmenides and in
Plato's dialogue, Parmenides. In the latter, Plato considers the One
beyond being and concludes that it is beyond all description and
thought. Plotinus accepts this consequence in making the One his
supreme First Principle, rather than follow Plato's more moderate
(i.e., pluralistic) solution. When unity is made the supreme meta-
physical concept, transcendence is a necessary consequence. Plato
held to a compromise between unity and multiplicity (a dialectical
tension) , but Plotinus makes unity supreme and accepts the difficult
consequences.

Yet, although transcendence comes to be attached to perfection
because of the prominence of unity in governing ontological struc-
ture, the primacy of unity for Plotinus goes back another step.
"Soul" was an important concept for Plato; to Plotinus it becomes
all-important and philosophy's very starting point. To the very end,
soul has an important but ambiguous role in Plato's dialogues.
Plotinus begins with a systematic study of the soul and becomes the
first classical philosopher to develop a subtle and profound psy-
chology and to make such psychology central to philosophical
thought. By comparison, Aristotle's treatise On the Soul is really
only a theory of knowledge. Plotinus develops what can be called a
metaphysic based upon an examination of soul, whereas Aristotle's
metaphysics is surely based upon the principles of the physical world.
Both Augustine and Hegel can be understood only against the back-
drop of Plotinus' achievement.

30 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

In examining the soul and various extant theories about it,
Plotinus concludes that soul is primarily characterized by a kind of
organic unity. This degree of unity distinguishes the soul from lesser
orders in the physical world and makes possible the development of
a higher interior order within the soul. Despite its dispersal through-
out the body, the soul has a degree of unity that prevents its becom-
ing split as physical enties may be. The presence of the whole of the
soul in each part simultaneously testifies to its non-material nature.
Having distinguished the soul from physical nature and founded this
distinction upon greater and lesser degrees of internal unity, Plotinus
then discovers that the soul exists above the material world and is
able to look either to it or away from it. Plotinus finds that when the
soul is directed away from the physical world, it contemplates an-
other sphere, the intelligible world. This realm proves to be above
the soul because of its higher degree of unity. Pure thought does not
look to the physical world, and thus such thought is not character-
ized by motion as is the soul. In fact, the intelligible world does not
contain any possibility for division, except the necessary distinctions
between thought and object, and between thought and thought.

Having transcended the physical and psychical world, guided by
varying degrees of unity, the dialectical scale thus established natu-
rally leads to its implied terminus, unity itself, absolutely without
division. The actual description of the Plotinian First Principle is a
complicated affair, but there is no question of the primacy assigned
to unity as a metaphysical and theological concept or that it involves
transcending both rationality and all of the natural characteristics of
being. Here the law of identity is suspended, which is one reason
that rationality is interrupted. All things are in the One as their
source, but not as individual things. Here the negative method of
approach becomes necessary, and all direct statement about the One
becomes difficult, that is if normal standards of accuracy are ex-
pected to apply.

However, one difficulty in understanding Plotinus and one com-
mon source of misunderstanding about his doctrine is that nothing
in his metaphysical hierarchy has only one side or aspect. Like

PLOTINUS AND THE PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS 31

Spinoza, Plotinus holds that every important entity can be viewed in
two ways, and different aspects will appear within each perspective.
For Plotinus this duality of perspective is usually expressed in the
metaphor "looking upward or looking downward." Each perspec-
tive is equally true, although of course the way up, i.e., toward in-
creasing unity and the One itself, is the primary route, just as for
Spinoza "under the aspect of eternity" provides the more adequate
understanding. But this duality of perspective often leads to ap-
parently conflicting statements, and it always leads to complexity
and intricacy of metaphysical structure.

All of this helps us to understand why Plotinus says a great deal
about his ultimate principle, the One, and at the same time gives
good reasons why description of it and direct statement about it are
both impossible and misleading when attempted. The underlying
principle of unity, uncovered through his analysis of the status of
the soul, forces Plotinus to maintain the extreme transcendence of
what is ultimately perfect; but duality of perspective (represented
in the negative method of approach) still allows him to give a full
discussion of the supremely perfect One. All that is found within the
structure of being, even Plotinus 5 Intellectual Principle (akin to
Plato's Forms), involves some degree of duality, which forces the
supremely perfect One to stand beyond intellection and outside both
the structure of being and of not-being. Unity as the supreme (and,
of course, singular) characteristic of what is ultimately perfect will
now involve Divine perfection in the difficulties and the protective
advantages of the extreme transcendence of rational structure.

Sometimes Plotinus calls his First Principle the Good, indicating
its freely creative and outgoing tendency. When so characterized,
the supremely perfect becomes abundantly full and is viewed as the
source of all structures and of all beings within the natural world.
However, it seems clear that the principle of identity is derivative
from the One and not applicable to it. Thus, when the One is
described as containing all things while yet itself being nothing, it is
precisely because the suspension of the normal, so-called "laws of
thought" results in a unique situation within the One. It cannot be

32 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

described by means of our normal distinctions; within it all is
present but without limit, distinction, or precise boundary.

Divine, or really more properly, ultimate perfection (since
"divine" as we use it applies in Plotinus 5 hierarchy to the secondary
realm of intelligence), although perhaps not beyond all grasp, is
dominated not by a group of characteristic perfections but by a
single, dominant one. Personality is surpassed, just as intellection
was, and all contingency or variability in the world's creation and
constitution is ruled out. What is supremely perfect is neither limited
nor unlimited, finite nor infinite, but transcends these and all other
such oppositions and distinctions. It is both supremely actual and
supremely potential, since it contains all things as their ultimate
source, but it does so in a manner beyond normal distinctions. This
means that the One cannot be called actual as opposed to potential,
but must be both without being either separately.

Such breaking of normal thought categories, already strained
where Divine perfection is concerned, makes perfection hard to
characterize in any satisfactory manner. One certain characteristic
remains, however: self-sufficiency. What is supremely perfect now
cannot be described by any simple set of characteristics such as rest
vs. motion. Yet never is any First Principle made dependent on
anything other than itself (once the era of a single First Principle is
reached). In fact, the transcendence of categories and distinctions
by the Plotinian One seems to be propelled by the very desire to
place what is to be adjudged ultimately perfect as forever beyond all
dependence, the dependence which any structure or list of distinct
characteristics must involve.

Although neither necessity nor freedom is quite accurate as an ex-
clusive characteristic of perfection for Plotinus, necessity (as for
Aristotle) is more important if it is contrasted with the possible, i.e.,
with the world we now have as it is conceived in alternative forms.
Choice involves distinctions and is not characteristic of the One.
The One produces ungrudgingly and without omission or lack, but
it is not a contemplated production or an act which involves any
alternatives. Eternity is not quite properly applicable to the One,

PLOTINUS AND THE PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS 33

except insofar as it is different from the temporal in being its source.
Nor is infinity characteristic of the One, since that involves multi-
plicity. The One is beyond both the finite and the infinite as the un-
divided source of both.

However, good does apply to the One; in fact Plotinus often
uses the Good as a synonym for the One. The Good is the One re-
garded in its relation to the Intellectual Principle which it produces.
Regarded as the source of all levels of being, the One is good and
is the opposite of all evil. Evil comes to be measured in distance from
the One, taken in its capacity as the source of all. Power certainly
is basic to such a conception of the One as the origin of all things,
although descriptions of the One itself tend to produce a feeling of
quietude and calm. Once again, what is important in the meta-
physical structure of the One is that it allows two apparently op-
posed descriptions. On the other hand, the One's perfection
certainly places it ultimately above even a dual mode of knowledge.
Knowing violates unity by being dependent upon the distinctions it
is necessary to make between thought and its object.

Like self-sufficiency, the One is cause-of -itself as opposed to cause-
in-another, although even this distinction is not wholly adequate as
applied to the One. As to being vs. non-being, it transcends both as
the source of both, which of course means that the perfection of the
One is not that of being as opposed to non-being. All of this sublety
of hierarchy and difficulty of attribution leads Plotinus to a definite
preference for the negative method of approach. Direct and positive
statements, even when balanced by negative ones, seern to require a
containment of the One within the basic structures of being, and the
stress on unity as primal in perfection makes the transcendence of
being and intellection absolutely necessary. The complexities and the
difficulties which this introduces into any description of Divine (or
supra-Divine) perfection are, and were, far reaching.

The Pseudo-Dionysius can be viewed within the Plotinian frame-
work of perfection with little modification or distortion. Perfection
as requiring transcendence of being and intellection is reflected on
every page. Dionysius asserts his preference for the negative method,

34 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

and mysticism of a disciplined sort is necessary because of the dis-
tortion of perfection which remains in even the most refined
thought, since thought cannot exist without distinctions. With an
interest in Christian categories, Dionysius leaves room for a trini-
tarian concept and an attribution of personality to his Supreme.
However, the ultimate way in which these distinctions are present
within the First Principle cannot be made precise. Plotinus, too, can
locate all within the One if it is viewed as the source of all distinc-
tions, and Dionysius locates Christian attributes in his First Principle
in much the same way.

Dionysius' treatise On the Divine Names indicates the necessity
for Christians to speak directly about God. The action of God in an
historical event and the existence of a sacred literature which speaks
casually and often of God, these make Dionysius more interested in
considering carefully the applicability of a series of names to God. As
every skilled theologian must, Dionysius totally rejects some names
as unworthy, others as partially so, and still others he finds to be even
more appropriate (i.e., undifferenced names, applicable without dis-
tinction to the whole of the Godhead). However, here symbolism
develops as an explicit method in a way that was not required by
Plotinus 3 metaphysical problems.

The result is that some names may be applied to the Divine per-
fection, but these are neither ultimate nor ultimately distinct. Rather,
such appropriate names direct us; they stand as symbols and signs
for what finally transcends both name and description. Theological
language becomes necessarily non-literal and symbolic whenever
Divine perfection is conceived primarily in terms of a unity that
demands the abrogation of distinctions. A search for appropriate
Divine names ends by taking the seeker beyond all names and dis-
tinctions. As in Plotinus, describing Divine perfection leads you not
only beyond this world but beyond intellection and direct speech.

Theology since Plotinus and Dionysius has continually faced the
problem of the transcendence of perfection beyond the confines of
both being and language. Yet both Plotinus and Dionysius are often
misunderstood and thought to be saying that nothing at all can be

PLOTINUS AND THE PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS 35

said about such a transcendent First Principle. As a matter of fact,
both devote great energy to describing their Supreme Principle.
Dionysius keeps his Super-essential Godhead somewhat closer to
usual conceptions of divinity, but our ordinary language neverthe-
less becomes both inadequate and symbolic. Plotinus' One cannot
even be called "God" in any usual sense. The normal characteristics
of a Divinity are more to be found in the lower levels, although all
levels are also in the One without distinction as in their source.

Rational discourse, Divine as it is, is now seen as involving the
imperfection of some distinction, however minor it may be. And
distinction is to be avoided because it may permit division, which
would impair Divine self-sufficiency, the most prized perfection. Be-
ing is no longer a supreme concept, nor is non-being, since the
primary consequence of this view of perfection is that the law of
identity holds only for the realms below the First. Negation, and the
creation of new terms to serve as symbols, is characteristic of this
approach. Final statements are ruled out by the ultimate inappro-
priateness of a language that is necessarily based upon distinctions.
Unity, the primary Divine perfection, has powerful transforming
and attractive qualities; but it also creates subtle and difficult prob-
lems wherever clear and accurate statement is attempted. Such
perfection certainly makes it hard to degrade a First Principle, but
it also renders precise statement necessarily improbable.

Dionysius is even forced to place his Supreme God beyond perfec-
tion, a not uncommon ending for a neo-Platonist. This, of course,
does not mean that God is imperfect but simply indicates that his
transcendence of normal categories is such that our usual concep-
tions of perfection (e.g., Aristotle's definition in terms of what is
limited and complete) are too confining. He is beyond standard
concepts of perfection and imperfection as the source of both. The
source of standards must be greater than the limits of the standards
and must go beyond their immediate confines*

3

AUGUSTINE
AND

A N S E L M

Perhaps no figure in the history of philosophy and theology is
more difficult or more important to understand than Augustine.
His writings are voluminous, but they hold to no recognized system-
atic form, neither that of brevity, consciously imposed structure,
nor complete consistency of viewpoint. It is no exaggeration to say
that Augustine began by endorsing pagan Roman philosophy and
only gradually began to remold this as he pondered over the prob-
lems of Christian doctrine. He has an affinity with the Platonic and
neo-Platonic tradition in both his early use of dialogue and the loose-
ness of his technical terms and his doctrine. Yet no figure looms so
large in influencing later theological thinking on Divine perfection.
Except perhaps in the work On the Trinity, Augustine never
treats the metaphysical problem of the perfection of Divinity in a
straightforward manner, yet it is fairly easy to see his views on per-

36

AUGUSTINE AND ANSELM 37

fection reflected with amazing consistency in all of his writing. God
is first and foremost characterized by immutability, and this central
quality of His perfection guides Augustine to many a doctrinal
decision. More akin to Plato and Aristotle on this point than to
Plotinus, Augustine views any form of change as evidence of im-
perfection, and the strength of this conviction has much to do with
his important doctrine of Divine foreknowledge and predestination.

Other than immutability, God's primary perfection seems to be
wisdom. Here we can see even more clearly that, especially in his
conception of God, Augustine did not follow Plotinus as he is often
supposed to have done. Unity is stressed as a characteristic of Di-
vinity but an ultimate trinity is allowed, and wisdom as the central
characteristic of Divine perfection indicates the essential reasonable-
ness and lack of extreme transcendence which Augustine finds in the
Divine nature. Wisdom, the supreme source of all knowledge, and
immortality reduce unity to a lesser perfection.

Perhaps in his doctrine of the soul Augustine can be seen to be
most like Plotinus, even if this similarity is not to be found in his
ultimate metaphysical structure. Augustine's psychology is detailed
and profound. As in Plotinus, an analysis of the soul often serves as
a systematic point of departure; and, in the case of both the Trinity
and time, it is within the soul that analysis discloses structures which
can serve as the basis for rendering intelligible both time and the
trinitarian nature of God. Our psychology reveals a certain distinc-
tion present within the unity of our mind (e.g., memory, intellect,
and will, operating together) , and these insights into our own nature
give us a genuine basis for understanding God.

It is no easy task to understand Augustine's attempt to assure
Divine foreknowledge of all events and actions, without either as-
serting God to be the immediate cause or impairing freedom of
action. However, as far as Divine perfection is concerned, the im-
portant point is that it is Augustine's desire to prevent any change in
God or in His knowledge which makes Augustine hold so forcefully
to the doctrine of absolute foreknowledge and also the eternality of
God. The situation is similar for the doctrine of evil. Since God

38 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

created even eternity and knows all things from eternity and is
primarily characterized by rest, evil comes to be thought of as a
lesser good, defined by its closeness or distance from the Divine
nature. All actions are immediately present to God's knowledge, so
that evil is robbed of any independent status by its immediate and
eternal presence in God and must be accounted for as a part of
what is essentially a completely good nature.

Augustine speaks little about such technical attributes of perfec-
tion as infinity, although he appears to ascribe it to God in a positive,
if not in an important, sense. God is certainly rational, determinate,
complete, and actual in His perfection, although Augustine is not
often given to arguing such questions explicitly. Rest is certainly a
primary characteristic, both religiously and metaphysically. Real
alternatives to the structure of this world do not seem either im-
portant or possible to Augustine. God's nature is mirrored fully in
this world, especially in men's minds.

The famous doctrine of time is perhaps most important here,
along with the trinitarian aspects that Augustine finds rooted in our
own psychology. Elaborating Plato's brief characterization of time
as "the moving image of eternity," Augustine finds memory and ex-
pectation (i.e., past and future) to exist only as they are held to-
gether in the present. Our time moves; God holds all parts of time
present in simultaneous and changeless vision. God, then, is actually
not extremely unlike men in His Divinely perfect nature, He es-
capes the disintegrating tendencies of time and place. He creates
time but is not Himself in time. He is a trinity as we are a trinity of
memory, understanding, and will; but He is at rest and is above us
as the creator of all things, although it is through our minds that we
may be intimately and immediately made aware of God. God does
not transcend wisdom because of His perfection ; He is wisdom par
excellence creative, immutable, and at rest.

This lack of the transcendence which perfection has often de-
manded leads Augustine to prefer the direct and simple attribution
of characteristics to God, rather than the more torturous and tenu-

AUGUSTINE AND ANSELM 39

ous via negativa. So close docs he see the analogy of God to the
human mind and soul that Augustine experiences no great difficulty
in speaking about God in a straightforward and simple manner. His
supreme wisdom. His moral perfection, and His omnipotence as
creator of the world and man make God forever different from man.
Although all words are signs or symbols for Augustine and not literal
knowledge, speaking about God poses no insurmountable difficulties
imposed by His perfection.

Anselm, like Augustine, must be read with the general Platonic
framework in mind, and much misunderstanding has resulted from
not doing so. It is true that he is a more systematic writer than
Augustine, but beneath his dialectic can be seen again a looseness of
basic structure and, what is more important, a certain detachment
and tentativeness about all of the reasonings he puts forth. As for
Augustine, so for Anselm thought about God takes the form of an
attempt to arrive at an adequate concept. Despite the popular con-
ception of his method, Anselm does not begin with a finished con-
cept. All discussion is an exercise for the mind and all statement a
testing ground for the mind, enabling it to check the adequacy of
its concepts by comparison. A non-dogmatic flavor is ever present in
Anselm, and his doctrine of God especially should be taken as a
starting point, not a conclusion, intended by him to be suggestive to
the inquiring mind.

Immutability again seems to be central in considering Divine per-
fection, and all reasoning takes the form of trying to rid the at-
tributes we assign to God of any imperfect connotations. As in
Augustine, degrees of value play an important role in increasing the
mind's knowledge of God. In fact, the whole of the discussion in
both the Monologium and the Proslogium is an effort to make the
mind rise to an apprehension of God through considering what at-
tribute is more perfect than another and what is absolutely perfect.
We begin with certain traditional notions of God's perfection and
then raise the mind above its normal field of vision by attempting to
strip God's usual attributes of any aspects which would place Him

40 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

beneath anything else. We begin with the most perfect conception
we can form and, through questioning it, improve our grasp of
what Divine perfection really means.

Perhaps the most important notion which emerges from the
changes which take place in Anselm's early and too easy formula-
tions of the ontological argument is that God is not simply the
highest being the mind can conceive but transcends conception.
Thus Anselm introduces a transcendental element into perfection
that is not so strongly present in Augustine or even present at the
beginning of his own formulation. However, Anselm introduces a
subtle distinction into his discovery that God's perfection requires an
ultimately ineffable nature by asserting that, although our terms
refer to a being beyond comprehension, the meanings of the terms
used in describing God are in themselves fully comprehensible.
Thus, God is no idea in the mind of any man, not even the idea of
the most perfect being, although our consideration of this pre-
liminary concept of perfection can lead us to form more adequate
concepts and eventually to see the necessarily limited accuracy of all
conception and naming.

Anselm's characterization of God takes the very traditional form
of listing the important names ascribed to God and then considering
the adequacy of some of them. His fundamental belief in the non-
temporality of God governs much of his qualification of the tradi-
tional attributes. God's immutability must not be jeopardized by
any predication which makes God in any way relative. Perfection
demands that God exist solely in and through Himself. All at-
tempted attribution merely serves the function of leading us to see
the independence of God from all normal structures of being. We
predicate perfections of Him, e.g., goodness, only as a means of
raising our own minds. We say this not in order to conceive of Him
as possessing that quality, or any other, but to discover Him as being
goodness itself and as bestowing that quality and all other perfec-
tions on this created world.

Although Anselm gives in fairly rapid order a traditional list of
the Divine attributes, which properly conceived constitute Divine

AUGUSTINE AND ANSELM 41

perfection, he does not discuss many of them in detail. The perfec-
tions which are to be attributed to God seem at this point in theo-
logical history to be fairly well established, and the problem is to
order and to give structure to them. Anselm does focus on God's
non-temporality, which places him well within the more traditional
conceptions of Divine perfection. Goodness is an attribute Anselm
also stresses in the Monologium, which allies him with Augustine in
seeing God's perfection as the supreme source of all the degrees and
kinds of goodness embodied in the orders of this world.

The force of Anselm's ontological argument, since it depends
upon God's absolute uniqueness as a rational object, results in God's
transcendence of normal conception and rational grasp. This is
based upon the now standard characterization of God's perfection :
infinite, non-temporal, self -existent, and possessing all power. It does
not involve the extreme transcendence of the neo-Platonic variety,
since unity, though included, is not the dominant attribute of Divine
perfection. Negative theology is not Anselm's mode of approach;
God's perfection is not so extreme as to demand it. Anselm's ap-
proach is direct and straightforward. However, after a brief en-
counter with the traditional attributes, God is found to transcend
any preliminary idea we may have formed. Anselm maintains that
if we begin by thinking of Him as highest in the known scale of
things (e.g., "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"),
further reflection on the perfection of such a being reveals Him to
be greater than any normal conception and thus beyond conception,
not merely at its limit.

If the Proslogium and Appendix make the "proof" for God's
existence depend (1) upon His transcendence of normal con-
ceptualization and (2) upon the admission of the argument's
uniqueness which is due to the special nature of the object, then the
Monologium can be seen as a "meditation" on the characteristics of
God which are such that they require a transformation of all thought
which is to be about Him. Anselm begins with the traditional valua-
tional approach, making God alone supremely good, He who is
alone good through Himself. Since all things are not embraced in a

42 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

single degree of dignity, the contrast of levels of existence leads us
to conceive of God's nature as deriving existence from itself. Thus,
"self-existent cause" and "supremely good through itself" become
the two chief characteristics of Divine perfection, and they cause
God to be set over against all other natures as radically different in
kind from them.

Creating through expressing His eternal ideas, creating by taking
absolutely nothing from any other source these are the next most
important perfections which Anselm finds in God. In any Christian
conception, God's perfection demands that His creative power be
unobstructed and be dependent upon nothing outside of Him. God
need not, as is sometimes thought, create from or depend upon
absolutely nothing; He simply depends upon nothing outside Him-
self. Such a creative source can be described as "living," which
under other circumstances might be considered a second-order per-
fection. Compositeness within the Divine nature must still be denied;
thus, after listing the Divine attributes, the problem is to demonstrate
the ultimate unity of them all. The reconciliation of the multiple
statements which must be made about God is a task which unity as
a central perfection demands of all theologians and metaphysicians.

4

AQUIN A S

AND

O C K H A M

In the writings of Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham,
and in John Duns Scotus too, definite changes begin to be revealed
in the way in which Divine perfection is conceived. In Aquinas,
such changes are contained within a traditional framework, but in
the writings of either Scotus or Ockham these changes can be seen
to have broken through to the surface and to have produced altera-
tions in the basic metaphysical principles of both of these writers.
Despite the renowned difficulties of language and thought struc-
ture that characterize the writings of Scotus and Ockham, in some re-
spects their basic positions are easier to grasp than is that of Thomas.
Taking the two Summas of Thomas as an example, we find be-
tween those covers an enormous collection of views, derived from
the famous model of the medievals' basic text, the Sentences. With-
out attempting here to analyse the complex structure and style of

43

44 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

the Summas, the real difficulty for their clear interpretation stems
from the wide variety of views which Thomas brings together in
those pages. It is a complex job to see Thomas' position clearly on
any issue, and he is often done the great disservice of oversimplifica-
tion, or what is worse of oversystematization, and this leads to
stereotyped doctrines and rigidified views. Augustine and the neo-
Platonic Pseudo-Dionysius are quoted by Thomas frequently and
at crucial points, so that any attempt to overstress Aristotle's in-
fluence is deceptive. The key to understanding Aquinas lies in the
reconciliation of the almost wild variety of sources upon which he
draws, a fascinating and baffling undertaking.

Perhaps nowhere is the contrast between Thomas and Aristotle
more clearly seen than in Aquinas' doctrine of the Divine nature. The
unmoved mover is never really discussed at length by Aristotle, and
hardly at all outside the Metaphysics or Physics, whereas God is the
center of and plays the largest part in Aquinas' thought. Aristotelian
terminology, it is true, is often used in the Summas^ but this simi-
larity can be misleading. Where God is concerned, Aquinas is much
closer to the Platonists and the neo-Platonists (mediated via Augus-
tine), the Pseudo-Dionysius and the many other followers of this
tradition whom he so often quotes.

One example is particularly illuminating in this connection: the
relation of "infinity" and "form." In the Physics especially, Aristotle
goes to great pains to deny the existence of an actual (corporeal)
infinite. Admitting that the problem will remain puzzling under any
solution, Aristotle accepts the existence of an infinite in the sense of
potentiality (e.g., the potential division ad infinitum of any cor-
poreal body) and perhaps also in uninterrupted and eternal circular
motion. However, even this limited admission of the infinite does not
remove its incompatibility with form (since form necessitates limit)
or remove its opposition to both reason and perfection. Reason
depends upon form, which requires limitation, and perfection re-
quires completion and pure actuality, the opposite of the infinite as
potential.

Aquinas deals with the problem by denying the incompatibility

AQUINAS AND OCKHAM 45

of infinity with form and removing the general question from the
context of a corporeal infinite, changing the question to one of in-
finity in the incorporeal Divine nature. Thomas agrees with Aris-
totle where the corporeal infinite is concerned, but he then goes on to
apply infinity as a perfection to God alone, having reversed Aristotle
and made the infinite compatible with form and actuality. The ac-
ceptance of infinity as a perfection within the Divine nature requires
a change in the Aristotelian metaphysics which could hardly be more
fundamental. It is true that the importance of form is maintained,
as it is not in some other conceptions of perfection, and it is also
true that the perfection of the Divine nature does not require the
transcendence of being. However, both limitation and the necessary
connection by Aristotle of infinity with incompleteness are reversed
by Thomas. It could not even have occurred to Aristotle to consider
infinity as a perfection or to raise the question in connection with
the nature of his unmoved mover; now infinity has become the very
hallmark of perfection for theologians considering the Divine nature.

It is the unforgettable legacy of neo-Platonism that causes Aquinas
to begin his systematic consideration of the Divine attributes with
the affirmation of the simplicity of God. Religiously speaking, of
course, this has its roots also in the traditional Hebrew affirmation,
"Hear, O Israel, the Lord Our God is One God"; but, technically
speaking, it is Plotinus and his kin who have impressed upon us
all the primacy of simplicity wherever ontological perfection is
concerned. This is all the more important for Thomas, since his
basically non-transcendent (i.e., not beyond being) view of God's
perfection causes him to attribute many characteristics to God, in-
cluding a trinitarian nature and the essential characteristics of
personality, so that the maintenance of simplicity is a difficult and a
pressing question.

Thomas begins his consideration of the Divine nature with a
variation on the traditional negative method, by denying of Him
whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, e.g., "it is absolutely true
that God is not a body" (Pt. 1, p3, Art. 1). Following this comes
Thomas* major item of agreement with Aristotle, the assertion of the

46 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

absolute priority of actuality (i.e., no motion, change, or unrealized
aspect) which dominates most of the theological tradition and safe-
guards the Divine self-sufficiency and omnipotence. Matter is of
course denied as applicable to God, due to its linkage with poten-
tiality; and God's existence is identical with His essence, since other-
wise He would be among those things whose existence is caused by
something outside of themselves. However, God is not to be found
in any genus. He transcends ordinary classification but He does not
transcend being itself, nor is He a subject of whom accidents may be
predicated. He rules all things without commingling with them.

Perfection is literally equated by Thomas with degree of actuality.
He follows Aristotle here, but he departs from him later to make
existence the most perfect of all things. All created perfections pre-
exist in God in a more eminent manner, since He is the world's
cause in a way in which Aristotle's unmoved mover could never be.
Thus, things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other pre-
exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity. It is quite sig-
nificant that, in making this unusual reconciliation of multiplicity
with unity, Thomas quotes Dionysius no fewer than five times. Good-
ness is equated with being, and God's immutability is deduced as a
consequence of His infinity and His pure actuality. He is eternal,
apprehending all things as simultaneously whole and without mo-
tion. God's unity consists of His indivisibility, His most jealously
guarded attribute in traditional thought.

Since one of Aristotle's primary reasons for rejecting an actual
infinite was its unknowability (since comprehension depends upon
limitation), Thomas' admission of an actual infinite in the single
case of the Divine nature poses a problem of knowledge. Since in-
finity cannot be directly comprehended, Thomas must make the
ultimate vision of God a matter of Divine grace, which is the raising
of the natural intellect to a higher mode of knowledge. God does not
transcend being, but, since He is infinite form. He transcends all
ordinary modes of knowledge. Since Aquinas agrees with Aristotle
on the necessity of limitation in natural knowledge, no natural

AQUINAS AND OCKHAM 47

knowledge of the Divine nature itself is attainable. It is possible to
see the essence of God, but not by means of natural knowledge.

In this view, faith becomes a kind of knowledge. And in the end,
Thomas seems to follow the transcendentalists and to deny that
multiplicity in the Divine nature is constitutive of His nature. Multi-
plicity is due solely to the fact that the weakness of our intellect
forces us to apprehend Him in a manifold manner. Distinctions and
multiplicity are finally seen to have only an epistemological basis
i.e., they are derived solely from the limitations of our mode of
knowledge and are not applicable to God as He is in Himself. At
the crucial moment of the apprehension of the Divine nature,
Plotinus triumphs and Aristotle fails.

The revolution which Thomas pioneered, and which led to an
eventual transformation, results from the ascriptions of an infinity
of possibles to the Divine intellect. With infinity elevated to a per-
fection, it is unthinkable to limit God's knowledge to the finite
entities of this world. Thus, there are other things in God's knowl-
edge, and also in His power, than the actual beings of this world.
Although the possibles are not nor will be, nor were in existence,
still, they are known by God and exist as possibles in the Divine
intellect. Thomas even goes so far as to say that a better world than
this was and is in God's power. However, since Thomas never gives
up the priority of actuality or the subservience of the Divine will to
both goodness and the Divine nature as a whole, no other world
than this is genuinely possible other than in conception. Contingency
in the Divine activity would be incompatible with a perfection that
is defined primarily by actuality. In the doctrine of the possibles
present in the infinity of the Divine knowledge, Aquinas has the
seeds for a revolution in the concept of perfection, though not its
accomplishment.

Aquinas allows for an actual infinite, but in God alone and only
in the infinity of form. Nevertheless, this removes the traditional
Aristotelian linkage of form and being with limitedness. This com-
patibility of form with infinity removes the usual classical objection

48 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

to infinity as indeterminate and incomplete and leaves infinity free
to become a perfection. Form implies actuality, so that any infinite,
if it is compatible with form, is subject to none of the usual objec-
tions of involvement with potentiality and motion. Although such
infinity of form allows the presence of unactualized possibles in the
Divine intellect, yet the lack of real freedom in God's choice in
creation prevents this unrealized realm from involving God in any
serious potentiality. He remains above time, since the exact plan of
actualization in the act of creation is determined from eternity.

God's goodness here plays a major role, specifying which pos-
sibles necessarily comprise the set to be actualized, and this elim-
inates any indeterminacy in God's nature or in His action. What
God has present in His intellect are universal concepts, through
which individuals are known as parts, but this mode of knowing
effectively prevents any direct involvement of the Divine nature
with the difficulties of particularity. Such a God is transcendent
only as involving infinity vs. finiteness, and, as regards his full
actuality, not as existing beyond being or knowable form. Thus, His
simplicity and unity are not for Thomas of the extreme kind of a
Dionysius or Plotinus. However, there are times, as I have indicated,
when Thomas seems to take it all back and to make all distinctions
seen in God only a reflection of the inadequacies of our mode of
knowledge rather than a sign of any real distinction present within
and constitutive of the Divine nature.

Thomas advocates the negative method, but it seems to be mainly
a method of approach which human beings find necessary, not
actually indicative of any transcendence of reason required by the
Divine nature itself. Positive and directly applicable attributes result
from the negative method, and the method proceeds by denying
predication according to an already present conception of God. In
line with such a view, it is particularly significant to note Thomas'
conclusion that the eternality of the world cannot be disproved
reasonably and that creation ex nihilo has to be held as an article of
faith. This is perfectly consistent with the general classical frame-
work within which Aquinas sets the embryonic form of a few trans-

AQUINAS AND OCKHAM 49

forming concepts. Novel elements are present, but the overall
scheme is still classically rational and eternal and necessary.

Using Ockham as an example of the more radical ontology which
arises both in his writings and in those of Duns Scotus, a new on-
tological framework begins to appear, and as a consequence Divine
perfection undergoes a major transformation. Perhaps most sig-
nificant is Ockham's explicit announcement that his aim is to rid
theology of the Greek-derived divine, immutable, and universal
forms. His famed nominalism thus must really be understood theo-
logically and, furthermore, as aimed specifically at opening up the
Divine nature to the freedom of alternative action. Ockham saw the
traditional universal ideas in the mind of God as binding God to
necessary action, both in knowing and in creating. The removal
of these universal ideas and the substitution of an absolute infinity of
possible individuals is the systematic basis for the famous dictum:
All things are possible for God, save such as involve a contradiction.

In understanding Ockham's fundamental revisions in the con-
ception of Divine perfection, it is almost more important to read his
writing and to feel the novel cast of his approach than it is to know
a few formal doctrines. There is a certain air of detachment, char-
acteristic of the logical temperament, and especially a sense of the
equal possibility of several arguments or modes of approach. Any
proposition seems entertainable here, with relative merit and weight
assigned by careful consideration. Much of his terminology, and
certainly his style of composition, evidence the classical rigor of the
logician. Some of the modern temperament is here, but, most im-
portant, there is not the modern abandonment of classical problems.
All traditional issues appear, but in a new guise.

Truth and possibility are most rigorously defined. There is scien-
tific knowledge only of what remains true regardless of the existence
or non-existence of our world, which renders all statements about
our world contingent. Possibility is limited not by the structure of
our world but merely by the demands of logic for the absence of
internal contradiction. Thus, our mind is immediately directed away
from the specifics of the structure which we happen to know toward

50 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

a logical structure of infinite extent, of which our order involves only
a small part and but a few of the rules. The possible approaches to
God are increased, but the finality of any statement is also propor-
tionally reduced. We now deal in possibles and in possible state-
ments, not in necessities and necessary conclusions.

Most important for our knowledge of the Divine nature is the
statement that we cannot have a concept of God that is both simple
and at the same time proper to God. Here it is important to re-
member that, for Ockham, we are always dealing with constructed
logical concepts about God, never with God Himself. Thus, our
position requires us to construct a concept jof God out of various
pieces, which means that the result must necessarily reflect the com-
plexity of our approach. We may most certainly reason about God
with probability, but never with certainty. It follows that we cannot
demonstrate that there is only one God, although we can give com-
plex reasons for the preferability of a single First Principle.

Ockham gives variety in philosophy a systematic basis : he main-
tains that one may safely hold different and opposite opinions re-
garding the mind of any author, if he is not the author of Holy
Scriptures. Such variety is not injurious either to God or to religion,
since a real science is not about things but about mental contents
standing for things. Our mental contents do stand for things, but as
they are not the things themselves, philosophical thought is free to
follow a variety of modes of analysis of all possible mental contents.
This detachment has its most startling result in the famous assertion
that God could cause in us the immediate intuition of a non-existent
sense object. To a world not so totally absorbed in epistemology as
ours, this is not too devastating a possibility, since it arises and is con-
sidered merely as a logical possibility, with no particular attention
at the moment to its actual likelihood in fact.

This is a view of Divine perfection which stresses its unlimited
aspect, limiting possibility only by the necessity of non-contradiction,
but keeping perfection within rational bounds by that single quali-
fication. For "being" is defined by infinite possibles, themselves
limited only by the necessity of containing no internal contradiction.

AQUINAS AND OCKHAM 51

But this restriction prevents the unlimited aspect of being from be-
coming indefinite, the quality which had previously often raised
infinity above being and beyond rationality. Being as it applies to
God is limited only by possibility, but rationality and will (as co-
ordinate Divine attributes) keep this from involving God in in-
determinateness. However, God is not fully actual, as traditional
doctrines require, in the sense that His will and power have not
actualized all of the infinite and individual possibles that His in-
tellect comprehends.

Divine perfection has been fundamentally altered, but the central
characteristic which all sought to preserve remains, i.e., self-suffi-
ciency. The existence of unrealized possibles within the Divine
nature seemed to earlier writers to involve God's nature in the in-
definite and the indeterminate and thus to jeopardize the Divine
self-sufficiency. Ockham, however, conceives possibility as unlimited
but rational, so that when possibility is linked with the Divine will
and understanding, it is able to preserve the necessary quality of the
Divine as contrasted with the human, i.e., self-sufficiency. But does
this involve the Divine nature in motion, change, and time? No,
since God's power is unrestricted (except by the prohibition of self-
contradiction), and His intellect is actually applicable to the full
range of possibles simultaneously.

What is crucial, however, is that while God is not necessarily in-
volved in motion, change, and time, His action does become free,
i.e., contingent. This both Ockham and Scotus wished to achieve,
freeing the Divine action from necessity and thus opening human
action to the same possibility that God is conceived to possess. God's
power remains infinite and His omnipotence is unquestioned, but
His action in creation is contingent on the final decision of His will,
subject only to the requirements of rationality and the limitations
imposed by the conditions necessary to constitute a creation. Criteria
of good and evil are operative here, but not in such a way as to
necessitate the actualization of only one set from among the possible
individuals. It is Duns Scotus who sees most clearly that the Divine
nature must be so conceived as to make its action in some sense

52 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

contingent before there can be any hope of finding freedom (i.e.,
contingency) in man's action.

Ockham's view retains another essential quality of Divinity:
cause-of-itself and all created things continue to locate the cause
of their existence in another being. A doctrine of creation is neces-
sary, because there is now the need for a power sufficient to actualize
the finite set of possibles which constitute our world, as contrasted
with the infinite set of possible individuals. Within the Divine nature
and compatible with its perfection non-being exists as the presence
of logically consistent but unrealized possible individuals the Divine
will and power did not attach to their primitive ancestors. And the
Divine nature, i.e., our constructed conception of it, becomes neces-
sarily complex, although unity is sustained through the unity of the
action of the Divine will and power, working under the conditions
of rational conception. Positive attribution is possible where the
Divine nature is concerned ; this view of perfection does not require
the negative approach. Essentially univocal predication may be
made concerning God, although the procedure is intricate and
highly structured.

5

MEISTER ECKHART

AND
NICOLAS CUSANUS

The recent widespread interest in Thomas Aquinas has often
served to distort the picture of the philosophical and theological
thought of his time, primarily by oversimplifying its complexity.
Certain simplified theories of historical development have also ob-
scured the fact that during the entire Middle Ages philosophical
thought continually exhibited wide variety. The mystical and the
neo-Platonic strains particularly are often underestimated as to their
strength and their continued influence. Recent thought, both in
philosophy and theology, has not been very sympathetic to the late
medieval tradition, and yet without it such a contemporary theo-
logian as Tillich and such influential philosophers as Hegel are not
understandable. It is true that one can find in Plotinus and Dio-
nysius a classical locus for all later transcendental tendencies, but in

53

54 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

Eckhart and Cusanus certain novel developments appear which
make them decisively modern.

Eckhart is clear in following traditional neo-Platonism : There are
no distinctions in God, the Divine nature is One. Although the
trinitarian doctrine is added, it is construed so as to make each
person of the trinity the same One in nature. Although such stress
upon unity and the lack of distinction is quite classical, in Eckhart's
doctrine of "disinterest" novel elements appear. Plotinus uses good
and beauty as primary ways to speak about the One, but Eckhart
puts disinterest higher than love. In retrospect, it appears that the
extreme quietude and emptiness, so often thought of in connection
with the perfection of the Plotinian One, are actually a development
of a much more modern strain of thought. "Emptiness" is not a
term Plotinus could possibly use about a fecund One, although the
One does stand above distinction and above knowing. In Eckhart
unity is made to follow from the Divine's primary quality, dis-
interest. Both love and unity are in God, but they are secondary and
follow from the higher quietude of disinterest.

In Plotinian thought the One is reached through increasing full-
ness; for Eckhart the cultivation of disinterest in the individual
alone brings God to him. The Plotinian ascent is somewhat reversed,
and we see the new humanism at work. When a mind is really freed
through disinterest, God is compelled to come. The center of atten-
tion is the human psychological state, and here one is reminded of
the writings of Kierkegaard. Disinterest is the Divine perfection; it
gives God his status as God; disinterest brings man into his closest
resemblance to God. And thus stated, disinterest as the highest
Divine perfection does not remove man by structure far from God,
since by spiritual discipline man can achieve disinterest and thus
likeness to the Divine nature. To be empty of things is to be full of
God. The Plotinian One is full of all things as their source and is no
one thing in distinction, but the idea of emptiness is foreign to
Plotinus and central for Eckhart.

Pure disinterest is empty nothingness. Such a description of God's
highest perfection has no classical counterpart. It entails a lack of

MEISTER ECKHART AND NICOLAS CUSANUS 55

action, and the soul of man is also seen to lack action at its center.
God has no ideas nor does He need any. The soul is the arena of
His activity, and His action there is without instrument. Here we
have the source of the concepts of "wilderness" and of "alienation"
from self and from multiplicity. Classical neo-Platonism, it is true,
had the soul turn away from multiplicity in seeking Divine perfec-
tion, but this always involved finding the true self, and never was
there a hint of a "wilderness" as the highest awareness of the Divine.
Eckhart, like Plotinus and Augustine before him, finds the avenue
to Divine understanding to be through a seeking and a finding of
the center and essential nature of the soul. For Eckhart, however,
perfection in God (and, in man, the finding of the Divine nature)
involves disinterest, emptiness, quietude, nothingness, wilderness,
and alienation. We have represented here a powerful and a novel
advance over neo-Platonism in conceiving Divine perfection.

If to a systematically minded philosopher Eckhart seems vague and
unconstructed, Nicolas Cusanus 5 fifteenth-century writings, though
they bear a close family resemblance to the core of Eckharfs ideas
about perfection, are developed in more technical detail. Of Learned
Ignorance is perhaps the classical expression of negative theology, a
method stressed by and associated with an extremely transcendental
concept of perfection. "Enlightened ignorance" is Nicolas' extension
of traditional negative theology, and, of course, at its roots it springs
partly from the famed "Socratic ignorance" and partly from the
biblical insistence that God may never be seen. Understanding that
we cannot, and why we cannot, realize our desire to see God means
for Cusanus acquiring an ignorance that is learned, i.e., an under-
standing of exactly why the desired goal is an impossibility. To realize
the final impossibility of knowledge this itself requires considerable
understanding as to why the Divine perfection raises God above our
grasp. To know why you cannot know God fully is in some sense to
have grasped the Divine nature. For this reason the ignorance is
"learned."

Cusanus makes unity identical with the absolute maximum, a
traditional neo-Platonic feature, but it is this unity which places

56 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION
the study of God above reason. Yet, like the Plotinian One, this ab-
solute maximum is the reconciliation of opposites and contains all at
the same time that it is one, since the normal laws of distinction do
not apply to it. This is something which cannot rationally be fully
grasped and thus our ignorance. But the more profoundly we
understand the reason for our ignorance the closer we are to truth
itself. Here one is reminded of the dialectic behind Anselm's on-
tological argument, and Cusanus uses Anselm's phrase, "that than
which nothing greater can exist." To understand why the phrase is
inadequate is to transcend the phrase and its structure. By argument
you have been brought closer to God, even if it means abandoning
the original concept of rational comprehension. "Learned igno-
rance" is unintelligible unless it is understood as a (non-Hegelian)
dialectical process acquiring knowledge, realizing the inadequacy
of formulation and rational grasp, and so on without end.

The coincidence of opposites in Cusanus 9 First Principle is evident
in his doctrine that the minimum is identified with the maximum. It
is true that in pre-Socratic thought we can find ontology which works
by the contrast of opposites, but we must wait until modern thought
before we find the assertion of the identity of these opposing con-
cepts. Plotinus places the principles of all things together without
distinction in his One, but the assertion of their identity by Cusanus
is another step. Like Plotinus, however, Cusanus finds distinctions
only on a lower ontological level, among things which are susceptible
of "more" and "less." And this leads Cusanus to a doctrine of the
realization of all possible perfections in the First or, rather, it is
this doctrine which requires that the absolute maximum be all things
and yet none of them, at once the maximum and the minimum. Thus
we see that it is not some original pious sanctity which causes
Cusanus to assert his ultimate ignorance about God, but actually a
quite clear apprehension of the Divine nature which leads him to see
the logical impossibility of making the First an item of knowledge.

No classical theory had made a strict contradiction applicable to
God. Cusanus does, because he is rationalist enough to refuse to
suspend the laws of logic. The complexity of the Divine as the ulti-

MEISTER EGKHART AND NICOLAS CUSANUS 57

mate source of all leads him to make statements which are opposed
to each other. Were he to surrender logic in the sense of discursive
thought at this point, as Plotinus tends to do, then he might not be
driven so firmly toward a doctrine of learned ignorance. Strangely
enough, it is his extreme rationalism, his refusal to surrender the dis-
tinctions necessary to reason, which forces him to place God beyond
knowledge. Cusanus says that there is no difference between these
two statements: "God is light" and "God is light at its lowest."
Thus logic is driven into silence when it apprehends God, because it
can neither surrender the distinctions necessary to its life nor rec-
oncile the opposed statements.

Our rational process is not able to reconcile contradictions, and
the fullness of all possible statements which Cusanus finds that he
must make about God, as cause of all of the natural order, leads to
an impossible combination of necessary attributes. It is precisely this
clear vision of the ultimate complexity of God which places Him
beyond our understanding, not our inability to apprehend Him.
Only one who actually apprehends God can have a full appreciation
of the difficulty in knowing Him in any definitive way. God's per-
fection, as locus of all possible perfections, is fully intelligible yet
recognized as beyond our comprehension. If Cusanus could trans-
cend discursive reason and find another mode of knowing, he might
overcome his resultant ignorance, but, unlike Plotinus and Dionysius,
he cannot.

Here we begin to find a concept of unity that makes it compatible
with variety, as the actuality of all that is possible, For Cusanus it is
the full realization, and the ontological priority, of the possibles,
which leads him to reshape the limitations of classical ontology. Non-
being is made identical with the maximum, since it is a possible
form of existence. Unity, equality, and connection are made a trinity
of concepts through which one can grasp the First. Such a unity is
the modified unity (i.e., one which contains within its definition a
relation to multiplicity) which Plato prefers in his Parmenides.
Mathematical concepts become important for understanding things
Divine; symbols, of course, become the sole possible approach to a

58 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

knowledge of God's nature. A doctrine of the nature of God such as
this is always behind a preference for symbolic knowledge, in virtue
of which symbols are not only an appropriate approach but a neces-
sity.

The Divine perfection is clearly conceived by Cusanus as the
infinite actualization of all that is simply and absolutely possible.
Absolute possibility and infinite actual existence are perfectly identi-
fied. The very scope of such a concept itself is what necessitates the
ignorance at the end of the knowing process. Even contradictions
are encompassed by God, which is another stumbling block in
reason's way. This leads naturally to a preference for negative the-
ology, where negative propositions can be true but affirmative propo-
sitions can in the nature of the case never be adequate. Our final
position is to see that such a nature exists but also to see that, pre-
cisely because of what we know about it, we cannot comprehend it,
The seeds of transformation in ontological structure, planted by the
early theological interest in infinity, have gradually produced a
change in ontological concepts until they seem to have completed a
radical transformation with Eckhart and Cusanus.

Possibility becomes absolutely central and is asserted to descend
from eternal unity, when previously it was precisely the demand for
unity as a Divine perfection which excluded possibility. Cusanus
asserts that we must begin by studying possibility, whereas Aristotle
had insisted on the absolute priority of actuality, both for ontology
and for the process of knowledge. Absolute possibility is God, a
statement which now has meaning in the light of the ontological
development but which would have shocked classical Greek thought.
The so-called "modern" period which follows will actually revert to
a more conservative and traditional ontological framework; but,
whenever the centrality of theory of knowledge is overcome, the
argument must proceed from the radical developments in ontology
wrought at the close of the Middle Ages. Although overlooked dur-
ing the "modem" period, the late Middle Ages (that era so often
spurned as sterile and rigid) itself contains the formulation of con-
temporary ontological problems.

SPINOZA

AND

LEIBNIZ

With Scotus and Ockham a new view of Divine perfection,
highly illuminating in the altered solutions it made possible to clas-
sical problems, had begun to emerge. Strangely enough, with the
divorce between philosophy and theology that soon occurred,
modern philosophers who treated theological questions reverted to
much more traditional theological views. Spinoza's philosophy is
radical in some respects, but in its view of Divine perfection it is
quite traditional, almost reactionary. Leibniz incorporates some of
the new emphasis upon the contingent and the possible, but in his
final solution he is very close to the Thomistic view of the necessary
process of selection by which the Divine nature is bound. Divine
will is rejected as an important factor by Spinoza and Leibniz, and
both Divine and human action thus become subjected to a rational
necessity.

59

60 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

Perhaps Spinoza's most crucial statement is his identification of
reality with perfection: "By reality and perfection I understand the
same thing" (Ethics, Pt. II, Def. VI). It is true that all classical
thought had associated perfection with the actual, but here a further
step is taken and perfection is identified with the actual. The result
is the elimination of any room for possible, but unrealized, entities.
All reality now becomes part of the Divine nature, embraced in
necessity and fully actualized under eternity's perspective. God's
own existence had always been conceived as necessary and purged
of potentiality, but here both God and the world are embraced by
actuality, and reality is equated with perfection. The doctrine of
infinite attributes becomes necessary (in place of possible worlds in
the Divine mind) in order not to limit the Divine nature.

God, or substance, has for Spinoza the usual primary attribute of
necessary existence, expressed as "cause-of-itself." This places sub-
stance in contrast with all particular things, the cause for each of
which must be located in another being. Not only is substance in-
finite in a particular kind (i.e., thought) , but it is absolutely infinite,
which makes extension necessarily a part of the Divine nature. This
no longer involves God in potentiality, since lack of fulfillment does
not exist in an infinite perspective, a perspective which Spinoza and
- his God can adopt, as against Aristotle who could neither conceive of
such a viewpoint nor conceive of the ontology which it makes pos-
sible. Freedom, of course, can now only mean necessity (the way of
most classical thought), since no unrealized possibles exist; and
such freedom is a goal not presently attained by any individual.
Freedom remains, but only in the sense that it means "determined
to action by itself alone," a definition which applies primarily to
God and to finite beings to the degree that, their understanding
improved, they come to view themselves as part of an absolutely
infinite substance.

There could be only one such substance, so that in this sense the
traditional perfection of unity is maintained, although it is a unity
containing absolute variety within it. Everything is ultimately under-
stood adequately only through God, which preserves God as the

SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ 61

traditional object of wisdom's quest, although understanding such a
God involves a grasp of the world's complexity at the same time.
God's actions are free, in the sense that no external force can compel
him, but there are no alternatives to our present mode of actualiza-
tion.

"Creation" is really eliminated as a concept, and Spinoza's re-
version is to something very much like the Plotinian necessary em-
anation. God could not be without His effects, since His very nature
includes them and there are no alternative sets of possibles. Con-
tingency, usually kept out of the Divine nature, is now eliminated
completely not only from God but from individual things as well.
"Will" becomes only reason's tendency to accept a true idea and
is a necessary cause. Some earlier philosophers had tried to keep con-
tingency out of the Divine nature and yet allow some measure of
freedom to man, and a few had even tried to allow God a small
amount of freedom and man a little less. Within Spinoza's thought
structure we see Scotus' maxim applied with a vengeance : if there
is no contingency in the First Cause in causing there is no con-
tingency in any second cause in acting. For in Spinoza's thought,
both God and men are equally embraced by the necessity which
perfection demands. The Divine will, to which theologians often
appeal in order to introduce contingency, Spinoza dismisses as the
refuge of ignorance.

Imperfection in man remains only in the form of inadequate ideas
and as the passive emotions which these necessarily involve. God's
perfection may still be distinguished from that of the finite, since
God's ideas are fully adequate. Considered under the aspect of
eternity, He is involved in no passive emotions. Sorrow as a passive
emotion, then, becomes the mark of the imperfect, so that the
Divine perfection is characterized by a lack of all emotion, except
the joy which accompanies God's intellectual love (i.e., through
man's comprehension in adequate ideas) of Himself.

Primary among the perfections of substance is its full actuality,
that is, its existence as the adequate cause of all things and thus its
freedom from suffering or the possession of passive emotions. In

62 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

contrast, our human minds act at times and at times suffer. The
perfection of God, or substance, frees it from such imperfection, be-
cause it is the adequate cause of every existing thing. Were there
any being or action of which God could not be said to be the im-
mediate cause, then He too would be subject to sorrow and passive
emotions, because of His inability to conceive these through His own
nature alone. Men are imperfect only in the sense of their not yet
enlightened perspective of the causal nexus. Their understanding of
their existence is merely a part of substance, in contrast to the goal
of understanding the whole.

God, of course, strives for nothing, since all possibles are in ex-
istence, or become actual when viewed under the aspect of eternity,
and He needs nothing outside of Himself to persevere in His being.
Our need of external objects keeps us subject to emotions and causes
us to call things "good" and "evil" as they help or hinder our con-
tinued mode of existence. God's perfection, being equated with what
is real, has no such needs, since nothing exists outside of substance.
The life of God, or substance, is entirely an internal affair, without
alternative, devoid of passive emotion and, since self-contained and
adequately conceived, neither good nor evil, but simply what it is.

Spinoza certainly stresses the unlimited aspect of Divine perfec-
tion, extending God's nature as he does infinitely beyond conception
in his famous doctrine of infinite attributes. We know only two of
these, thought and extension, but we do not limit God's nature by
the boundaries of our ability to think. Not only is God infinite in
kind, as, for example, in Thomas' infinity of form. Substance is
absolutely infinite, which makes absolutely every kind of being a
part of God. Here matter is taken up into the Divine nature as a
part of it, no longer the destroyer of perfection because of its poten-
tialities. The famed potentialities, usually thought to be necessarily
present in matter, may now be brought under conception, since
there is an idea paralleling every mode of extension. The Divine
nature is different in kind from our world, but only in the sense that
it includes the attributes of our known world as only two from
among an actual infinity of attributes.

SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ 63

Nothing is indefinite save as, when viewed by human passive emo-
tion, obscure understanding makes it appear so. Nothing is in-
determinate, except as our understanding does not adequately grasp
the causes which are operative. Potentiality reflects only an inade-
quate mode of comprehension, which disappears when things are
viewed under the aspect of eternity. Nothing is self-sufficient except
substance taken as a whole, which means that an essential depend-
ency of existence still characterizes all finite modes. Motion is a part
of God, but this does not imply an imperfection, since all is seen as
realized when it is viewed under eternity.

Freedom becomes only a lack of external restriction, and does not
exist in the sense of alternative routes of action. This restricts free-
dom to a property belonging only to God, or to ourselves when we
are viewed as part of God; and this equates freedom with necessity.
Time still characterizes the existence of all modes, but all entities
may also be seen under the timeless perspective of eternity, which is
man's rational and ethical goal. Plurality is without limit and is
placed within the Divine nature, but unity is preserved through the
existence of only one such substance. No ultimate chaos is to be
found, inadequacy of understanding being the only remaining
source of indeterminacy. Ultimately, nothing may elude reason's
grasp or obscure any aspect of the absolutely infinite nature of sub-
stance.

Evil and good both disappear in God, being present only as the
result of our finite need for things outside of ourselves. God's power
is perfect and fully realized, restrained from full actualization by
nothing, and ultimately identical with substance's self -understanding.
Knowledge is the supreme characteristic of substance, but finite
creatures may become Divine through sharing in this perfect causal
understanding, open to them (as it was not in most previous views)
without theoretical barriers. Substance alone is perfect as being
cause-of-itself, but it is no more transcendent that it is immanent,
although it certainly is both. Non-being has no ultimate role here,
since all being is ultimately actualized without remainder. Nothing
lacks being in so far as it is actual, and the only lack of actuality

64 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

which appears is not ultimate but merely the result of inadequate
understanding, the causes for which we can now delineate and
comprehend.

Creation merely means temporal coming into being, never a
radical origin, since God's decrees are part of His nature and are
co-eternal with Him. Distinction is certainly present within a Divine
nature that embraces the natural world as a part, but division is
prevented by the absolutely infinite reach of substance and the full
reality of all possibles. God's nature does not require that the nega-
tive approach be used, since our minds, as part of the infinite in-
tellect of God, participate in God's own understanding of Himself.

Leibniz is most popularly known for his Monadology, but it is
primarily in his Theodicy that one must look to find his view of the
Divine perfection. It is true that, as a condensation, the Monadology
contains glimpses of his doctrine, but it is chiefly in justifying the
ways of God to man in creation (the theme of theodicy) that the
nature of Divine perfection is best clarified. For God's action in
creation can neither be explained nor accounted for except by ref-
erence to the nature of His perfection. Freedom and evil are facts
which can only be interpreted by reference to the concept of God's
goodness, which is the operation of His nature as perfect. And Leib-
niz 3 task here is a modern one, since the explanation of God's choice
in creation is only a meaningful question within an ontology in
which possibles exist beyond those actualizable in this world. The
traditional limitation of possibility (to merely the potential within
the structure we find actualized) has with Leibniz been set aside
once and for all.

Like Thomas, Scotus, and Ockham, Leibniz takes the meta-
physically possible to be limited by nothing other than the law of
non-contradiction. This being the case and admitting the non-
actuality of at least part of any such an absolutely infinite set the
problem of theodicy is posed : to account for God's selection in such
a way as to make the existence of evil in the actualized world com-
patible with God's goodness. Unlike Plato's gods, who are made re-
sponsible only for the good (which is essentially the neo-Platonic

SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ 65

and Augustinian answer, too ) , God must be made to account for all
that we find actual, including what men call good and what they
call evil. When no other world but our own is possible (as for
Spinoza), the problem is less severe. When the high Middle Ages
lifts the restrictions upon the possibles in God's knowledge, then the
concept of Divine perfection becomes more difficult and also more
important.

Leibniz' answer, although posed within a modern ontological
framework, is essentially traditional and conservative. As they were
for Thomas, the alternative possibles are really possible only logi-
cally. The goodness of God and the possibles, when taken together,
are such as to permit only the actualization of our present constella-
tion. When both Thomas and Leibniz say that God might have
created a better world, they speak purely hypothetically ; actual
reference to the nature of God and His perfection requires what we
in fact find present. This is the basis for the famous doctrine of the
best of all possible worlds. Traditional ontologies knew of no possible
worlds other than ours (save perhaps a few hints to be found in the
pre-Socratics). Leibniz expands the possibles, but his conservative
view of Divine perfection leads him to the same practical outcome
that the traditionalists took for granted as their starting point.

In the preface to the Theodicy Leibniz glimpses a more novel
solution to the problem when he says that the perfections of God are
as those of our soul, for it has not usually been to the soul that the
tradition had turned for its model of Divine perfection. However,
a necessitarian view of human action (ironically enough, originally a
consequence necessitated by a different view of Divine perfection)
soon robs Leibniz' model of any potential radicalism. Predestination
rules the Monadology, which seems to be a necessity for the modern
rationalist, and God then surely cannot escape to action which is
based on a decision between genuine alternatives. To be sure, the
doctrine of the possibles has provided logical alternatives for Divine
action, but God's mode of action upon them in original creative
choice is the element which still yields the classical necessity we find
present in our world, in our actions, and also in God's.

66 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

God pre-establishes the truth (i.e., the form) of future events in
establishing their causes. Yet very early Leibniz claims to hold to a
balance between liberty and absolute necessity and to establish an
indifference in freedom. However, the fine print in the contract
must be read here before one hails this document as a metaphysical
basis for human liberty, such as might be found in Scotus and Ock-
ham. For the freedom Leibniz provides consists in establishing the
existence of a realm of logically non-contradictory possibles, which
stand in contrast to the actuality of our world; but it does not con-
sist in alternatives which are still allowable even from the standards
which God's perfection demands as a basis for His choice. Pre-
established harmony governs our actual world, just as it governs
God's original act in creation. Leibniz rejects Spinoza's "geomet-
rical" necessity as a perfection governing God; but he substitutes
a logical possibility of alternatives, which, when coupled with the
necessary criteria, combine to make it necessary that a certain set
of possibles be selected.

The principle of "universal harmony" is perhaps most important
in Leibniz' conception of perfection, for it is a harmony that ex-
cludes the actualization of any possibles which are not cornpossible,
i.e., capable of simultaneous existence without logical and also,
apparently, actual contradiction. Of course, this requires "intelli-
gence" as a primary perfection in God as the First Principle, since
reasoning among possibles is required for creation in a way it never
was in neo-Platonism. "Will" is also a primary and irreducible per-
fection, since actualization means the attachment of power, through
an act of will, to some possibles and not to others. "Infinity," of
course, is a perfection and, as for all moderns, troubles Leibniz not in
the least. It is possible for him to understand and deal with infinity
in a way which would have startled Aristotle.

Goodness as a perfection requires that God choose the best set
from among the possibles, and God would be imperfect, i.e., correct-
able by man, if it were not so. Why, then, is there physical and
metaphysical evil? Although there is an infinity of possible worlds,
Leibniz answers, all of them contain some evil, so God has not the

SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ 67

choice of avoiding evU by actualizing another conceivable world.
And His will is determined by goodness, so that God actualizes
according to the proportion of good contained (this being de-
termined by a fixed, single scale), a world without evil being impos-
sible. But God cannot create another God; therefore all creatures
contain limitations and possess only certain degrees of perfection.
Here Leibniz distinguishes certainty from necessity and introduces
the doctrine of the "inclination" of the will. The course of the will
is certain, being inclined by the nature of the possibles, but it is not
necessary since other possibles than those He is certain to actualize
are logically real.

Contingency enters into this scheme only in the sense that alterna-
tive courses of action are logically consistent and conceivable, but
there is a sufficient reason for every actualization that makes its
route and result certain. Prevailing indination always triumphs;
contingency remains real because the existence of logically real
possibles eliminates the absolute necessity involved in allowing onto-
logical existence to nothing other than our world and its potentiali-
ties. Even the imperfections in the universe which God actually
constituted do not imply that it is not better than every other pos-
sible universe. The best of the possibles have been actualized, God
acting as a perfect cause. Some evil is present in any possible uni-
verse; and some imperfection of parts may be required for a greater
perfection of the whole, our limited perspectives obstructing our
comprehending this at times.

Imperfection comes from necessary limitations, which means that
no creation can be accomplished without imperfection. Yet, what
we have is the greatest variety possible within the simplest basic
plan. Greater variety would bring certain advantages but reduce the
advantage of simplicity. Thus God's perfection acting in creation
struck a compromise here, and our resulting world is the best
possible, considering the balancing of criteria which was and is
necessary. Taken in part, our world might be better; but when all
the criteria are taken as a whole, we see the goodness of the possibles
inclining the Divine will toward the particular action which He in

6S SEVEN TYPES OF DIVIDE PERFECTION

fact took, although not as if other unrealized possibles were not very
much in His view.

This blend in Leibniz of the traditional necessity in perfection
with the expansion of the field of possibles to an absolute infinity is
curious indeed. His ontological framework is radically altered, but
the classical limitation of God to one course of action remains.
Thomas put a traditional stress on necessity but allowed an ontolo-
gical expansion of the possibles in the Divine nature. Leibniz, like
a true modern, begins with the possibles ( anything being conceivable
and therefore possible that does not involve a contradiction ) , but he
nonetheless views God's perfection as requiring necessary selection
and predestination. Infinity is surely a ruling concept in perfection,
as against the early tradition, and God's nature is not fully actual
but contains more possibles than could ever be realizable. The denial
of full actuality does not demean God's perfection, as it might have
traditionally, since His choice in actualization remains ultimately a
necessary one.

Motion is thus eliminated, which might have been introduced into
the Divine nature by a doctrine of the possibles. Freedom is present
as the existence of logical alternatives, although necessity still gov-
erns choice. Plurality must have a higher status in such a concept of
perfection, although never the plurality of choice, since this remains
singular. Evil is placed among the possibles in the Divine nature, a
modern innovation; but the necessary criteria which govern choice
and the maximization of compatible goods removes any possible
reproach from God. (Job misunderstands the lack of choice really
open to Divine action and God's necessity to compromise in any
creation.) God is infinitely powerful, but His power is exercised only
under necessary guidance. What is compossible we have. More than
that neither God can do nor man can ask of action so rationally
restricted.

7

KANT

AND

HEGEL

Nearly every major form of contemporary philosophical the-
ology can either directly or indirectly trace at least one part of its
ancestry to Kant or Hegel. Kant's fatherhood belongs to those who
abstain from metaphysical construction in theology and to those
who begin their constructive work either with a theory of knowledge
or with an epistemological prolegomenon designed to apologize for
its possibility. For symbolic convenience, even those who trace their
origins to Hume can be counted under the negative and empirical
side of Kant's critical method. Although it may have lacked philo-
sophical assistance in its constructive efforts, theology has not lacked
attention since the time of Hume and Kant, Perhaps most charac-
teristic of this epoch has been the continued effort expended on the
preliminaries of philosophical theology. The old question has been

69

70 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

posed in new ways, i.e., whether the construction of a doctrine of
the Divine nature is possible.

"Kantians of the first Critique" (i.e., those who stress the primacy
of that volume) are closely akin to Hume's empirically-minded
heirs in insisting on the priority of, if not the exclusive preoccupation
with, epistemological and logical questions. Thus, a great deal of
theology has become a uniquely modern form of apologetics and
finds it difficult if not impossible to return to the speculative and
constructive task. Much theology of the past hundred years has
found itself unable to escape from Kant's paralyzing methodological
criticism, and this accounts for the comparative scarcity of genuinely
creative and constructive theologies (other than those carrying to
completion the fruitful suggestions of the nineteenth century) . Here
the theological and metaphysical apologists are mirror images of
their empirical critics, wishing to come to different conclusions but
asking essentially the same questions. Perhaps nothing has been
more healthy and at the same time more stultifying in its effect
upon constructive effort than the empirical critique launched by
Hume, supported by one side of Kant and continued in the present
age by several schools.

"Kantians of the second Critique'' have largely been responsible
for the ethical basis which some recent theology has adopted, as well
as the predominant value orientation characteristic of much current
philosophical thought. If epistemological questions have paralyzed
direct discussions of the Divine nature, this line of thought argues,
then perhaps theology can be constructed upon and oriented by a
primarily ethical basis. Undoubtedly Kant is here influenced by the
Reformation, which once again stressed the ethical side of Chris-
tianity as opposed to its philosophical and speculative side. But
whatever its origins, the group who follow Kant here have found it
possible to construct theologies within an ethical framework, even
when they continued to feel skeptical about the possibility of any
direct knowledge of the Divine nature. Since Kant published the
second Critique, much theology has become simply a general ethical
theory, but its major problem has been, and still is, to escape the

KANT AND HEGEL 71

domination of mere local custom and provincial ethical standards.

"Kantians of the third Critique" are a much rarer species. Even
dedicated Kantians admit that the third Critique is Kant's most
difficult writing to interpret, and yet it is here that the connection
is to be made with Hegel, and it is here that the speculative side of
Kant appears. The third Critique contains some suggestion of the
possibility of transcending the forms and categories which limit our
mode of knowledge. More important, it is here that the possibility
appears for some direct knowledge of the self as a noumenal entity.
Previously Kant had allowed metaphysics to be actual merely as a
natural disposition of reason, not as a constructed doctrine, and God
was to be known only indirectly through the requirements of the
ethical life. But with the third Critique as a basis, it seems possible
to find a ground for direct statement about the Divine nature, but
this positive and constructive suggestion by Kant has largely come to
be identified with its Hegelian development.

The empirical side of Kant may be used to explain the discon-
tinuance of the classical questions about Divine perfection which is
characteristic of so much of the contemporary scene. And the ethical
side of Kant may be given as an explanation of the almost complete
transformation of much theological thought into theoretical and
practical ethics. Thus, when the question of Divine perfection is
raised, it stands in a more tenuous context in the present era than
it ever did in most pre-eighteenth-century discussion. There are con-
temporary constructive efforts today, most of which can be traced
to Hegel. But, if the time is ripe for a revival of speculative theo-
logical and metaphysical effort, it is to the great centuries of con-
structive work beginning with the Greeks that one must turn in
order not to be either immobilized by the Humian and Kantian
critique or prejudiced in approach and in the formulation of the
issues by the unparalleled dominance which Hegel has come to have
over constructive thought. An historical revival is necessary in order
to restore a needed balance to theological method and to free it from
the domination of modes of thought which are merely recent.

Perhaps Hegel's view of Divine perfection can best be grasped by

72 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

comparing it with Plotinus 3 doctrine. As was noted before, if Plato's
model of perfection is the level of existence given to the forms, it is
characteristic that Plotinus begins his analysis with the soul. Con-
sidering Kant's epistemological skepticism, it is interesting that the
soul is also Hegel's starting point and constant model. But Hegel is
not merely a modern day Plotinian. Plotinus, discovering a govern*
ing principle of unity within the soul's life, extracts this as the model
of perfection, leaving the soul in its full life to occupy a lower level
in the Divine hierarchy. Thus reason is transcended and is not
Plotinus' ultimate guide, Hegel, however, preserves the ideal soul
as his model of perfection and thus never arrives at pure unity or
transcends reason. Hegel always retains the distinctions of thought
as his guide.

This explains HegePs distinctive revolution in the doctrine of
Divine perfection, namely the introduction of motion as not only
compatible with but necessarily characteristic of Divinity. It must
not be overlooked that there are times when Plotinus describes the
One as if it contained movement, but the important point is that
distinction and the rationality of thought are for Plotinus necessarily
transcended in the ultimate sphere. The rationality of the pattern
of the self's development is only a starting point, not a model, for
Plotinus; for Hegel the depth of the self's existence is itself the key.
For Hegel the pattern of Divine activity can be traced and compre-
hended rationally, and motion becomes absolutely necessary to the
proper understanding of the Divine life. Inclusiveness and relations
are with Hegel made central to perfection. These can be attained or
grasped rationally, never as at rest but only through a process.

For Plotinus it is safe to say that motion is characteristic of all
that proceeds from the One but is not ultimately constitutive of the
One itself. It is otherwise with Hegel. If we need an historical
location, Hegel as well as any figure can serve as a symbol for the
elevation of motion to become a primary characteristic of Divine per-
fection. Rational development now characterizes both the perfect
and the imperfect. In fact, the development of the latter is to be
understood as the self-expression of the former, without which it

KANT AND HEGEL 73

would remain unfulfilled and thus unself-conscious and imperfect.
The Absolute has to be conceived essentially as a result, Hegel tells us
in the Phenomenology. This is as radical a change in the concept of
perfection as has ever been attempted, and the contemporary scene
is almost totally under the spell cast by this novelty.

The Absolute is to be represented as Spirit. If this is to remain its
ultimate perfection, then it will require the development of a com-
plete and fully rational system, in order for its perfection to be realized
and in order for the mind to understand it adequately. When on-
tological perfection was devoid of motion, propositions could be true
independently of one another, but coherence and system come to be
required as the criteria of truth when what is ontologically ultimate
and perfect is also necessarily in motion. Where scientific knowl-
edge was concerned, Aristotle defined substance as universal form;
now Hegel defines its essence as subject, and the self becomes the
source in which a doctrine of perfection must be found. Since no
self remains self-identical, only a system which grasps and represents
both change and opposition can express truth. Being has the charac-
ter of self, is motion.

The basis of a philosophy of organism is here propounded, and
this means that thought can be both systematic and comprehensive
only if it duplicates the organic process of motion, here seen as consti-
tutive of perfection itself. The very nature of understanding is to be
a process, and this does not, as it does for Aquinas, reflect our in-
adequate modes of knowing but rather merely reflects the nature of
Divine life. Nor is reason transcended in the quest for perfection,
since the total process may be dialectically grasped. What is rational
is the rhythm of the organic whole. Our world and selves represent
the process of the Absolute becoming "conscious of itself," so that
the processes of our world and lives become necesarily a part of the
understanding of Divine perfection. Consciousness, selfhood, and
rationality are not transcended but are exalted, since motion and
process are now compatible with perfection. In fact, Spirit is real
only as the moving process of the aspects which it possesses.

God has existence in nature as well as in spirit, which is reminis-

74 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

cent of Spinoza's view of thought and extension as the two primary
attributes of substance or God. However, Spinoza keeps one side of
God traditionally motionless. He identifies the ideal of perfection
(and thus of rationality and of the ethical life) with God as motion-
less, i.e., as viewed under the aspect of eternity. Like Spinoza, Hegel
not only includes the process of the world within the Divine life as
its necessary expression, but he makes the process essentially charac-
teristic of the Divine life and thus makes his God more centrally a
person than could ever have been true for Spinoza. In compre-
hensiveness, inclusiveness, and the ultimacy of rationality Spinoza
and Hegel are alike; however Spinoza retains the classical view of
the motionless vision of the Divine perspective while Hegel trans-
forms the Divine life itself, modeling it after the pattern of the
human self.

Like Augustine, Hegel finds God by starting from his own con-
sciousness; unlike Augustine this starting point also serves as the
primary norm for Divine perfection. The incarnation in a human self
of such a Divinity, of course, is not only easily conceivable but be-
comes almost necessary to the complete self-development of such a
God. The Divine nature is intuitively apprehended as being the same
as the human, since Hegel begins with self-consciousness as Kant
could not do. When the absolute Being exists as a concrete actual
self -consciousness, this is not an essentially difficult concept as it was
for the previous tradition ; for such a Being must come so to exist in
order to attain its highest nature. Individual self-consciousness,
taken as the starting point and the norm for perfection, now requires
of God individual and self-conscious existence for the completion
of Divine perfection. This is true of all history and is not confined to
one moment.

God is revealed, and is only real, as Spirit. Thus movement is
compatible with perfection as the necessary expression of absolute
Being as a Spirit. Not to grasp absolute Being as Spirit is to grasp
nothing. This, of course, leads to the important Hegelian notion of
the rationality, the necessity, and the perfection of opposition, of

KANT AND HEGEL 75

struggle and of progress through cancellation. This we know to be
the inmost nature of the self, to struggle with opposing tendencies
and to bring them to resolution, and this process, in its perfect ex-
pression, now becomes God's life. As otherness, and thus opposition,
are part of any conscious self, so they now become Divine attributes
and are made perfect. God's perfection consists in maintaining self-
identity in the face of the negative and its resulting opposition. Such
conflict results from uniting the abstract with the concrete, a process
which both Spinoza and Hegel insist on as necessary for Divinity,
although in different ways*

God's life as perfect must include the particular and opposed
aspects of individual existence, hence the Divine life comes to actu-
ality through process and struggle. The abstract must include the
other than itself, the concrete particular. Only a process could make
God to be God (i.e., perfect or fulfilled) under these circumstances.
Unity is maintained as a classical hallmark of perfection, since dis-
tinctions and oppositions are in the form of moments which are
overcome and included in the fully realized process. Alienation is as
much a part of the Divine nature as it is of human nature. Evil is
not opposed to the Divine nature but is a part of its necessary im-
petus to full self-consciousness. As for Spinoza, nothing can be ex-
ternal to absolute Being, which means that every aspect of individual
existence must become a moment in the realization of its own per-
fection.

Truth is not a state or a statement but a process, a rational move-
ment. The moments as much are as they are not, and this is the
character of thought and the process which is Spirit. The unity here
is to be found in the fact that distinctions and oppositions appear
merely as moments, transcended in the fully realized self -conscious-
ness. Even God must be reconciled with His own existence, which
means that He must lose abstractness and alienation through in-
carnation and death. This movement through its whole self consti-
tutes the actual reality of God, without which He could not attain
perfection. It is through action that Spirit is Spirit, so it must be

76 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

through historical action that God becomes God. When one reads
Hegel he comes to realize the truth of the maxim: There is nothing
new under the sun since the time of Hegel.

God can only come to know Himself through process, which is
accomplished as actual history. And this brings out another side of
Hegelian ontology which has perhaps dominated theology even
more thoroughly than his metaphysical conception of perfection as
process (a basic idea which all later process and organismic meta-
physicians merely borrow as a theme and elaborate upon) . For it is
in Hegel that we must find the primary force that has driven part of
philosophy and most of theology into historical and cultural analysis.
This is a perfectly obvious consequence of Hegel's view of the nature
of the Divine existence. If God becomes perfect (i.e., complete) and
self-conscious only through the unfolding of historical and natural
phenomena, then it is logical to turn to history, to sociology, to psy-
chology, to the arts and to literature and to expect to find unfolded
there profound theological insight.

When God's life was more detached from the actions of nature
and of men, the theological and metaphysical task was in a real
sense much easier. Would it be an exaggeration to pin a century of
fantastic effort expended in historical and cultural analysis onto an
idea of Hegel? Surely it would be impossible to account for the
quantity of historical research and the intensity of the sociological
and cultural inquiry if men did not hope to gain from it some pro-
found understanding of ultimate reality, and this is possible only on
Hegel's basic view of the nature of, and the approach which we
must make to, God. It is Hegel and his descendants, then, who must
be held responsible for the prominence of history and culture in
recent theology, since neither Hume nor Kant nor the previous
tradition provides any optimistic ground for such an interest. If
process is not ultimately characteristic of the Divine nature and
compatible with His perfection, then no study of process could hope
to yield first principles for our understanding of God or man or the
natural order.

Kant and Hume gave philosophical theology its methodological

KANT AND HEGEL 77

and its epistemologically absorbing concern, and Kant provided the
possibility of a metaphysically agnostic theology based upon the
ethical life. Hegel gave philosophy and theology good reason to be
interested in the process of history as revelatory, and theology built
on cultural and psychological analyses became a reality. Without the
critical empiricism of Kant or Hegel's revised concept of Divine per-
fection, little of this revolution would have been possible. In con-
trast to the preceding twenty or twenty-five centuries, most theology
and metaphysics since Kant and Hegel has been a variation on one
or more of the basic themes which they formulated.

If Kant at least in the side which he shares with Hume can
be held responsible for the abandonment of the traditional meta-
physical questions in theology, it is Hegel who has fixed the concepts
which are now basic to all subsequent constructive attempts (con-
struction being contrasted with the revival of a traditional view).
As far as infinity is concerned, few metaphysical arguments could
appear to be so well settled at this point. Infinity now is the natural
atmosphere of all theological work, and it is not only compatible
with rationality but becomes reason's fullest and only free expres-
sion. But such infinity as characteristic of Divinity's nature and
thought is neither indefinite nor incomplete, although its completion
for Hegel involves its expression in the historical realm. At any
moment it may be indeterminate, since the oppositions and particu-
larities of human existence and consciousness are part of its life. The
process involves overcoming these aspects of indeterminacy.

Potentiality has thus become compatible with perfection, since the
actuality of Divinity is only achieved through actualizing the poten-
tialities (including some actualized through opposition and destruc-
tion) of the historical and human world. However, in keeping with
the tradition, Hegel never sacrifices the self-sufficiency of the Divine
life. Its development is a necessary one (another classical feature),
and it is essentially the process which determines the particulars, not
the indeterminate individual moments which guide the self -realizing
process. The process makes the particulars what they are, although
it is true that the realization of perfection is possible only through

78 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

the opposition inherent in individual moments; such conflict alone
provides the passion from which flows the energy to actualize.

Freedom, as for Spinoza, is to be found in the self-realization of
the whole of Spirit. By accepting what the process yields from its
oppositional (i.e., dialectical) progress, the individual becomes truly
himself and in that sense achieves freedom. Even if the theological
and the metaphysical element is often missing, existentialism (e.g.,
Kierkegaard) can nevertheless be viewed as essentially Hegelian in
its stress upon the necessity of, and the edification provided by, suf-
fering. This is especially evident in the existentialist interest in the
individual consciousness as the key to understanding our situation.
All that is missing in existentialism is the transformation of this view
of individual life into a rational and comprehensive doctrine of the
expression and the development of Divine self-consciousness.

Unity is maintained by Hegel as a system, although plurality is
given stress as individual moments without which the comprehensive
development would have no material or life force. Chaos, as in
most classical views, is banished and form made compatible (as
in Aquinas) with infinity and now (in Hegel) also with process.
Power is most certainly central to perfection in such a concept as
Hegel's, and one finds a strange affinity here to that important but
undeveloped passage in Plato's Statesman where power is identified
with being. Since rationality always characterizes such a compre-
hensive and partially destructive process, knowledge remains a
primary perfection of the Divine. Here motion does not deny the
possibility of a rigorous science, as it would for Aristotle, but instead
completes it. Being and non-being are equally ultimate and both are
compatible with perfection, since these basic opposites provide the
very source of opposition, and thus also of power and motion.

Transcendence characterizes Divine perfection, but only the tran-
scendence of any particular view, person, or historical moment,
never the transcendence of reason as incapable of comprehending
the dialectics of the total process. Surely the Divine is also perfectly
immanent in the world, since its self-consciousness and thus its per-
fection can only be achieved through individual consciousness and

KANT AND HEGEL 79

the unfolding of historical process. Simplicity, however, must be
excluded by Hegel as a classical characteristic of perfection, since
process requires inclusiveness and the most comprehensive becomes,
as it does for Spinoza, the most real. The union of the most abstract
with the greatest (even if conflicting) concrete detail is now the
essence of perfection. However, although this certainly requires dis-
tinction within the Divine nature, division (as in all classical treat-
ment) is ruled out, due to the power and the absolute control which
the Divine exercises over its own development.

Interestingly enough, both positive and negative attribution be-
come equally necessary for such a view, whereas most classical
theories used either positive attribution or negative predication only
as a means to, or in place of, a finally positive characterization. And
the world must have come into being, i.e., be subject to creation and
not be eternal, since the eternality of any framework without de-
velopment is inconceivable. Perhaps Hegel, not Darwin, is really
responsible for the grip which evolutionary thought has upon the
contemporary mind. Furthermore, the Divine life involves the
actualization of entities not all compossible, since from such opposi-
tion comes the very power of its actualization. What is good, there-
fore, must be plural, and the conflict of standards of value is,
consequently, both ultimate and necessary for perfection.

When it comes to language, it is obvious that Hegel sides with
univocation (as contrasted with equivocation or the method of
analogy). Since the Divine life is essentially so like the human per-
sonality, human terms and concepts will obviously be highly ap-
propriate. Since it is through self-consciousness that God becomes
known, there will be no inappropriateness in the use of essentially
psychological categories to characterize Divinity. The attributes of
personality are not excluded from perfection as incompatible but
are taken as the very key to its understanding. The same essential
process which governs our individual consciousness, opposition, con-
flict, and even destruction, is the same process (expanded to include
nature, logic, and science) through which God's perfection becomes
actualized, i.e., comes to full self-consciousness.

80 SEVEN TYPES OF DIVINE PERFECTION

Hegel knew, of course, that prosaic and sordid human history
did not express the Divine life, and he saw this with a clarity which
those influenced by him have often forgotten. Insight comes only
from history, idealized (i.e., philosophically transformed) cultural
and human self-consciousness. It is not really from cultural and
historical facts that enlightenment flows, but rather from ideal
facts reconstructed by philosophical method. The self must take its
cultural and historical facts and transfigure them under reason's
guidance in order to find significance in them. Factual, historical,
and statistical inquiry into cultural phenomena will neither give in-
sights into the Divine life nor yield any basis for certainty. Objective
and factual history are as such uninteresting. But as reason begins
the ideal reconstruction and interpretation, then, through reason's
guided development, the Divinely perfect process will become visible
as realized.

PART TWO

SOME

I M PO RTAN

T

CONCEPTS

RELATED

TO

PERFECTION

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO

In a contemporary constructive effort, how shall we employ his-
torical materials and earlier theories? Is it possible to extract a
crucial point from a complicated setting and then employ it in
present discussion? What happens to a doctrine when it is lifted
out of its native setting and used for analytical and constructive pur-
poses? These are the questions which an historical-critical-speculative
and constructive attempt must face.

What, let us ask, are our alternatives? If we must first complete a
total historical source inquiry and reconstruction, that task will be
impossible for any one man to accomplish ( and perhaps impossible
in theory) in order to go on to systematic work. Yet if we abandon
historical material altogether, we risk cutting ourselves adrift,
making ourselves more vulnerable to current whims. And more im-
portant, we cannot learn from, or train ourselves by, previous specu-
lative thought unless we pick it up and use it. Metaphysics and
theology have no training ground, no pre-established standards
other than those to be found in the body of the writings of the great
speculative thinkers. We must use historical sources for contempo-
rary construction or starve for lack of theoretical food.

Furthermore, a close look at classical writers reveals an instructive
fact: none of those men were by our exacting standards historical
scholars, and yet all of them seemed to orient their own writing by
constant reference to their predecessors. Whether overtly or not,

83

84 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

most classical writers seem to be using and speaking to a variety of
their speculative forebearers. It is interesting to note how many in
the past and in the present (e.g., Plato, Aquinas, Spinoza, and
Heidegger) claim to have received their orienting direction by
reaching back and drawing on some past work. Contemporary the-
ologians and metaphysicians must assert their right to the use of
every historical source.

Even at the risk of generality, we must learn to use theories, in
addition to knowing how to analyze their detail. These two enter-
prises, of course, should be kept distinct, and the employment of a
theory should never be confused with a scholarly inquiry into its
context. But both are needed for our speculative health. If we lack
scholarship, we may distort or fundamentally misunderstand trans-
lated theories; if we do not make use of them in constructive at*
tempts, then our own speculative powers grow weak from disuse or
may be disoriented from their tradition. Neither must be lost or
allowed to engage in damaging warfare with the other.

In the first part of this essay, a brief historical summary was at-
tempted. It necessitated changing the theories in exact detail but, it
is hoped, not in essence. In Part II a more difficult transition occurs,
one which moves from historical theory toward a reconstructed
solution. Admittedly it is sometimes hard to tell when the reference
passes from someone else's theory to the author's own statement.
Such, for instance, is the case in much of Aristotle's writing, interest-
ingly enough particularly in his metaphysical writings. Metaphysics
and theology seem to grow immediately out of previous theories,
although not necessarily following any exact historical pattern.

When has a previous theory been left behind and a distinctively
new theory emerged, capable of sustaining itself under analysis and
expansion? That is the critical question which must be applied to
every contemporary reworking of a classical issue. On the surface,
the presence of historical fragments may seem confusing; actually it
may be a more honest confession of source. As ever, the novel
emerges from the familiar when the long familiar is reworked in
new lights.

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 85

Chapters VI and VII evidence this process more clearly. The
ordering and the priority given to concepts is in itself another stand-
ard measure of a man's view. Theories change as different concepts
are raised from subordinate to central positions, and the theoretical
result of this summary and reordering becomes evident in the last
two chapters. Actually, the way in which any topic is approached,
any material treated, is itself the most crucial fact about a theory or
study. In that sense, the last two chapters simply bring to conscious-
ness what the whole essay has unconsciously evidenced all along.

Most metaphysicians would fail if they had to stand on their his-
torical accuracy. And yet the life of a metaphysical or theological
theory is so tenuous that it must attach itself to previous theories or
risk oblivion. Like Plato's form of unity, metaphysics has no visible
existence except in the body of writing which actually comprises it.
Thus, the contemporary theoretician must use this accumulation
and yet pass beyond mere commentary on it.

What, we must also ask, could be in the mind of a metaphysician
when he commits a speculative sentence to print? Are we safe in
assuming that he had a single specific meaning which an exact
analysis can uncover? Does he use words as others in his time do, or
does his theoretical mind give each crucial term a unique task?
These most fundamental questions cannot be answered here, but
the answer given to them is crucial to the way in which previous
theological and metaphysical theories are used. If the metaphysician
always operates at the limit of his understanding, necessarily and for-
ever in a boundary situation, then the words he uses never lead to an
exact formulation in the mind of anyone other than himself. They
only lead on to further speculation. Metaphysical and theological
words, then, may not be entities in themselves. They simply yield in-
sight and further theories, which in turn provide additional per-
spective.

Speculative theories, whether concerning God or man, cannot be
totally modern, since neither God nor man is. Nor can such theories
stand alone or support themselves for longer than their speaker lasts,
unless they tie themselves into the body of preserved literature. Some

86 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

recent theories have been too novel and thus too rootless; others
have never passed beyond scholarly inquiry to recreative efforts. The
possibility of being simultaneously historical and contemporary, that
the second part of this essay attempts to explore. Success would mean
the beginning of a self-supporting and yet novel theoretical structure.

8

INFINITY

AND

UNITY

Perhaps in no other area of philosophy is cumulative progress
more difficult to discern than in metaphysics. In some ways this is as
it should be. Metaphysics seeks to delineate in words the basic struc-
ture encompassing nature and man, but this structure is not itself
subject to change, even if the terms in which it is described are.
Ethical conduct, for instance, as philosophical data is much better
characterized by evolution than is metaphysical structure. The
metaphysicians influenced by Hegel are perhaps the exceptions to
this rule; for them all phenomena are somehow metaphysically im-
portant. Thus we have recently been passing through an era of
metaphysical novelty in terms, in concepts (e.g., Whitehead), and
in novelty of viewpoint. Nevertheless, in historical perspective the
"lexicon" found in Aristotle's Metaphysics still serves very well as a
basic definition of both metaphysics and the terms important to it.

87

88 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

In spite of this relative stability, a metaphysician or theologian in
our day is in a position to compare and contrast the virtues and
vices, the advantages and the disadvantages, of historical meta-
physical views, and to do so with a completeness and an accuracy
perhaps hitherto unparalleled. A study of the Middle Ages leaves
one impressed with the fruitfulness of that time, and this stands in
contrast to the scarcity of the original metaphysical writings which
were available for use in that age. The Enlightenment was by nature
uninterested in the thought of preceding eras and suffered for its
provincialism, by a lack of perspective on its own views. The nine-
teenth century was profoundly interested in historical material, but
it had a peculiar way of bending every view to make it fit into its
prearranged place in a nineteenth-century architechtonic. Philos-
ophy, if not theology, having broken so radically with nineteenth-
century schemes, is left with the advantage of having recovered the
historical sources which we are now free to study on their own terms.
One advantage in our possession of such a range of historical
material, now freed from the transforming grasp of peculiarly
nineteenth-century perspectives, can be seen in the concept of infinity
as it relates to the question of the nature of Divine perfection. It is
perfectly clear that Aristotle associates infinity with the indefinite
and the indeterminate; and, as such, it is outside the grasp of knowl-
edge. For him form means limitation and completion. The infinite
or the unlimited stands opposed to both and is thus opposed to per-
fection, which requires limitation and completion. Only the poten-
tial infinite is allowed by Aristotle, but this can never be actualized,
and actuality is the very hallmark of perfection. Plato does not make
the unlimited a central concept, but he does make use of it at least
in the Philebus in asserting that all things (perhaps even the Forms
themselves) arise as a combination of the limited with the un-
limited. From even this brief history the problem is clear: If infinity
is to be compatible with perfection, then a mode of knowledge
(either in God or in men) must be found which is capable of grasp-
ing it in totality. For this to be possible, a way must be found to
reconcile infinity with form, or else to provide a mode of knowledge

INFINITY AND UNITY 89

which is not dependent upon a grasp of form. In any case, infinity
must be made fully actual and purged of its association with the in-
complete and the indeterminate.

Aquinas represents just such a process of the purification of in-
finity, for he conceives it so that it is made compatible with form,
actualized in God, and characteristic of the primary mode of Divine
knowledge. Infinity is not transcended, except perhaps, as we shall
see later, by unity. Aquinas retains the classical stress upon form as
the condition for knowledge but makes it compatible with infinity.
Such infinity may make the Divine nature impossible for us to com-
prehend, although not difficult to grasp, but the presence of form
and the possession by God of an infinite mode of knowledge keep
God's nature infinite without placing it beyond form or beyond all
knowledge, although it is beyond man's natural mode of knowledge
via form.

In an historical review of the use of "infinity," one thing quickly
becomes clear: the concept is never discussed or applied to God
simply by itself. Always the question is, "An infinity of what?" Yet
the question of infinity naturally arises in connection with the Divine
nature, since the Divine can be Divine only by being qualitatively
different from the natural order. This was not always so, as we have
seen in classical Greek thought, but most often it has been true.
Especially since the Christian era, the method has been to apply to
God in an infinite mode whatever qualities or attributes He is said
to share with limited beings (e.g., power). Of course what it is
important to note is that not all theologians agree to use terms ap-
plicable to human nature in their description of the Divine, particu-
larly those who stress the Divine transcendence. Whoever does use
terms to describe God's nature which also apply to the natural order,
then, will find the application of the term in an infinite mode a
natural tendency.

Spinoza, and perhaps Plotinus and Hegel, are the exceptions to
this rule since they also apply infinity to the natural order. In fact,
one characteristic tendency of modern thought seems to be the
common acceptance of infinity as being widely applicable and easily

90 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

handled. Descartes and Leibniz have no trouble grasping infinity,
and when this is the case it is not too hard to see infinite aspects as
present also within the natural order. Perhaps such ease in the use
of infinity accounts for the problem modern thought seems to have
of keeping God distinct from the natural world. This application of
infinity to the natural order is most obvious in Spinoza's writing.
The natural realm certainly has finite aspects, but infinity also
applies both to nature's modes and to its attributes. However, the
attributes of our known natural world are limited to two (extension
and thought), and this raises the question of an infinity in kind vs.
an absolute infinity.

This concern over the question of the possibility of an absolute
infinity (i.e., an infinity of infinite kinds) is perhaps most character-
istic of the modern temper. Aristotle considered the question of an
actual infinite only in the category of quantity. Puzzled as he was
about the necessity of admitting the infinite to be in some sense
actual, he limited the question to one category and rejected even the
consideration of the question of infinity as itself being infinite. Aris-
totle's theory of knowledge (in which knowledge is dependent upon
form and form is made the very principle of limitation) prevented
such an expansive consideration of the infinite's mode of existence.
Modern rationalism, which considers it natural and normal to deal
with infinites, raises the perfection which it applies to God above
that of infinity in kind to that of the absolutely infinite.

Even if the natural world and the men in it can be said to possess
aspects or kinds of infinity, or to be able to grasp them in knowledge,
still the absolutely infinite characterizes God alone and is grasped by
Him alone. From now on it is not simple infinity, but the kind of
infinity, which distinguishes man from God. Yet a Divine nature
characterized by such an expanded form of infinity does not trans-
cent knowledge, since each of the infinite attributes is in itself know-
able. The unity of such a nature becomes a kind of unity that is not
opposed to distinction but instead comprehends every possible
variety. Thus it is a unity due to the fact that nothing is outside its
nature, rather than through any lack of internal distinctions. Reason,

INFINITY AND UNITY 91

in expanding its grasp to an infinity of infinite kinds, has created a
new kind of unity by which it is able to keep reason, which requires
unity for its operation, ultimately applicable to every aspect of
Divinity.

Excluding for the moment, then, those who make infinity as a
Divine perfection a matter of an absolute infinity (primarily Spinoza
and Hegel) vs. an infinity of kind, the issue of infinity as a Divine
perfection really is the application of infinity to whatever primary
qualities are assigned to God (e.g., power, will, love) as a way of
contrasting them with the limited extent of the similar quality in
man. What is commonly misunderstood, however, is that this does
not at all mean that the quality applies absolutely without restric-
tions (the counterpart of the concept of an absolute infinity of
kinds) . It does mean, for example, that in the application of power
God has no external or internal limitations due to deficiencies in His
nature. One attribute of the Divine nature may limit another, but
each attribute in its own right is infinite. There are always the tradi-
tional considerations of "what God cannot do," but these do not, as
they do in man, spring originally from a state of inherent weakness.

The contrast of God as alone properly infinite becomes more
striking in a view which sees the universe, and thus time and motion,
as having had a definite beginning, and perhaps also a definite end.
For here everything in the natural order is necessarily limited by the
finite extent of time, and also by the limited life of the natural order
and of everything within it. Oddly enough, this modern perspective
has found itself more at home with actual infinities, at least in
thought, whereas the classical view of the eternality of the world
had a natural framework of infinity in extent of time but rejected it
as a perfection. Of course, this reversal of an imperfection so that it
becomes a perfection is understandable enough, since an eternal
world could never become actual, whereas the modern conception
of a beginning and an end to time and process fits perfectly into the
classical concept of completion and actuality.

The classical rejection of the unlimited, and the consequent stress
upon limitation as the vehicle of perfection, can hardly be over-

92 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

stressed, Even Plato, who uses the unlimited and who nowhere rejects
it as strongly as Aristotle does, is unequivocal in seeing limita-
tion as the source of beauty, harmony, and thus of perfection. Later
theologians meet this Platonic conservatism by asserting infinity of
extent but preserving form as a mode of limitation, thus reconciling
infinity with the classical notions of beauty and harmony as being
dependent upon some limitation. What the new stress upon the
actuality of infinity does is to remove some limitations but not all.
The doctrine of an absolute infinity vs. an infinity of one kind, carries
the metamorphosis of classical concepts a step further, but it is
really in the contrast and yet association of infinity with unity
that the radical break is made. Plato only hints at the transcendence
of being by the Good; but Plotinus, and all who treat unity as a
dominating concept in ontology, completes this revolution.

As was pointed out in discussing Plotinus and Hegel, although
Plotinus "begins" systematically with the soul, he does so only in
order to establish it as a mid-point, with greater diversity to be found
in the body and in physical nature. The soul itself points to its
contacts with realms characterized by an even greater unity. Such a
hierarchical arrangement of modes of being according to degrees of
unity is bound to end by transcending both being and thought in the
One, as the source of both unity and the degrees of it present within
being. Whenever the scheme of things is so ordered (infinity neces-
sarily involving expansiveness), form and multiplicity are bound to
fall and to be no longer characteristic of perfection at its ultimate.

Metaphysicians learned to deal with infinity, to rid it of its nega-
tive aspects, and, through infinity's association with form, to make
is compatible with knowledge in its highest mode (though not
with ordinary knowledge until the modern period). But unity as a
guiding concept requires that the transcendence of form not be
characteristic of the primal level, and thus infinity either again be-
comes disassociated from form and thus destructive to knowledge or
is left behind with form on a secondary level of the hierarchy. The
finite is to be contrasted with the infinite, but unity demands that
such contrasts be transcended until the One becomes beyond either

INFINITY AND UNITY 93

the finite or the infinite as the undivided source of both. Naturally
thought fails here, for it is dependent upon distinctions and upon
forms, and both of these are left behind in a definition of such a level
of perfection.

Here the objections of Aristotle reappear, for it becomes obvious
that scientific knowledge of such a source of being is impossible. The
suggestion is fairly clear that even the ordinary "laws of thought"
are suspended. Nothing in the One holds elements apart so that they
may be grasped by the distinctions of thought. This is the meaning
of Plotinus' description of the One as the source of all things without
being itself any one thing. The One is the source of all beings but
nothing is found in distinction from anything else, and hence no
predication at all is possible. Distinctions, even the distinction of
thought vs. its object, appear at a level lower than that which is fully
perfect, i.e., fully one. It is not the chaos of Plato's receptacle, but it
is indefiniteness of a kind. Here rationalism is lost, since the ultimate
source of being, i.e., that which explains being, in its supreme unity
must transcend that alone upon which reason can operate : distinc-
tions and the diversity of definite objects.

One interesting point to note in considering the concepts of unity
and infinity and their various applications to Divine perfection is
that they form at least one basis for discussing the problem of evil.
For instance, if, following the neo-Platonists, we use unity as the
defining characteristic of perfection, then evil comes to be associated
with multiplicity or the degree of distance from the Primal One.
Such a view makes evil a matter of fact, a necessary consequence of
the fullness of a creation that reaches to the farthest distance. This
should cause us very little objection, nor is it a fault to be attributed
to the source of being. Infinity, when associated with form, makes
evil out to be lack of form (i.e., chaos) or the limitation implied in
being finite. When, however, infinity is replaced by unity as the
determining factor in perfection, then lack of particularity and dis-
tinction characterize perfection, and evil is the separation associated
with individualization.

Even without completely analyzing evil in these terms, it is evident

94- SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

that the determination of perfection is at the same time the specifica-
tion of the nature of evil. And since what constitutes perfection can
vary, the same alternatives and flexibility characterize evil In this
sense the source of perfection must always be at the same time the
ontological, although not necessarily the immediate, source of evil.
The difficulty is not that of making the Divine creative source also
the source of evil, for a deviation and thus a fall from its full per-
fection will always be necessitated in any creation. The problem is
whether evil as such is contained within the Divine nature itself. It
need not be, except as the Divine is the source of the created order
and is the standard of perfection from which lesser beings of neces-
sity deviate in varying degrees. In any case, the determination of
Divine perfection must always be (by negation) at the same time
the determination of the standard of evil.

Perhaps the most interesting argument for the necessity of infinity
as primary in Divine perfection develops from the increasing atten-
tion given in modern thought to the variety of possible worlds as
they are contrasted with our actualized natural order. This approach
via the possibles become almost the distinctive characteristic of the
modern metaphysician. Some hint of an order of possibles can be
found in the concept of the "unlimited 33 in pre-Socratic thought, but
this is almost always placed in contrast with what is perfect. The
increasing positive attention which comes to be given to infinity as
a possible perfection begins to bring with it increased attention to
possible orders of nature. In classical thought there is little sug-
gestion of any possible ontological framework other than our own.
Medieval theologians (e.g., Aquinas) , however, in finding it difficult
to limit God's infinite thought to our order begin to postulate God's
grasp in thought of a range of uncreated orders.

It is true that it was some time before it was possible to suggest
any contingency (and thus freedom) in God's action in choosing
from among the possible orders in His act of creation. The domi-
nance of "actuality" in perfection (to be discussed below) acted as
a restraining factor. But it is the increasing expansion of infinity

INFINITY AND UNITY 95

(e.g. toward absolute infinity) that has supplied the greatest im-
petus toward giving serious consideration to "possibility" as a central
concept for perfection. The revolution is completed when possibility
finally comes to be a primary concept. Then all consideration begins
(systematically speaking) by giving attention to the unlimited scope
of possibility. This is particularly true when, as in Ockham, it is
defined solely by the limit of self-contradiction. The radical changes
which this requires in the concept of Divine perfection have their
origin in the expansiveness introduced by the acceptance of infinity
as primary.

Let us now take the terms "infinity" and "unity" and attempt a
long range historical recapitulation of their metaphysical employ-
ment in the concept of Divine perfection. Infinity came to be a
quality of perfection when it was dissociated from chaos and in-
determinacy, and this was accomplished by making it compatible
with form and, thus, with at least one mode of knowledge. Infinity
then was subject to further expansion into an absolute infinity, an
infinity of infinite kinds rather than just one mode of infinity. When
this happens the natural world almost always comes to be viewed as
merely one aspect of the Divine nature, so all-inclusive is such a
concept of infinity. Even here knowledge is not necessarily tran-
scended, since an infinite mode of knowledge is developed to parallel
the ontological expansion. However, sometimes both the infinite and
the finite are transcended in their opposition by placing what is
Divinely perfect beyond both as the source of both. However, such a
transcendence of infinity as applicable directly to Divine perfection
usually only happens when unity comes to be the determining con-
cept.

An absolute infinity has a kind of unity implied in its extent, such
that nothing is conceivable beyond it. But in serious ontologies
based upon unity as a primary concept such extreme multiplicity
cannot be either ultimate or ultimately perfect. However, when unity
receives such stress, then the earlier view of infinity tends to return,
such that the First Principle is characterized by a multiplicity which

96 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTIO\ 7

Is without definite structure or limit. As recognized classically, this
raises what is fully perfect above the rational modes of knowing
that are dependent upon form and distinction. An early rationalism
rejected infinity on the grounds of its unknowability, but the assim-
ilation of infinity with form eliminated this objection. For all ontolo-
gies which stress unity as primary in perfection, knowledge becomes
directly applicable only at a secondary level. Perfection itself, when
dominated by the concept of unity, is surrounded by a cloud of un-
knowing.

Infinities become commonplace in the late Middle Ages, and
especially for the seventeenth-century rationalists. However, under
the critical restraint of Kant, infinity once again was excluded as be-
ing disruptive of knowledge. Form and limitation again dominate,
although this applies primarily to the phenomenal world. In Kant's
noumenal realm hints of infinity return in the feeling of the sublime.
What the understanding cannot know directly, aesthetic feeling may
possibly experience indirectly. However, with Hegel infinity once
again reigns supreme, while unity and its consequent unknowability
recede into the background. The dialectical process, the develop-
ment through opposition, the expression of Spirit in the unfolding
of nature and history all these combine to bring the Divine close
to temporal multiplicity and to make it necessary for any God to be
expansive to the ultimate degree in order to encompass all of this.

What, then, shall we do with "unity" and "infinity" in construct-
ing a concept of Divine perfection? In a scheme in which possibles
are given unlimited extent, a Divine nature must be absolutely in-
finite in intellect in order actually to comprehend this vast range,
and if infinite in intellect then infinity must also apply to any nature
possessing an intellect of this scope. Such being the case, unity can
apply to Divine perfection not as its primary characteristic but as a
consequence of the completely inclusive nature of the possibles when
they are so liberally conceived. Knowledge would not be so much
transcended by such an infinity, but only restricted in its grasp, i.e.,
unable to hold all such diverse possible individual entities simul-
taneously in attention. Since such a realm of possible entities, and

INFINITY AND UNITY 97

the intellect infinitely applicable to them, would form only a part
of the Divine nature, such a God would transcend even absolute in-
finity (and thus knowledge) by possessing a nature of which an
absolute infinity of possibles would be only one aspect.

FORM

AND

TRANSCENDENCE

As should be clear from the previous discussion, the issue of
form vs. transcendence is really dependent upon a prior consider-
ation. For instance, if, as for Aristotle, what is perfect must be
(at least in principle) fully knowable, then form will always repre-
sent perfection. If infinity violates form, as it does in Aristotle's early
formulation, then infinity must be excluded as a Divine perfection,
whether or not it is allowed existence in some other manner. When
the conception of infinity can be transformed to be made compatible
with form by being made fully actual, then it can be accepted as a
characteristic of perfection. On the other hand, whenever unity is a
key ontological concept, then form will come to represent distinction
and must be transcended. In this case discursive knowledge is also
transcended, so that knowability and form no longer represent per-
fection. Now transcendence of the bonds of being, of form and

98

FORM AND TRANSCENDENCE 99

infinity, is more in keeping with perfection than is rational grasp.
Such perfection may still be knowable, but only by means of a more
immediate vision than rational discourse and only after a difficult
process designed to break the bonds which form imposes.

Intelligibility, which means primarily amenability to form, is
Aristotle's guiding concept, and this is never totally reversed where
Divine perfection is concerned. As different conceptions of intelli-
gibility are framed, Aristotle's more strict requirements are aban-
doned. It is never asserted that God is unintelligible, although His
transcendence of form, distinction, and ordinary logical grasp will
often make the Divine nature appear unknowable simply by con-
trast. Whenever Aristotle's restrictions of completion, definiteness,
and limit are set aside for Divinity, then knowledge is bound to be-
come more difficult and probably will require an indirect approach.
Although "knowledge" will become a different kind of thing from
plain discourse about the ordinary levels of being, it is never set aside
completely. Standards of intelligibility vary; and, where transcend-
ence of the limits of being is involved, these become debatable.
Differences about the knowability of a perfect Being represent not an
argument of knowability vs. unknowability but basic disagreement
over ontological structure and the nature of its ultimate source.

Exemption from motion is perhaps the most debatable characteris-
tic of perfection which both Plato and Aristotle insist upon. Form
again represents completion and thus lack of motion, but this is no
difficulty for Plato and Aristotle since they are able to trace motion
to ontological sources other than what is perfect. When, however,
there is to be only one first principle in ontology then no one can
agree completely with the classical exclusion of motion from perfec-
tion. All metaphysical thought after Plotinus accounts for being by
means of a single first principle and accepts motion into Divinity in
some sense; the question is, in what sense. Motion for Aristotle
meant change and incompleteness. Just as infinity was altered to
transform it from imperfection to perfection, so now motion is
altered in concept so that Divinity itself may be the source of motion
but still be itself unchanging and complete in nature. Motion in

100 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

Divinity gives life and power to all created by it. Motion in creatures
represents life and power also, but it is imperfect here in its involve-
ment with incompleteness and the possibility of a radical change in
nature.

When we consider Plato's use of beauty as evidence for, or as a
reflection of > the presence of perfection, then Plato's use of form and
motionlessness in defining perfection is somewhat altered. Beauty
for Plato is usually connected with the presence of form, but form
itself is subject to some transcendence as it is not for Aristotle. Al-
though it transcends the natural world, form does not transcend the
structure of either being or reason, since it is itself the very embodi-
ment of these two characteristics. However, Plato's concept of the
Good has aspects which transcend both being and reason, and the
Good is surely associated with the source of beauty. Thus, in Plato-
nism is to be found a basis for the development of a concept of Divine
perfection which transcends being, although it is probable that for
Plato the Good is simply a higher form and does not transcend form
altogether. Beauty, whenever it becomes an avenue to, or is used
as evidence for, the nature of Divine perfection, almost always in-
volves a transcendence of at least the ordinary structures of knowing.
Beauty is more akin to what is immediately grasped than that which
requires discourse and distinction, so it is not surprising that Plotinus'
second term for the One is often the Good.

An important point to note here in connection with transcend-
ence and perfection is that the Greek and Hellenistic conceptions
usually apply the same concept of perfection to both gods and men,
although the Divine always embodies perfection more fully. As ex-
treme transcendence comes to characterize perfection, Divine per-
fection tends to develop special characteristics and human nature
and the natural order have opposite, or at least quite different, char-
acteristics (e.g., infinite vs. finite). Whatever transcendent aspects
can be found in Plato and Plotinus, their First Principles each share
their characteristics with men. Later on, God comes to have a nature
and a life quite His own; His perfection now makes Him unique.
This involves transcendence of a more drastic kind and, since natural

FORM AND TRANSCENDENCE 101

categories no longer fit, problems of knowledge become more serious
to handle. Perfection, which once gods and men shared however
unequally, comes to be the very quality which separates Divinity
from man.

It is the transcendence of form, as in Dionysius and Plotinus,
which makes the use of language so difficult and the grasp of knowl-
edge so insecure. Whenever perfection means the transcendence of
the structure of being, our language (which is derived from being's
qualities) becomes faulty and at times misleading. When unity's de-
mands are so strong that the law of identity is suspended whenever
the One is characterized, our language, being dependent upon struc-
ture and distinctions, is robbed of its power to describe. As long as
form is preserved, even if it is the Platonic form which transcends
nature, language has an applicability. Whenever perfection requires
the transcendence of form, as it does for Plotinus, Dionysius, and the
mystics, language and its usefulness become a serious and primary
problem. Concepts may still lead us to perfection, but now they can
never describe its nature, except by negation and indirection. Those
who preserve form as ultimately characteristic of Divine perfection,
suffer less over language and its inadequacies, since rational dis-
course remains applicable here without fear of distortion.

Nevertheless, the primary asset of such extreme transcendence of
form is that it places Divinity beyond any question of dependence
upon any being other than itself. Such transcendence is usually ar-
rived at through the attempt to rid God of His dependence upon the
structure of being, which is necessary whenever there is a similarity
in nature between God and being in general. If both God and nature
are apprehended by the use of the same concepts, then there is
always the danger that Divinity will become subjected to those
structures and thus be as dependent upon them as are men. In this
way the transcendence of form is dependent upon, the concept of
self-sufficiency (see below), just as, in another respect, form and
transcendence are determined by the considerations of infinity and
unity. Infinity need not now cause Divine perfection to transcend
form, but unity as a primary attribute usually does. Similarly, the

102 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

desire to protect the Divine self -sufficiency often requires that form
and the structures of being both be passed beyond.

Except within the mystical tradition, metaphysics and theology
have hardly, since the time of Plotinus and Dionysius, known a view
which stresses the ultimate transcendence of form and of all ordinary
modes of knowledge. Augustine and Anselm are aware of aspects of
transcendence, but Divine perfection seems to be fully within the
limits of form and thus to pose no insuperable problems of knowl-
edge. Already Divine perfection is being moved out into categories
which will make it distinct in kind from the characteristics which
describe man, but the rational bonds which hold man and God to-
gether are, although loosened, never broken. Aquinas assimilates
infinity to form, and Ockham makes our knowledge of God less
direct and less subject to definitive formulation, but all that Ockham
speaks about is fully within the framework required for rational dis-
course.

Spinoza and Hegel, of course, represent the extreme optimism of
reason. The concept of the Divine nature is infinitely expanded by
them, but so also is man's rational grasp. These two natures may be
somewhat different, but both God and man reason essentially alike
if man's reason is properly trained. Man is as capable of simul-
taneous grasp as is God, and there is nothing beyond form and no
form to which reason does not extend. Kant's metaphysical skepti-
cism limits known form to the form of man's understanding, but at
the same time every aspect of the phenomenal world is within this
grasp. It is possible that God Himself might transcend form on
Kant's view, but it is not possible for reason to know this directly
with any assurance. With Hegel all restrictions are removed from
reason. In a classical view, reason derived knowledge from only a
limited group of objects; for Hegel reason must now encompass an
infinite variety of historical and metaphysical data and is considered
ideally suited to this arduous task.

Form, then, is transcended in Hegelian conceptions of Divine per-
fection in the sense that form is not sufficient for perfection but must
be combined with passion, with the material process of the world

FORM AND TR.VNSCENDEXCE 103

and all of its individual aspects. Just as unity transcends form in
moving perfection above the structures of being, so Hegel transcends
form by moving downward to include an infinite variety of material
and historical phenomena. However, form still remains in all cases
central to the doctrine of perfection. In some theories it is the very
epitome of perfection, both Divine and human. In others it points
the way upward beyond its own necessarily distinct existence toward
an even higher level. For still others, form must be opposed to the
historical and material particularity of the world process and perfec-
tion attained only in the dialectical process expressed and con-
summated by this opposition.

Just as form always plays a central, if somewhat varying, role in
any concept of Divine perfection, so also is there always some degree
of transcendence present. Even if the mode of perfection is the same
for men and gods, the Divine still transcends the natural realm by
embodying the characteristics of perfection more fully. When the
preservation of self-sufficiency in Divinity demands that it be placed
beyond the necessarily multiple framework of being, extreme tran-
scendence is introduced, with all its consequent problems of the
adequacy of language and the development of a unique mode of
knowing. When Divinity can only be found in the total process, as
with either Spinoza or Hegel, the transcendence of every particular
aspect of nature is implied, even though the perfection of the Divine
life does not transcend a reason of infinitely subtle power and range.

10

ACTUALITY

AND

SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The thought of Divine perfection often turns the mind to the
concept of "actuality." Nothing could be clearer in Aristotle than
his characterization of perfection primarily in terms of actuality.
That which is fully actual is form, free from matter, motion, and
change. These latter three characteristics are excluded from perfec-
tion not so much on their own grounds as on the ground that each
implies a lack of actuality. Obviously, it is primarily actuality that is
important to perfection. Matter, motion, and change may be in-
cluded in Divinity if it can be shown that they do not damage the
Divine actuality, as Aristotle held they would. Spinoza made matter
compatible with perfection by making it fully amenable to an infinite
reason. Aristotle's reason was more limited and could not assimilate
matter without damage to its ability to achieve completion.

Behind actuality (which after Aristotle meant excluding matter,

104

ACTUALITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY 105

motion, and change until someone could free them from the charge
of subversion) lies a concept even more important to perfection. I.e.,
self-sufficiency. For actuality is crucial only because it indicates a lack
of dependence upon anything outside of itself; anything not fully
actual runs the risk of standing in need of something other than
itself to complete its nature. Thus, as the concept of perfection de-
veloped, even full actuality could be taken away from perfection and
the theory might still fit the classical pattern, if only a way could be
found to protect the complete self-sufficiency of the Divine. What is
fully actual is surely self-sufficient. What is not fully actual, or what
involves matter, motion, or change, may be self-sufficient; but the
risk and the burden of proof fall upon the proposer of the innova-
tion.

Speaking of the unmoved mover, Aristotle asserts contemplation
to be the most self-sufficient activity (Metaphysics, 1074 b 34 and
Nich. Ethics, 1 178 b 21 ) . This indicates the governing power which
self-sufficiency as a concept has. Contemplation may be ascribed to
Aristotle's principle of perfection because contemplation is the best
evidence that can be given of self-sufficiency. It is also clear that
activity is not, as many believe, incompatible in this case with per-
fection, although it may be in a theory that stresses the dominance of
unity. What is fully perfect may act, but its action must be the kind
that testifies to its self-sufficiency, whereas our imperfect motions
testify so clearly to our dependent status. Not all motion is in-
compatible with perfection for Aristotle, but it must be a motion of
only a certain type, i.e., motion which seeks nothing outside of its
own nature.

Certain kinds of motion and activity are compatible with perfec-
tion, and even the Aristotelian framework could be modified to
allow matter, motion, and change as long as self-sufficiency could
be maintained. All patterns of perfection, however, are not this
generous. Plotinus forces the One to transcend all such attribution,
since the complete transcendence of normal categories is itself per-
haps the best way to insure the Divine self-sufficiency. If it tran-
scends all particular attribution, then it cannot be made dependent

106 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

upon them. This is the reason why so many later theologies make the
fundamental split in all things to be: that-which-is-the-cause-of-itself
vs. that-which-has-its-cause-in-another. The outcome of this is to
draw a radical contrast between Divinity, dependent for its existence
upon nothing outside of itself, and all of being and its particular
beings, whose primary characteristic is their need for other beings
or for other parts of the structure of being.

Here is the red unity of the whole theological and metaphysical
tradition: what distinguishes Divinity is its perfection, and funda-
mentally this means its self-sufficiency, its dependence upon nothing
other than itself for its own existence and activity. Classically this
has been conceived in terms of actuality, and usually full actuality,
but this can be and has been altered when other ways are found to
preserve the Divine self-sufficiency, whether such a nature volun-
tarily involves itself with other beings or not. If infinity did not
threaten the unmoved mover's self-sufficiency, it could be ascribed
to it as an attribute. But as Aristotle thought of infinity, it meant the
denial of actuality and thus could not even be considered as an at-
tribute of what was perfect.

When Spinoza literally identifies reality and perfection, yet an-
other solution becomes possible. All of matter, motion, and change
are now included within Divine perfection, but absolute infinity is
also here, so that the intellect is able to grasp everything qua actual-
ized. For Aristotle and Plato matter, motion, and change all stood
as an impediment to knowledge and thus could not be included in
perfection because they introduced obscurities. With a more power-
ful theory of knowledge, one which is able to encompass even an
absolute infinity, perfection may include all of reality, now that it
can be adequately understood. Such understanding for Spinoza ban-
ishes contingency, so that actuality is still a hallmark of perfection
when all of reality is viewed properly. Lack of actuality indicates
only a lack of improved understanding. All aspects of reality are
included in Divine perfection, but only when they are grasped by
an understanding strengthened to the point of grasping absolute
infinity. All aspects of reality appear, but they appear as actualized.

ACTUALITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY 107

A more difficult problem develops with the beginning of a stress
upon possible and unrealized entities within the Divine understand-
ing. When Aquinas introduces never-to-be-actualized-worlds into
God's intellect, actuality as a necessary characteristic of perfection
takes on an altered meaning. God is no longer fully actual in the
sense that every possible concept will eventually come to have exist-
ence in concrete reality. He can remain fully actual in nature quite
easily, even if the unrealized possibles in themselves remain only
possible, if His actualization of them in any other way is not really
possible. This is the solution which Leibniz and Thomas choose,
although both Spinoza and Hegel deny the unrealized actuality of
any possible entity, making God and the natural world quite close
in nature. Whenever unrealized possibles appear, actuality as a per-
fection can be preserved, but it can never be the simple actuality of
the Aristotelian scheme.

The issue, of course, hinges on the presence (or lack of it) of
contradiction within the nature of the possibles as individual enti-
ties. If, as Leibniz thought, all are not compossible, then they cannot
all be actualized as Spinoza asserted. Since Hegel's scheme re-
quires clash and opposition for its very development, the actualiza-
tion of incompatible possibles is more easily accomplished within such
a dialectical framework. However, if we begin with the very gener-
ous definition of "possible" which Ockham gives (i.e., any conceiv-
able entity is a possible if its essential definition involves no internal
self-contradiction), then the realm of possible individual entities is
so indefinitely multiplied that not even Hegel's gigantic process can
accommodate them all. Full actuality cannot easily be attributed to
a Divinity whose intellect encompasses such diversity, and the main-
tenance of some form of actuality, and also of the perfection of
self-sufficiency, now depends upon the adequacy of the account we
give of God's mode of choice for actualization from among these
ultimately incompatible possible entities.

When possible individuals are so liberally expanded that the con-
crete world obviously could not accommodate them all, then the
Qf Argument" is also somewhat changed. All arguments be-

108 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

come merely possible, and what is true with certainty can only mean
what must be the case even if our particular world should not exist.
All other truths and all other arguments are contingent, containing
at best a degree of probability, which is derived in turn from the
degree of probability possessed by the possible entities to which the
argument refers. Here actuality as a Divine perfection can only
mean the ability of the Divine to accomplish the actualization of
one basic structure of being, which He constitutes from among the
possible individual entities. Self-sufficiency can only mean God's
ability to contain all of the absolutely infinite possibles within the
Divine nature and to actualize a living and a self-sustaining natural
order from among this vast range, giving it independence from
Divinity but subject to His ultimate control.

During the entire history of theology, even when actuality has
been variously conceived, self-sufficiency has always been main-
tained as central to the very nature of Divinity's perfection and as
that which distinguishes it from all else. In this respect much non-
sense has been written about the Platonic Forms as a model of per-
fection. They do represent one type of perfection for Plato, but Plato
has no single first principle. Even a cursory reading of the Phaedrus
will show the kind of perfection which "soul" represents in Platonic
thought. As the cause of its own motion, the soul exhibits a mode of
perfection which becomes increasingly important for Plato and
which becomes central for the neo-Platonists. Both Plato and Aris-
totle distinguish various types of motion, and by no means do all types
represent defect. Interestingly enough, it is easier to see the rational
motion of soul as perfect within Platonism than it is to view such
motion as perfect in Aristotle, although probably it is to be found
in the circular or rotary motion of some of the heavenly spheres.

It is not so much a negative attitude toward motion as it is a posi-
tive attitude toward actuality which guides Aristotle, so that if the
motion were of a kind that is compatible with actuality it could be
acceptable. Motion often is an evidence of imperfection in the ob-
ject, indicating a lack or a deficiency, and such motion must be
rejected as representing an imperfect state. For Plato self-sufficiency

ACTUALITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY 109

is more important than actuality, so that the activity of soul (or at
least its ideal rational activity) is more easily acceptable as perfect,
since as found an ideal model it is not inconsistent with self-
sufficiency. The difficulty comes with later Platonism, committed to
a single First Principle, since it must find a way to combine in one
source the perfection represented by motionless form with that
represented by the actuality of a rational and self-sustaining soul.

All serious theologians have allowed at least some motion to be
compatible with perfection, although the type of motion is highly
restricted by some and made more inclusive by others, e.g., Aristotle
and Aquinas vs. Spinoza and Hegel. Anyone who constructs an on-
tology around a single First Principle must make it as least the
source of motion, even if God does not actually exhibit certain kinds
of motion Himself. If the universe is eternal, as it is for Plotinus, then
the problem is easier, for there need be no beginning creative activity.
Constant and eternal emanation of the lower orders from the higher
can present motion as continually produced by the One without
making the One itself contain internal motion. However, if once
there was nothing and creative activity brought time into existence,
some activity has to be predicated of the source of this present
structure of being.

Whatever the type of motion and whatever the intimacy of its
presence in an ontological First Principle, this involves no problem
as long as the Divine self-sufficiency is maintained. Not such unani-
mous agreement can be found concerning full actuality. To some it
seems necessary, but for these metaphysicians the First Principle is
seldom the single principle ontologically responsible for creation
(e.g., Aristotle. ) If modes of possibility are to be found in God, as the
later medievalists find them, then no harm comes to perfection as
long as this is not such as to damage the Divine self-sufficiency. The
alternative here, if self-sufficiency is destroyed, is to return to ulti-
mately plural first principles, since only a self-sufficient principle can
be the single and prior source of all being. If He is to create and to
be responsible for creative sustenance, His own ability to control and
sustain Himself cannot itself be in question.

110 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

Here again the attractions are obvious if we make Divine perfec-
tion a matter of extreme transcendence. What transcends the struc-
tures of being, what lies beyond and is not bound even by our laws
of thought, cannot itself be in jeopardy of being compromised or
subjected to the contingencies of existence. Plotinus sees the necessity
for protecting the self-sufficiency of the One by its transcendence of
all structures, and Aquinas accepts this in a modified form when he
makes God capable of affecting the world but incapable of being
affected by it. This is the traditional neo-Platonic emanation theory
in which pow r er flows only outward and downward, and the upward
reach is accomplished only by abandoning in turn each lower nature,
so that what finally touches God is only a part of God Himself. This
inability to be affected by the temporal events of the natural order is
Aquinas 5 own way of insuring the Divine self-sufficiency in the face
of the greater amount of activity and motion and involvement
Thomas must ascribe to his God.

Although all motion becomes a part of the Divine nature for both
Spinoza and Hegel, self-sufficiency is preserved through the tradi-
tional concept of actuality. That is, the total process will eventually
become, and may always be viewed as, fully actualized. Even an
extreme variety of motion does not introduce difficulties into Divinity
as long as we follow the conservative avenue of achieving self-suffi-
ciency (i.e., full actuality) . Leibniz essentially follows this alternative
too. His God moves as human souls do, but no abandonment of
traditional perfection is involved since the whole process will be fully
actualized according to pre-established harmony. The choice among
possibles and the ultimate non-actuality of some, all this is part of a
necessary process which allows for no alternatives. Plato did not give
necessity much prominence; but since the time of Aristotle, necessity
has always been a means of assuring self-sufficiency, even in the face
of a lack of the full actualization of all possibles.

When any freedom of choice or any contingency is introduced
into the Divine activity, then preserving the perfection of self-suffi-
ciency becomes a not impossible but at least a more difficult task.
Freedom lifts the bonds of necessity from the Divine activity, and

ACTUALITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY 111

necessity has always been the great preserver of self-sufficiency. Not
a few theologians (e.g., Augustine) have been induced to bind God's
action (and thus also man's) by necessity, for thereby no question is
raised about God's self-sufficiency or His ability to create unopposed
and to retain full control over His creation as well as Himself. This
accounts for the resistance found within the tradition to placing any
contingency within the Divine nature. The introduction of motion,
as has been indicated, is not a particular difficulty; but the possibility
of loss of self-sufficiency is difficult to guard against, and necessity is
always a sure guarantee and a powerful guardian.

The introduction of a range of unrealized possibles into the Divine
knowledge requires that God's basis for decision be accounted for.
Aquinas and Leibniz do this, but they simply make the criteria for
selection themselves necessary and capable of yielding only one
decision. When, however, the voluntarism of either a Scotus or an
Ockham enters, the situation is more complicated. Now genuine
alternatives must be allowed, although choice is never without a
rational ground in Divinity. In such a situation it is more difficult to
preserve the full control (and self-control) of Divinity while still
preserving genuine alternatives in His activity of selection. Actuality
and necessity, the traditional means for accomplishing this, are now
ruled out, and new ways must be found to reach the classical goal
of self-sufficiency. Without this quality, no First Principle is able
from Himself alone to account for creation or to be assured of con-
tinued or at least eventual control. There may be some today who
simply prefer not to construct a theory of the Divine nature; but, if
we do, it probably should include the more modern notions of free-
dom, while at the same time preserving the classical distinction be-
tween Divinity and humanity, i.e., His full self-sufficiency. Such an
attempt will be made when freedom is discussed.

11

POWER

AND

MOTION

Embracing perfection within the bonds of necessity is perhaps
the clearest and most obvious way to protect the Divine self-suffi-
ciency. Whenever the stress upon unrealized possibles makes such a
controlling necessity impossible, then one way of preserving the
Divine self-sufficiency (religiously expressed as "omnipotence") is
through an increased stress upon "power" as a central attribute.
Power may be a limited force as long as necessity controls (e.g.,
Aristotle), or it may receive slightly increased stress (e.g., Plato)
even without necessity's full control, if perfection resides partly in
another area (i.e., the Forms) and if power is at least sufficient to
accomplish its creative task. When power as a Divine attribute re-
ceives stress, motion seems necessarily involved in the control and in
the operation of that power. Our natural power is often not suffi-
cient to provide us with the control which we find necessary to pre-

112

POWER AND MOTION 1 13

serve ourselves. Thus the Divine power must be infinite if it is to be
thought of as perfect, particularly if the possible entities in the
Divine intellect are postulated as absolutely infinite. From the ex-
tension of possibility to an absolute infinity of possible entities, we
derive the need for a perfect power to be itself infinite if it is to be
able to exercise the requisite control

For Plato power means rational control, and this is the soul's
central characteristic. Soul always requires an involvement with
motion (in fact, it is the ultimate source of motion), but this is no
denial of perfection for a Platonist who idealizes the soul. Irrational
and chaotic motion is a violation of perfection, but Plato attributes
such motion to another source* A neo-Platonist would predicate (of
his First Principle) neither rational motion nor irrational motion nor
rest, but the One will be the unseparated source of all while yet
transcending these distinctions. When Plato later (in the Sophist,
247E) defines being as power, a new possibility is opened and
power may be treated as perfection itself, expressed in a variety of
modes with varying degrees of perfection. With a view of the iden-
tity of power and being (which Plato himself never develops),
"soul" and "form" can be reconciled, and motion need no longer be
considered necessarily characteristic only of a lower order.

Plato links power to stability of nature and to the lack of radical
change in characteristics, both of which are central to Divinity. Suffi-
cient power secures control, so that only that motion which indicates
a lack or a loss of control need be considered imperfect. In a Platonic
scheme power must be rationally directed and oriented toward the
Good in order to be perfect, but the action and consequent motion
of such a power only indicate its perfection. The patterns (i.e., the
Forms) which guide such power do not themselves change, but the
motion which is in accord with them is the very expression of perfec-
tion. Plato's possible Forms are not infinite, so his principle of power
(i.e., soul) need not be infinite in order to operate effectively. Con-
trary to much prejudice, it is actually in Platonism, and its later
development in neo-Platonisms, that the main example of motion as
perfection is to be found. Aristotle offers a more limited example, but

114 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

even he allows some types of activity and motion to be expressions of
perfection.

Development, motion, and seeking tend for Aristotle to imply the
lack of an attained end, but we must not take this as casting an
aspersion upon all motion. What we must inquire about is whether
motion indicates the presence of an imperfection, as it so often does,
or whether it represents instead the activity characteristic of Divinity.
Power cannot be power without involving motion; but, if the power
is sufficient for the accomplishment of its objective, then it can only
be a limited perspective which would consider such motion an im-
perfection. The majority of human motions do indicate lack and
need, and their success or failure is a matter of contingency. Divinity
is not restricted by its perfection from any activity it wishes to ac-
complish, but such action cannot arise from lack or need. It must
be the expression of its superabundance of power (perhaps however
only brought to expression by an excess of love) .

It is primarily from Aristotle, and not from Plato, that the at-
tribute of rest receives its stress as a perfection. Aristotle prefers rest
because he associates motion with time, change, and incompleteness.
It is these three which are the questionable qualities, and rest is an
important Divine attribute only as it stands for their opposite. No
God can be subject to time in the sense in which we are, otherwise
He could not be its creator. Change outside our control is essentially
what describes our nature, and it is primarily this which cannot be
ascribed to God. Our change is never perfectly within our control
and is always subject to a radical form, i.e., passing away. Divinity
may be subject to change, provided that its power is perfect and
yields full control and that its nature cannot pass away. Incomplete-
ness is not even incompatible with Divinity if it is the incompleteness
of any given, temporal moment. However, our lives and all of nature
are subject to ultimate cessation without completion, and a possi-
bility of this kind will always remain incompatible with perfection. It
is easy enough to deny any of the classical restrictions required by
perfection, but it is very difficult to show that such an "imperfect

POWER AND MOTION 115

God" is sufficiently able to perform the functions required of Him
(e.g., creation or salvation) .

Matter for Aristotle was incompatible with perfection, since it
represented potentiality and thus the impetus to motion. Time is also
a consequence of motion for Aristotle. Although this associates time
principally with physical nature, it does not necessarily make it in
every aspect incompatible with Divinity. If any motion were found
consistent with Divinity's nature, Aristotle would find a form of time
associated with it. His motion and form of life being different, God
as the creator of all natural motion (and thus of time) cannot be
subject to either motion or time in the same way that we are, but
Augustine's discussion of time in the Confessions is an excellent
example of the way in which a form of time may legitimately be
ascribed to God.

Plotinus can allow no motion or division to be within the One,
although it is the source of these without itself exhibiting their quali-
ties in distinction. This indicates the sense in which, whenever we
deal with a single First Principle, any aspect of the natural world
whatsoever must be ascribed to God as its source. It is a simple
enough doctrine that an effect need not exist in its cause in the same
way in which it comes to exist after gaining the independence of
coming-into-being. At least in this sense of ultimate source, every
quality or aspect of any entity within the natural order must be
traced back to God as ultimate cause. Otherwise we either do not
have a single First Principle or else it does not serve its rational ex-
planatory function, which it must be able to do if it was able to
effect and sustain creation in the beginning. This need not involve a
doctrine of predestination, nor must it remove contingent responsi-
bility from men. But it does set us the difficult task of reconciling
(with the Divine nature itself) every predicate that is possible within
the natural order, however differently such qualities may exist in a
transcendent and perfect Divinity.

Any theology which stresses infinite possible entities and a Divine
actualizing will must give a primary position to power as a perfec-
tion. "Will" is nothing but the control of power as it actualizes in

116 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

accord with one (but not the only possible; standard of value. God
becomes responsible for His choice and for the potentialities of good
and evil present within His elected structure of being, but He is not
necessarily responsible for every contingent choice of man. God's
motion in the activity of selecting at the moment of creation repre-
sents not Imperfection, but the operation of His infinite, and hence
perfect, power. Such motion internal to the Divine nature, resulting
in the constitution of a natural order outside of it, represents the
basis within Divinity for the natural sequence of time. Here the exer-
cise of power is an evidence of the basic perfection required of a
Divinity, i.e., its self-sufficiency. God's power remains fully actual
in its applicability, even if vast numbers of possible individual entities
necessarily remain as potential within His nature. His absolutely
infinite power retains ultimate control; He is perfect.

12

SIMPLICITY

AND

DIVISION

It is interesting to note that the usual formulation of the famed
"Ockham's razor" (entities must not be multiplied without neces-
sity) does not seem to appear in Ockham's writings. Rather, he
often uses a form of the traditional maxim: plurality is not to be
posited without necessity (see Reportatio II, qu. 150). The meta-
physician will immediately recognize this as simply the usual theo-
logical goal of preserving a simplicity of basic ontological structure.
Infinity was rejected by Aristotle partly on the grounds that its in-
definite multiplicity would destroy the simplicity necessary for his
theory of knowledge. As the powers of reason become expanded, the
urgency to reject infinity was reversed, since if infinity is brought
within reason's control it no longer violates either the simplicity
necessary for ontological structure or for knowledge. Plotinus is often
considered the prime advocate of simplicity in a First Principle, but

117

118 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

Ockham's use of the traditional phrase indicates how widely recog-
nized is the norm of simplicity among theologians.

Simplicity ought not to be confused with unity. Actually unity is
only one way of achieving the goal of simplicity which can be
reached through the use of other concepts (i.e., form). Simplicity,
then, is an important concept, perhaps second in importance only to
self-sufficiency, but it is a relative term. That is, ontologists have
provided for it through the use of various concepts, all the way from
Plotinus and absolute unity to Spinoza and absolute infinity. There
is no one avenue, then, which a modern ontologist needs to follow,
nor need he reject the desirability of simplicity as a primary charac-
teristic for a First Principle simply because he objects to one his-
torical way in which this has been achieved. Contemporary interest
in theology may be pursued, but the modern ontologist must either
satisfy the requirement of simplicity in his basic structure or demon-
strate that this classical requirement may be set aside without dis-
astrous consequences (e.g., paralyzing division). Simplicity as a
concept, of course, is not an end in itself; it is a primary concept
(i.e., a norm) for theologians because of the desirable consequences
of its presence in Divinity and the difficult problems which appear
in its absence.

Simplicity, therefore, is a desirable characteristic primarily be-
cause it prevents division. Some theologians allow distinctions to
remain present within the Divine nature, whereas some do not; all
theologians exclude division. If self-sufficiency has been shown to be
the chief, if not the only, basis for making a radical distinction be-
tween God and man, division also serves as a crucial and basic
means to separate the First Principle from all that follows after it.
Every created thing is capable of division. Such a capacity is helpful
in allowing us to deal with multiplicity as we must do, and it makes
possible the removal from us at times of undesirable parts. But this
beneficial characteristic is capable of being carried to extremes, until
our very nature is divided against itself, paralyzing action and often
resulting in destruction or even in the loss of our nature (e.g., schizo-
phrenia). Such a ground for division, present within the very struc-

SIMPLICITY AND DIVISION 119

ture itself, cannot be characteristic of Divinity, although nothing
could be more indicative of human nature. We can be destroyed and
can destroy because of our potentially divisible nature, and the
natural world is such that it allows this division to take place. In
Divinity the presence of simplicity makes that nature basically dif-
ferent, i.e., not subject to these faults.

What makes a God "Divine" is his immunity to the internal
grounds for destruction always present within man and nature . This
does not at all mean that Divine perfection is not the source for
every quality and characteristic found within the natural order; it
must be so, or else there cannot be a single First Principle. On the
other hand, God cannot be the source for and the creator of the
realm of nature unless He exists in some mode that gives Him cre-
ative power sufficient to this awesome task. The Divine nature pos-
sesses every natural trait, but He does so in such a way that these are
held together and their divisive or destructive powers are neutral-
ized; simplicity accomplishes this crucial task. The presence of sim-
plicity in a controlling fashion, sometimes sought for by men but
seldom achieved, makes possible the presence of an absolute infinity
of entities (some realized and some not) without the least fear of
causing a division within the Divine nature.

Simplicity also has a logical or epistemological role which re-
quires that it be made central to any description of Divinity. The
purpose of constructing a metaphysical First Principle is to explain
the multiple and perhaps conflicting phenomena which seem too
great in variety and extent to explain themselves. This is not a scien-
tific explanation, although the process is similar to that of reference
to a theory or law; but "God" does explain by serving as a point to
which all phenomena may be referred as to their source, whether
directly or indirectly. No explanation results if the phenomena and
the First Principle both exist either in the same mode or with equal
multiplicity. "Explanation" takes place when natural phenomena
come to be seen as pre-existing in a different and in a higher mode,
as in a source which itself requires no further reference. And it is the
quality of simplicity which makes the First Principle higher in mode

120 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECT I OX

of existence (i.e., Divine) and renders further tracing of causes un-
necessary. A restless intellect in search of causes can only be satisfied
and come to rest in this way. Simplicity alone explains*

The way in which simplicity is achieved (and with it a resolution
of the Intellect's restlessness) varies in each classical metaphysic, but
simplicity can always be found operating either explicitly or im-
plicitly. It is the hallmark of those thinkers whose writings have been
preserved out of the too vast store of man's written word. Their
thought has managed to embody this principle, to give simplicity to
their multiple thoughts. The distinctive characteristic of all "clas-
sical" metaphysics is that within a given constructed intellectual
framework it is possible to reduce the great multiplicity of life and/or
nature to a few (if not a single) central concepts in terms of which
much is brought into intellectual resolution, i.e., explanation. Many
important metaphysical writings are an absolute maze of sentences
and sometimes baffling concepts, but beneath this surface men have
time and again made the discovery of an essential simplicity of First
Principles and of explanation made possible by referring a great deal
to a few concepts. This quality distinguishes the writer who becomes
"classical" from his equally subtle and perhaps profound con-
temporary. The simplicity of formal style and analysis demanded by
so many moderns is but the surface and thus superficial counter-
part of this basic or underlying simplicity of First Principles which
is the mark of the clear philosophical Intellect.

At first glance Plato's preference for the principle of "mixture"
(primarily in the Philebus} might seem to go against the supposed
requirement of simplicity. Actually, what Plato's preference for
"mixture" indicates is the variety of ways in which a simplicity of
ontological principles can be maintained. Plato's basic principles are
about three in number in the Timaeus, which indicates Plato's ulti-
mate plurality of principles, but this certainly evidences some degree
of simplicity of structure at the same time. In the Philebus he will
allow no unmixed life to be the ideal, but the principles which guide
mixture (the Good, harmony, etc.) indicate that this strictly con-
trolled process (i.e., mixing the elements which we allow to enter

SIMPLICITY AND DIVISION 121

into our lives) Is itself one effective way of achieving simplicity.
Harmony guides mixture and is surely itself another form of sim-
plicity. At the end of the Philebus the Good cannot be described
by one idea but must be pursued by three. Unity is given second
place in importance for a mixture that is controlled by the Good,
which is neither indefinitely multiple nor absolutely one in concept;
but simplicity remains the goal even when harmony rather than
unity is its means.

Perhaps most characteristic of both Spinoza and Plotinus is the
ultimate duality of metaphysical viewpoint which is always present
in their writing. Within the structure constructed by both men any
aspect may be viewed in two ways (e.g., in time or under eternity;
looking toward the One or looking away from it). However, it is
also true that both men give an unquestioned preference to one
perspective over the other, although both viewpoints remain ulti-
mately possible. "Under eternity" and "toward the One" are to be
preferred because of the contrasting simplicity which they yield. The
intellect finds under the preferred perspective a reduction of multi-
plicity, a simplicity of conceptual framework and the opposite of the
tendency toward division which the second and more common per-
spective represents. The conversion of the intellect is to a new per-
spective which yields simplicity precisely because it comprehends
multiple phenomena and a variety of modes of existence in terms of
a causal source whose own structure is, if not absolutely simple, at
least less complex in structure.

Philosophers have always tended to label as "mystical 55 any view
which requires that rational discourse at any point be set aside.
However, the more responsible representatives of such a tran-
scendental tendency have always been quite clear and detailed as to
the reasons why such a "passing beyond 33 is necessary. Such writers
are quite rational and articulate in pointing out their reasons for
considering that rational discourse becomes inadequate at certain
crucial points. Plotinus sees that reason necessarily depends upon dis-
tinction, and It is not a reckless anti-rationalism which makes him go
on to place the exact nature of the One above rational discourse; it

122 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

is his desire to insure simplicity. Plotinus is a good representative of
those writers who are aware of the defects in the natural order that
flow from the possibility of division and its dependence upon the
multiplicity inherent in distinctions. Others, such men claim, repre-
sent the Divine nature as possessing all too many of the same flaws
inherent in the natural order. Simplicity is the perfection which dis-
tinguishes God from men, and Plotinus is a rigorist who sees this as
demanding the denial of even the distinctions necessary for logical
and rational structure. All structures and entities are present within
the One, but present as in a cause and under a mode of absolute
simplicity which makes rational structure not applicable at this level.
Reason is operative beginning only on a secondary level where dis-
tinctions begin to appear in sharp contrast.

On the other hand, Ockham is a thinker who never relaxes
rational structure, and the result is that for him only a complex
concept of God is possible. The best we can do is to sort out the at-
tributes we feel to be necessary to Divinity, but the concept we con-
struct can never be such as to exhibit the ultimate reconciliation of
these attributes with one another. Language depends upon clear
distinctions and so yields at best a concept still complex, whereas
perfection strives for simplicity in Divinity. Here Ockham grasps the
reason for the unsatisfactory feeling we have about even the best
descriptions of the Divine nature. The language in which these must
be stated requires a more complex structure than we feel able to
attribute to God Himself. This is the basic incongruity which all
theologians have struggled with: the commensurability of a complex
language structure with the natural order but not with the simplicity
necessary to Divine perfection.

What we can do with language we must do, since the meaning of
theology requires that we speak. For example, the "ontological argu-
ment" is a means of bringing the mind to an awareness of the prob-
lems involved in the basic inadequacy of concepts that are of
necessity based upon a complexity characteristic of the natural order.
We construct a complex concept of Divinity, achieving as much sim-
plicity of structure as possible, and then perhaps proceed via the

SIMPLICITY AND DIVISION 123

negative method to deny the appropriateness of the aspects that are
inadequate because of the complexity necessary in conceptual form.
However, such a problem becomes most extreme for those theo-
logians who stress the priority of unity as perhaps the most nearly
adequate term for Divinity. Simplicity, as has been shown, can be
achieved through less severe means, and the modern tendency has
been to find a more basic complexity in Divinity and then to find
divine attributes powerful enough to encompass this and to provide
for simplicity through control. Leibniz' discussion of the possibles
and the compossibles illustrates this more modern problem.

In any view where unity is stressed, such as Plotinus*, there cannot
be either unrealized possibles in the First Principle or possible in-
dividual entities which are not compossible. For unrealized possibles
require at least one ultimate distinction, i.e., between those which
are actualized and those which are not. Often such a situation calls
for a decision to be made by the First Principle, an activity of which
the Plotinian One is incapable. Even more serious is the presence
within one framework of possible entities which are not all corn-
possible, particularly if the criteria for selection are not absolutely
binding (as they are for Aquinas) but are such as to allow God
some alternatives. If a contemporary ontology stresses the priority
of an absolute infinity of possible individuals, then the achievement
of Divine simplicity will be more difficult, but it is also all the more
necessary. Such an ontology will remain essentially within a rational
framework (although various levels may be distinguished), because
the distinctions which rational thought needs will remain, and di-
vision within Divinity must be prevented in ways more difficult than
that of placing God beyond reason's basic distinction (i.e., the dis-
tinction of thought and its object) .

Plato prevents division and achieves simplicity through harmony
or proportion, as accomplished by the self-sustaining activity charac-
teristic of soul, all of which is guided by reference to a realm of
Forms themselves more simple and self-sustaining than the world
which embodies them. Both Plato and Aristotle represent a compro-
mise and achieve simplicity without resorting to a perfect unity

124 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

that would demand transcendence. Even more than does Plato,
Aristotle uses the limiting qualities of form as characteristic of his
unmoved mover, orienting its attention only toward its own actual-
ized thought, since the potentiality inherent in matter is the very
epitome of the possibility of division. Plotinus always stands as the
champion of an unrestrained demand for unity as the central per-
fection, with its absolute guarantee of simplicity and the impossibility
of division, but also with its necessary transcendence of direct ra-
tional grasp. It must not be overlooked that multiplicity is present
within the Plotinian One, in the sense that it contains the causes for
all intellectual and natural phenomena. But such variety is present
without the distinctions which hold entities apart from one another
and so could not possibly be a source of division (that is, until this
multiplicity becomes structured within the confines of being).

Augustine's God tends to have the simplicity of unchangeableness,
although this requires the predestination of the natural order. What
cannot change surely cannot fall prey to division, but then neither is
any alternative action open to such a God nor in any essential sense
to men. Aquinas allows alternative possible worlds to exist in the
mind of God but preserves unchangeableness and thus simplicity by
making the selection of the possibles in the act of creation a process
without alternatives even for a God. "Will" is a more important
concept for Thomas because of the presence of these unactualized
possibles, but the selection that such a will can achieve is de-
termined for it without alternative. A further guarantee of the
Divine simplicity is present in Aquinas' denial that creatures have
any real relations with God, although He stands in a relationship of
a creator to His creation. What cannot be touched from below can-
not possibly be subject to division from any outside force.

With Scotus and Ockham, however, we find more status given to
relations, particularly to mutual relations between God and man.
For Hegel relations become ultimately real and God cannot even
be God without encompassing every possible relationship. Under
such conditions simplicity is difficult to maintain, but Hegel does it
by making the development of the relations a necessary process,

SIMPLICITY AND DIVISION 125

hence incapable of being divided by the freedom of alternative routes.
Spinoza's simplicity Is similar to this, that is, the simplicity of an
absolute infinity which excludes nothing and therefore has nothing
outside of itself capable of causing any difficulty. When all can be
viewed as necessary and without alternative, then all relations and
all entities can be introduced into the Divine life (along with an
infinite reason capable of comprehending them), and still there need
be no fear of a loss of simplicity via division. This is, to be sure, not
the simplicity which strict unity provides but the simplicity of a
complex and yet fully realized system. No unrealized possibles can
remain and no alternative courses of action can be seen.

With unrealized and non-compossible possible entities, the main-
tenance of simplicity is more difficult, although a freedom of alterna-
tive structures is also more easily achieved. Leaving this issue until
the next section, it is still easy to see that simplicity is necessary to
Divine perfection (to distinguish its existence from that which de-
pends upon it) but that this simplicity may be achieved in a variety
of ways. Moreover, this variety of approaches is possible due to the
fact that it Is not so much simplicity itself as the lack of potentiality
for division (and thus change of nature) which must be prevented.
The harmony and proportion of Plato prevent division as success-
fully as the unity of Plotinus, although in some sense the latter at-
tribute achieves a greater simplicity. The introduction of possible
entities into the Divine nature presents a more difficult problem in
that other Divine characteristics must now be stressed (e.g., power
and will) . The possible entities in the Divine mind no longer them-
selves provide the insurance against division as they did in the days
when their actualization was without alternative. To free creative
action and yet to preserve Divinity's perfection (self-sufficiency),
that is the contemporary ontological problem.

13

FREEDOM

AND VOLITION:

A CONCLUSION

In The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology, R. N. Flew
traces the concept of ethical and spiritual perfection through its
history within Christian life and writing. In a much more modest
fashion, this brief essay has attempted to develop a counterpart to
the type of perfection with which Flew has so comprehensively dealt.
Although it is not entirely decisive, the ontological concept of Divine
perfection certainly has a great deal to do with the formation of any
idea of ethical and spiritual perfection. We do not all agree as to
what God's perfection is like, and our decisions about Divine perfec-
tion will affect the kind of perfection which we deem to be desirable
or attainable by man. The latter may be a consideration which
comes to our attention prior in time, but Divine perfection is cer-
tainly ontologically prior and the more important concept for us to
form. The mystical, and even the monastic, life is closely linked to a

126

FREEDOM AND VOLITION: A CONCLUSION 127

concept of Divine perfection in which transcendence is stressed. If
God did not transcend ordinary categories, the separation from life's
common ways would not be necessary and might even be mislead-
ing. The spiritual attitude toward prayer, not to mention the ethical
attitude of responsibility, are almost entirely dependent upon some
view of the Divine freedom and foreknowledge.

Any particular view of the form of the religious life, then, depends
for its sanction upon the reference to a particular concept of the
Divine perfection. Contrary to popular opinion, in the use of any
term which has application to both Divine and natural beings, it is
the Divine meaning which is normative and which determines that
term's varied employment in human affairs. We may begin with the
question of "will" as it relates to man's action, but a conclusion
about its proper employment comes only after we have constructed
a theory which shows its use in characterizing the Divine nature. To
be sure, the Divine employment will differ from the human use of
the term, but specifying the difference of its application within the
Divine nature will at the same time yield a specification of that
word's proper human use. All important concepts (e.g., being, good,
will, etc.) have a Divine application, from which alone proper
human usage can be determined.

It is not the ordinary but the extraordinary use of language which
reveals to us its substance. For the trivial events of life perhaps no
Divine reference is necessary. But for most of the important concepts
that are applicable to man, the contrast of the Divine with the
natural application of the term is helpful. Certainly a language may
be worked out along solely naturalistic principles; but, if a concept
of Divinity is to be constructed, then one of its major functions ought
to be to give precision to terminology through contrasting the Divine
nature with all the important human concepts. For example, the
central term under consideration here, "freedom," cannot have its
boundaries determined until we have decided what freedom means
as applicable to the Divine nature. If freedom in God means absolute
necessity and also self-determination, then freedom for man can
only mean necessity too, coupled however (because he is finite) with

128 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

a lack of complete self-determination (e.g., Spinoza). God's nature,
being as It is the source of our created order, is too determinative to
overlook whenever we work out the applicability of terms within
the realm of nature.

Does this mean that it is an easy or a simple matter to know God
directly? No, all that is implied is that a possible theory of the Divine
nature always needs to be constructed. "Possible" in this case is
determined by the accumulated criteria provided by the major views
of the Divine nature, contrasted with the magnitude of the data in
the natural order for which such a Divinity must provide an ac-
count. Able to answer classical requirements and able to give an
explanation for the form of the natural order such a theory can be
called a possible theory 7 of the Divine nature. In some non-verbalized,
spiritual life God may be quite real and singular in nature. All
spoken religious life, however, becomes Itself a theory, subject to
human variation and to the difficulties that any transcendent expres-
sion encounters within a linguistic framework (since theories are
possible only in terms of words or concepts). Theoretically, the var-
ious concepts of Divinity are multiple, and all that we can require
of any man is that he be able to demonstrate the possible existence
and the possible explanatory usefulness of his concept of the Divine
nature.

Since God has no lips He cannot speak, which Is another way of
saying that every "word of God" must come from human lips. This
means that we have much indirect but no direct word about God
and by God. Were it otherwise, we would have but one religion and
one doctrine of the nature of God. With no direct word available or
possible, what can we learn by indirection from the very situation of
the multiplicity of the views themselves? Variations in our theories
about God indicate the multitude of the possible qualities within the
Divine nature which can be variously (i.e., humanly) apprehended.
Our only danger is one of limiting God to our particular possible
apprehension, thus denying the absolutely infinite extent of the pos-
sible entities within the Divine nature. What shall we do to dis-
tinguish among conflicting and competing theories and to reject

FREEDOM AND VOLITION: A CONCLUSION 129

those which might be unacceptable? Here a concept of perfection is
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for selection. To serve as an
explanatory cause for creation, a Divinity must be shown to embody
perfection, although no single set of standards for fixing this concept
can be established in advance.

Although this is not the place to point out the limits of the ques-
tion of how we may distinguish the acceptable from among the un-
acceptable theories of the Divine nature, it is proper to note the
similarity here to Plato's concern in the Phaedrus. Not all possession
of an individual by passions and psychological forces (e.g., love) is
necessarily bad. In fact, some of the greatest blessings come by
means of madness, but by a madness which is Divinely inspired.
Therefore, all who speak at any length about God are possessed men
(since the object of their conversation is outside the natural order),
and it is our task not to reject psychological possession by non-
natural forces but to try to distinguish that which reveals Divinity
from that which results from a demonic possession that is all too
frighteningly similar to it. The creative expression of theologically
dominated men that is what the "word of God" means. Such a
creative use of w r ords presents a word in a way in which it has not
quite been presented to the world before, because such a word now
represents the Divine possibles. To assess such an expression means
to locate it within the Divine nature, to see what sort of a possible it
is within God's life. This is a human word now transposed to its
location within the Divine possibles and as such made revelatory of
God's nature.

Why as human beings do we write about metaphysics at all? To
give definitive formulations to solutions proposed, or to provide the
mind with material for consideration? Of necessity it must be the
latter, for the creative use of all important terms (i.e., representing
them as they exist among the Divine attributes, as the original source
of the natural order) itself prevents an exact understanding of these
terms solely from their previous usage. The extent of the Divine
possibles is itself what allows such a variety of meanings to become
attached to terms, since there is nothing in the world which might

130 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

not have been otherwise. The lack of fixity of an exact meaning to
all important terms Is an evidence of this fact. All new discourse
about God of necessity cannot be simply factual It gives common
terms new meanings to bear. Thus, the creative expression of the
Divine nature takes terms of human origin and attempts to alter
their meaning to make them suitable to the Divine. Given the per-
fection of God and the natural incommensurability between our
language and such a being, the words used about God are bound to
change and bound to change their meaning. We must turn to ex-
pressions of past ages for help, but we can never utter exactly the
same words again, language and God being what they are.

If we consider the particular concepts at issue here (freedom and
volition ) , the problem we face can be seen clearly. We must come to
understand such terms through a study of at least some of their his-
toric uses, but it is obvious that under no conditions can these con-
cepts apply to man and to God in exactly the same way in a new
age. A concept of Divine perfection must be constructed to de-
termine what the resulting deficiencies will be if these ordinary terms
are applied to God. But to do this means to say a great deal about
God when He has said no single direct word about His nature to all
of us. What do we do, then? We construct a theory of an absolute
infinity of possibles and then of a Divine nature sufficient to en-
compass them. However, oriented as we now are away from natural
objects toward the possibles in the Divine nature, our terms will be-
gin to shift in meaning and in that sense old terms will become
novel. The creative process is at work within human language, and
the Divine as well as the demonic possessive forces will again need
to be distinguished from each other.

As such, "freedom" and "volition" are modern problems. This
does not at all mean that classical writers did not consider such
concepts. Aristotle specifically states that no action can be considered
moral unless it is voluntary. The only uniquely modern characteristic
of these concepts is their recent centrality. Freedom and volition
used to be considered human qualities within an ontological frame-
work to which the terms could not really be applied. With the intro-

FREEDOM AND VOLITION: A CONCLUSION 131

ductlon of possibles into the Divine nature and their reconciliation
with perfection, these two concepts came to have a meaningful ap-
plication to Divinity and to the ontological framework in general.
As long as necessity governed both Divine action and the ontological
order, freedom and volition could at best be only minor human
problems without a foundation in the natural order itself. The
medievals in considering God, and then the moderns in considering
nature, in turn become aware of a lack of necessity about the Divine
and the natural order. Now freedom and volition have become
major issues with an ontological and a Divine application as well as
a human one.

Sometimes these modern considerations are posed by asking about
"personality," i.e., whether its central characteristics apply to Di-
vinity (or even to nature) in such a way that man's ontological
structure is not unique. The nineteenth century took the model for
its ontological structure from the self, until the classical problems of
transcendence disappeared, and God, nature, and man (and thus
the language applicable to all three) became very close in structure.
The stress upon human characteristics as ontologically revealing has
been continued by existentialism into our own day. What we now
need is to recover a sensitivity to classical problems, in which a First
Principle could not be spoken about easily, since its structure dif-
fered so from our own. The nineteenth century has spent its energy
with incredible fruitfulness. Today we require that "freedom" and
"volition" receive attention, but this time against a more classical
background we must ask about the appropriateness of their on-
tological and theological attribution. God, the world, and man need
to be seen as contrasting structures. Man will always be temporally
prior, but the construction of a theory of Divine perfection ought
once again to become ontologically prior and the first order of theo-
logical business.

Considering "volition" first, it is evident that both Plato and
Aristotle gave it a central place within human nature and made its
proper employment (i.e., as rationally trained and guided) the very
condition for achieving freedom (i.e., freedom from dominance by

132 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

passion). Volition in Divinity, however, is another matter. Ob-
viously, for Aristotle such a term could not apply to his unmoved
mover, for volition indicates something sought for and thus some-
thing lacking in that nature. The unmoved mover's activity of
thought is self-sufficient and complete-in-itsdf, and a will which
could produce a volition would actually introduce a defect. Plato is
somewhat more complicated. If we take the Forms as the embodi-
ment of perfection, then the incompatibility of volition with perfec-
tion is even more obvious than in Aristotle. However, in contrast, it
is a different story when we consider "soul," and particularly the
"world maker" of the Tinmeus. Plato obviously applies "volition"
to such activity; and yet, in its perfect embodiment, this does not
require freedom. The possibility for alternative action is character-
istic only of imperfect men; the world maker creates because he is
good and not grudging. It takes volition to release his creative
power, but his actions have no alternatives open to them. Here is the
source for one long-dominant theory of Divine perfection.

With Plotinus and Dionysius the Areopagite the situation is some-
what altered. Soul and its volitional capacities are much more cen-
tral to perfection than in the usual Aristotelian-derived views. But
neither volition nor freedom can really be said to characterize either
the One or the super-essential Godhead as such. Creative energy
flows from the creative source, but volition is not a characteristic
distinct from the objects to which such energy is applied, until we
reach a level outside the First Principle. Volition as a power requires
a definiteness and a presence of distinction that prevents man from
attributing it to his Divinity as a perfection. Freedom can be applied
to the First in an interesting way, however, in the sense that it tran-
scends all the bonds and distinctions characteristic of being's struc-
ture. The First is thus itself free from all of the restrictions present
in the levels created by it, although this is a freedom of the tran-
scendence of rational structure and never the freedom of alternative
action. Choice would require the presence of unacceptable distinc-
tions.

Augustine's early picture of perfection seems very close to Roman

FREEDOM AND VOLITION: A CONCLUSION 133

rational necessity, but in the later writings this becomes modified to
include volition and other aspects of personality. Yet the classical
restrictions against contingency and change prevent Augustine from
ever allowing volition in God to imply any genuine choice among
alternatives at least as rationally knowable. The pattern of the
future, Augustine is quite sure, is fixed unchangeably in the Divine
knowledge. The outcome of God's activity and the process of nature
are clearly embraced in a classical view of essential unalterability.
Yet creation ex nihilo has altered the picture for Augustine. Time
now has a different position within the Divine nature, since God is
the source of all that is in time. The power of God is also stressed,
which means that the possibility of alternative selection (particularly
as regards salvation) becomes real for Augustine, However, the on-
tological framework Augustine uses is not such as to allow freedom
of choice without imperfection, and so the inscrutability of the
Divine volition must be postulated. Any scheme of creation and sal-
vation introduces alternatives; but, with a metaphysical framework
that cannot deal with them, perfection is preserved by placing the
basis for decision beyond human scrutiny and making its outcome
fully determined and foreknowable throughout eternity.

Augustine introduced novel problems but did not alter the basic
ontological framework. Aquinas subjects the operation of the Divine
will in decision to scrutiny, and he finds its selection of alternatives
fully rational but also fully determined by other aspects (e.g., good-
ness) of the Divine nature, Thomas makes the Divine alternatives
real; Ockham makes them possible and raises volition to a more
central place in Divine perfection. As we progress chronologically,
freedom has been growing in meaning as ontological alternatives
have increased. When volition becomes central to Divinity, then
freedom may mean more than an absence of exterior determination.
Nevertheless, Spinoza will revert to a more classical view. Such
freedom as Ockham postulates subjects the whole order of nature
to contingency, although the Divine nature itself is not similarly con-
tingent. Volition present within creation is a source of contingency,
although God's own nature is not itself contingent. That is, God is

134 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECT I OX

contingent only as Including an infinite set of possible individuals,
some of which He never selects for inclusion in nature and others of
which, although they are definitely real potentials, become depend-
ent upon nature's contingency for their actualization.

Existentialism resembles a form of Hegelianism in its use of per-
sonality as the central metaphysical object, yet it is actually the exis-
tentialists who have reintroduced a stress upon volition and freedom
where Hegelian derived views have been almost classically de-
terministic. The discovery of genuine alternatives available to human
volition has reopened the question of volition as a Divine character-
istic, although volition can never be a part of God in exactly the
same way that it characterizes men. The existentialists suffer from
the modern restrictions against constructive metaphysics and the-
ology, and this constricts their formation of theories about God's
nature. Such a speculative task is required, however, in order to
disclose the ontological sources of possible human volition. Necessity
characterized both knowledge and perfection for Aristotle. To be
such that it could not be otherwise was for him the very mark of
stability, and volition was a sign of weakness. The problem, then, is
to permit Divine volition without damaging self -sufficiency or power.

If volition is to be attributed to Divinity, necessity cannot char-
acterize the act of creation, although necessity may still be applied
to the Divine nature as a whole. Contingency may characterize
Divine action, but not the substance of the Divine attributes them-
selves. In human nature contingency characterizes both action and
the instruments of action that is, man's attributes are themselves
contingent in their performance. Here is the basis for the question
of attributing "pereonality" to Divinity. Choice necessarily involves
distinctions, and as such these distinctions could not be characteris-
tic of the Plotinian One. Personality is central for Plotinus but not
compatible with perfection at its fullest. If personality is to be at-
tributable to Divinity, necessity can no Idnger characterize Divine
action, although the Divine nature always is necessarily what it is in
its inclusion of attributes. Choice is based upon volition, which in
turn depends upon the presence of distinctions and of a range of

FREEDOM AND VOLITION: A CONCLUSION 135

possible Individual entities in themselves unactualizable but out of
which the Divine selection is made. Personality in this sense is per-
haps attributable to Divinity without involving the defects so char-
acteristic of human personality.

14

EXTENSION

OF
CONCLUSIONS

If the thesis of this essay is true, then "perfection" is the most
important concept in establishing a view of the Divine nature and in
determining man's relationship to that First Principle, both in
nature and in knowledge. If "freedom" provides a more con-
temporary perspective on perfection, and if freedom is determined
by the way in which "volition" is to be attributed, then what hap-
pens to the other central terms relating to perfection (infinity and
unity, form and transcendence, self-sufficiency and actuality, power
and motion, simplicity and division ) when freedom becomes the cen-
tral issue? Obviously, there is no one, single way to specify Divine
perfection. These twelve concepts (freedom and volition, plus the ten
listed directly above) tend to be the ones which cluster around the
classical definitions, interrelated in a way that involves the definition
of all of the others in the specification of the use of any one term.

136

EXTENSION OF CONCLUSIONS 137

Certain metaphysical views about the nature and origin of the
natural order influence our choice of which terms are most impor-
tant. We can indicate possible views of perfection and the advantages
and disadvantages which accompany each concept. We can never
fix on a single view as alone being adequate, although the historical
writings help us to see what a concept of perfection must include if
it is to become available for theological use.

An ability to eliminate inadequate views (i.e., ones which are not
capable of sustaining the Divine life internally) but not to fix on
any single view or even to limit the number of possible views of per-
fection is, as pointed out above, a revealing fact both about the
Divine life and about human language. The more important the
concept, the more language becomes subject to variation and the
more obvious becomes our inherent inability to fix a single meaning
for the term. Thus, every new discourse about Divinity will evidence
this flexibility of meaning which language exhibits whenever it con-
cerns Opd. In turn, this tells us something about God : His nature is
such that it contains the unlimited number of possibles to which our
unending discourse is a painful testimony. The prosaic and unimpor-
tant details of human life can be expressed simply and in final
form. However, the more complex aspects of existence begin to
evidence the same basic involvement in an indefinitely extended
possibility that appears when we approach Divinity. God has no
need to speak about Himself, but when men use their only tools,
words, their unending speech proclaims their involvement in an
absolute infinity of possibles which only a perfect Divinity could
control with success.

Infinity, it is easy to see, is important for any concept of perfec-
tion which takes as its starting point the question of freedom. If the
world is limited in possibility, human freedom may still be attainable
but human creativity will be somewhat restricted. If infinity does
not apply to God, then He has no alternatives to work with, since
our finite series would be the only candidate for actualization. When
infinity applies to God, as freedom seems to demand (particularly if
it is an absolute infinity of kinds), then infinity becomes a central

138 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

Divine attribute and requires the involvement of possibility in the
Divine nature, if all of such possibles are not capable of eventual
actualization. An infinite time span need not admit such full actual-
ization, although it does as Spinoza conceives of it, but the limited
time span required by a doctrine of creation means that a choice
from among possibles becomes a necessity. From here on it is the
details of accounting for this choice which determine whether free-
dom is central to perfection, or whether necessity is preserved in the
face of infinite possibles by making the process of selection itself
necessary.

Unity will necessarily receive a less than dominant place among
the Divine attributes, if we begin with freedom as the central con-
cept. Freedom requires choice and choice depends upon alternatives,
and successful choice can only take place when the alternative pos-
sibles remain clearly distinct. Freedom thus prevents the extreme
transcendence of reason which unity taken alone might demand.
Nothing is per se beyond rational grasp, since freedom cannot be-
come irrational choice for God as it can for men. Unity still involves
transcendence of a kind, since it requires that the Divine intellect be
such as to grasp simultaneously all possible entities for consideration.
Our intellect would only destroy itself by attempting such a feat.
Man's intellect shares infinity in the sense that it is actually ap-
plicable to the whole range of possibles, although at any given
moment it considers only some perceived finite group. Infinity is
not alien to our intellect and does not impede its operation. It speeds
the creative process, but it also prohibits our desire to achieve a
definiteness not subject to alteration. Lacking the infinite power of
Divinity, we still face His intellectual task, and this discrepancy is
the source of both our creative powers and our intellectual despair.

Form can be made compatible with infinity, even an absolute
infinity of kinds, if the intellect applicable to them is itself actually
infinite. This is the argument from the infinite extent of possibility
to the infinity of the intellect comprehending them. Man's intellect,
although applicable, does not simultaneously grasp the whole
range which distinguishes man from God and indicates why for

EXTENSION OF CONCLUSIONS 139

men infinity often seems indefinite and may appear to lack form.
Man's intellect is applicable to a wider range than Aristotle could
see, but its limited grasp at any instant always makes the unlimited
range open to it seem from a distance to be formless. Freedom re-
quires that form not be transcended, since form is a requirement for
rational choice. A Divinity bound by necessity can transcend form
and still cause form to be present in a lower order. But a Divinity
which must choose freely what that order is to be cannot operate
where form is absent. Thus, freedom demands the ultimate main-
tenance of form in the Divine nature, although never any single
form or set of forms.

Transcendence is neither the transcendence of form nor of dis-
tinctions. It is the inaccessibility to immediate grasp of all of the in-
finite possibles. Men transcend their immediate environment, and the
provincial terms of their language, when they try to determine what
possibles remain, either as potentials within their presently actualized
structure or as alternatives to that original structure itself. Creative
imagination goes even beyond the bounds of the actualized order to
explore possibles as God Himself explores them eternally, as alterna-
tives to the various parts of our order and even to the natural order
itself. God transcends our grasp, as holding within His intellect in
consideration all possibles simultaneously, although some of the
actualizing process is now left to nature and to human will. The
Divine nature is transcendent in that it stands behind creation as its
cause, the primal creative process of choice itself erecting a barrier
which man can guess about (in Plato's phrase construct * 'likely
tales" ) but never transcend. Whatever we discern about God may
be expressed. Language is not transcended, although the possibility
of final statement is.

Self -Sufficiency is the main problem that a theory which begins
with freedom must face. For freedom in man is often the very evi-
dence of his deficiency in this respect. Lack of stability in internal
structure, failure to maintain a decision to actualize these form a
large part of man's freedom, but they also represent his imperfection
most dramatically. Thus, from the human side, it is easy to see why

140 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

self-sufficiency has been preserved as the core of Divine perfection,
although it has been maintained through various means. Yet free-
dom need not be ultimately incompatible with perfection, although
self -sufficiency will be the shared characteristic which is least ap-
plicable to man and most applicable to God. Change is not even
incompatible with self-sufficiency, although it is perhaps the most
dangerous characteristic for man. Control is the key to the main-
tenance of self-sufficiency, so that freedom as applied to God must
be construed so as to preserve perfect control, an attribute absolutely
essential to a creator who is to be the single First Principle.

Actuality will then become the continual actuality of self-suffi-
ciency, not necessarily the absence of change or lack of motion. Of
course, actuality can no longer mean that every possible is slated for
concrete realization, or else Divine freedom has no area of operation.
In this sense, potentiality remains within Divinity, but it is a self-
selected potentiality and stands in contrast to a fully organic and
self-sustaining natural order. Divine self-sufficiency need not be
construed so as to depend upon a full actualization of all possibles;
thus freedom of choice can be preserved without destroying perfec-
tion. The material processes of the world can be viewed as having
their origin in Divine creation, as being from His own nature with-
out involving Him necessarily in the difficulties of potentiality. The
created order exists outside the Divine nature, and a perfect and
infinite intellect is able to comprehend every aspect of the natural
order without difficulty. Like most classical perfections, actuality
must be maintained as a Divine perfection, even if not in the spe-
cific form of any particular classical view.

Power becomes perhaps the attribute most central to a concept of
perfection which begins by considering freedom. For it is power, so
to speak, that holds the Divine nature together. When unity is cen-
tral, nothing needs to be held together. When possibility is either
limited or fully actualized, there is no chance of disruptive conflict.
But when possibility is absolutely infinite and the Divine attributes
are made multiple, then power is crucial and must be absolutely
infinite m its extent. Here is perhaps the most dramatic distinction

EXTENSION OF CONCLUSIONS 141

between God and man. Although never comprehending, man's in-
tellect is actually applicable to the full range of the infinite possibles
present to God; but the powers of men, although they vary in de-
gree, are never other than finite. This imbalance between degree of
power and range of intellectual grasp is the sburce of most (but by
no means all) human evil. Power in God as fully infinite is expressed
in the actual selective act of His will, completely adequate to actual-
ize all possibles, although not all simultaneously. Human nature fal-
ters, not only in sometimes failing to recognize incompatibles s but in
desiring more possibles than are within its own grasp or power to
actualize.

Motion must be present whenever power expresses freedom.
Human motion sometimes attains its end and sometimes fails, if its
power is not sufficient to sustain it. Motion is, then, quite compatible
with Divine perfection if the range of power present is always ca-
pable of supporting any decision without contingency, which in God's
case requires an absolutely infinite power. Motion, however, is still
not a primary characteristic of God as it is of man, although it will
be possible to Him. Motion was required for the creative act; and,
in a religious view, it would be required again for any miracle, a
miracle being a kind of partial re-creation of the natural order. Any
Divine intervention or appearance, and certainly the process of end-
ing or of transforming the life of the natural order or of an indi-
vidual, all would require motion. But the continued life of the
Divine excludes the variety and constant motion that is so character-
istic of less perfect orders.

Simplicity must also be preserved, by means of control via power,
in any concept of perfection based upon freedom. Unity and neces-
sity classically were responsible for this important characteristic, but
in the face of the absolute infinity of possibles such a desirable goal
can still be achieved by power. Human life, carried out as it is
among a limited range of possibles, is subject to complexity largely
due to our failure to actualize or to maintain a choice once actual-
ized. Divinity does not suffer from this same limitation of power,
although the kind of simplicity which infinite power constantly main-

142 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

tains is not the lack of distinction and of alternates which classical
views often demanded. The simplicity here is one of constantly main-
tained choice. The actualization of possibles did not have to occur as
it did, but the element of absolute certainty involved in the process is
that of knowing that any choice will be perfectly sustained by an
application of infinite power. Simplicity here is the simplicity of the
changelessness of a Divine decision.

Division is thus not possible within Divinity, whereas men are
sometimes as much divided after a decision as they were before and
during the selective process. Traditionally self-sufficiency, unity, and
lack of motion were all aimed at removing from the Divine nature
any possibility of division. Now the presence of distinction, particu-
larly In the sense of non-compossible possibles, would seem to make
division possible, the most unacceptable situation for Divinity which
a classical writer could imagine. Although it must be asserted in one
sense that such a division within God is possible for a view which
makes freedom basic, it must at the same time be said that such a
possibility is Incapable of being realized, due to the constant pre-
serving bond of Divinity's absolutely infinite power. The basis for
division is present within God, but its actualization is of necessity
constantly prevented. That is one thing which makes God to be
God and sets Mm forever apart from human failure.

The basic sets of concepts necessary for perfection have now been
constructed in outline around a concept of freedom. What can be
said about some of the other questions which are so often related to
the concept of Divine perfection? "Will" perhaps needs little com-
ment, since volition and power are the two components which consti-
tute will. What will is depends upon the power available and the
direction and consistency of volition. As these go, so goes will. The
question of "foreknowledge" perhaps requires a greater extension of
the basic concepts developed here. There is no individual possible
entity not directly and eternally present within the Divine nature and
not constantly In that intellect's apprehension. The extent of these
possibles is absolutely infinite, but so is the range of the Divine
intellect. No possible as concretely embodied in the natural order is

EXTENSION OF CONCLUSIONS 143

"within" the Divine nature, although it is still within the range of
the Divine intellect and power (which are extended outside Himself
in any act of creation or in any miracle). No possible entity within
the Divine intellect as such is subject to change, but some receive no
concrete embodiment and others depend upon the contingencies
of human actualization. Nothing is per se new to God, since no pos-
sibles are outside of his constant grasp, but the concrete decisions of
human agents are grasped concretely only as actualized in time.
God's internal knowledge never changes; His information about the
creation existing outside of Him does change in detail but never in
general outline or as introducing any unforeseen possibilities.

"Being" is ultimately applicable to God, or else freedom could
not be basic to perfection. Being includes the range of the infinite
possibles and the other essentials of the Divine nature, i.e., volition,
power, intellect and the possible standards for goodness. Being as
applied to the created natural order includes these same five basic
attributes, but now applied to an actualized finite group. Because
these attributes exist primarily in an infinite mode and are actualized
as finite only by an act of power and volition (will), aspects of in-
finity are everywhere present within the natural order. This is par-
ticularly so in the areas of volition and intellect, where we find no
actual boundaries definitely marking them off from their infinite
origin. Power and goodness bear much more clearly the marks of the
necessary finite range open to created beings.

"Non-being" derives its principal meaning from the self-contra-
dictory possibles, which are not as such present within the Divine
intellect in actual apprehension but are present by negation. Every
entity has within itself a relation to a version of itself containing self-
contradiction, into which it is always possible for it to fall and to
lose that measure of its present being. Other than the ever present
self-contradictory counterparts of each possible entity, non-being is
present within being in the traditional Platonic form of "otherness."
To be what each entity is (including God) it must also be not-every-
other-possible-entity (just as it must be not-its-self-contradictory-
counterpart) . In these two senses non-being is inescapably present

144 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

within Divinity and within each possible being; and, since pos-
sible negative relations are infinite, non-being is present to each finite
entity to an infinite degree. The Divine power, being itself abso-
lutely infinite,, in its own life keeps such non-being within perfect
control. With no such range of power available to sustain us, and
with a natural tendency toward both positive and negative infinity
within each actual entity, what is amazing is the extent of balance
actually achieved in the created order. The considerable lapse to-
ward non-being, or the indefiniteness (for the creature) of infinity
about which we are constantly aware, is in fact not nearly so star-
tling as the possibility of achieving even temporary balance.

"Chaos" enters the natural realm as a normal part of its existence.
It reflects no similar lack of order in the Divine life but rather the
inability of a creature with limited power to resist the constant
temptations of infinite desires or the tendency to lapse into non-
being, whether intentionally or not. Power had to be granted at the
instant of creation sufficient to preserve a basic order and the pos-
sibility for order within human affairs. But the discrepancy between
this necessarily finite power and our openness to infinity means that
our limited power can fail and chaos can replace order. Partly this
represents the possibility of our actualizing any one of several orders.
Indecision, not always a deficiency of power, can often be the cause
of chaos. The potentials which result in our chaos are certainly
within the Divine nature, but His power coupled with His steady
volition and range of knowledge keeps chaos ordered in a manner
that is not available to human beings.

"Good" and "evil" are perhaps the most difficult concepts to
handle, and therefore they are a testing ground for every meta-
physical theory. Metaphysics is never born in ethics (although the
desire to use its explaining power may be), but it is here that it often
receives its test. Good vs. evil is the most pressing and persistent lay-
man's problem. // freedom is to be the starting point, then standards
of value must be ultimately multiple. However, since they cannot be
standards if they equal in number the entities to be judged, the
standards of value themselves must be less than absolutely infinite.

EXTENSION OF CONCLUSIONS 145

Following Plato's maxim in the Parmenides, we would then do well
to accept some definite number of possible standards, although we
are always powerless to say exactly what number. Standards are not
indefinitely numerous, but they are multiple, which accounts for our
lack of agreement in ethical theory. Conduct is subject to variation
according to the standards men actually select to embody in their
practice. God's selection of entities in creation eliminated some
standards and perhaps gave us an inclination toward certain others,
but only a similarity of standards is possible among men, never an
identity. This is as far as the abstract analysis can go; in order to
be specific, value theory must turn and deal with the facts of each
concrete life.

God's choice in creation was actually subject to much the same
conditions. No single standard for goodness binds either Him or His
action in creation, although His nature is such as can easily ac-
commodate all of the finite number of possible standards. Being
Himself good, God was bound to recognize some, but not all, value
standards in creation. Thus, His action remained essentially free,
although it was restricted to a finite number of possible combinations
involving certain sets of standards. His creation was in that sense
good, although it was not necessary, and it was not by any means
the only possible combination of value standards. Since possible
standards are always multiple and lack the rigid necessity of singu-
larity, it is always possible for men to hold to a selected set of stand-
ards or to violate values at any time, often in the name of other
values. Hence the presence of "evil" (plus the limitations on power,
volition, and intellect previously described), and such is its source in
a Divine nature not itself ever actually evil.

The ascription of "positive attributes" to Divinity is, quite ob-
viously, always possible within this theory. Negative procedures,
however, are still necessary in that no attribute can be given to God
without first distinguishing between God and creatures and then
denying of the term the aspects which are found to be inapplicable
to God. No term, deriving as it does from our normal language, is
applicable directly to God without first applying a negative pro-

146 SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO PERFECTION

cedure, which In turn depends upon a theory of the Divine per-
fection. The establishment of this theory, which is to become the
standard for negation, itself depends upon first denying of Divinity
any aspect which would render it incapable of its actual act, i.e.,
creation and its maintenance. The possibility of positive attribution
does not necessarily mean that this theory asserts that God is easily
knowable. Before very much can be done in the way of construction,
a whole philosophical and theological tradition must be mastered.
However, a theory of perfection which is constructed around free-
dom does remove many of the insuperable obstacles to direct knowl-
edge that are present in many traditional theories.

Since positive attribution is at least possible, even if it cannot be
absolutely definitive, such a theory has an obvious kinship to the
method of univocity. Equivocity is associated with a theory of per-
fection which involves extreme transcendence, and analogy is a
special and controversial view which tries to preserve a ground for
knowledge even when the object is agreed to be above direct grasp.
As ought to be obvious, nothing could be more futile than arguing
for a theory of language which uses terms for Divine attribution as
unlvocal. The issue lies not in language or in our use of terms but
in the theory we construct about the Divine nature and the mode
of knowledge applicable to such a nature. When the concept of
Divine perfection is worked out, then it will always be easy to see in
what sense ordinary terms may be appropriated.

What is to be concluded? What we have arrived at after much
difficult consideration is not God Himself, but merely one theory
about God which we can assert with confidence to be fully possible.
It is not the business of metaphysics to decide among such possible
concepts as still remain. It may guide the theologian to the promised
land of usable concepts, but it is forbidden to any metaphysician to
decide upon the precise place and moment of the Divine entry into
the possibles, which knowledge alone could yield a single, incontro-
vertible theory of both nature and the Divine nature. To outline
and to work within a limited number of possible theories such is
man's intellectual and moral limit and his required task.

SELECTED READINGS

CHAPTER I

Plato: Laws, Bk. X; Parmenides; Phaedrus, 245C-256E: Philebus,
58C-67B; Republic, 376E-392C and 5Q2C-509C; Sophist; Timaeus,
27-54.

Aristotle: Generation and Corruption; Metaphysics, Bk. Lambda;
Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. X; Physics, Bks. Ill, VIII.

CHAPTER II

Plotlnus: Enneads (See especially the treatises of the Fifth and Sixth

Enneads, and 1.8 and III.2.)
Dionysius the Areopagite: The Divine Names; Mystical Theology.

CHAPTER III

Augustine: The Trinity, Books I, III, V, VI, XV; Concerning the
Nature of the Good; Confessions, Books XI and XII; Divine Provi-
dence and the Problem of Evil; Enchiridion; Free Will; Grace and
Free Will

Anselm: Monologium, Chs. I-XXVII; Appendix in Behalf of the Fool;
Proslogium.

CHAPTER IV

Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, QQ. 2-49; Summa

Contra Gentiles, Bk. I.
William of Ockham: Philosophical Writings, ed. P. Boehner, Chs.

VII-X; Studies and Selections, ed. S. C. Tornay, "On the Ideas of

God."
Duns Scotus: De Primo Principio.

CHAPTER V

Meister Eckhart: "About Disinterest"; "Talks of Instruction;" and se-
lected Sermons,

Nicolas Cusanus: Learned Ignorance, Bk. I.

147

148 SELECTED READINGS

CHAPTER VI

Spinoza: Ethics, Part I; Cognitata Afetaphysica; Principles of Des-
cartes* Philosophy, Pt. I; Tract atus Theologico-Politicus.

Leibniz: Theodicy^ Part I; Discourse on Metaphysics^ I-XVI; Monad-
ology, 31-90; The Ultimate Origination of Things.

CHAPTER VII

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, "Transcendental Dialectic"; Critique

of Aesthetic Judgement, "Analytic of the Sublime"; Religion Within

the Limits of Reason Alone.
Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind, "Revealed Religion" and "Absolute

Knowledge"; Early Theological Writings ;, Trans. Knox and Kroner;

Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.

ADDITIONAL SOURCES

Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics., Vol. II, part 1 : The Doctrine of God.

New York, Charles Scribner's Sons.
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. Modern Library ed. New York,

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Bonaventura. Breuiloquim. Trans. E. E. Nemmers. St. Louis, B. Herder

Book Co., 1946.
Bolzano, Bernard. Paradoxes of the Infinite. Trans. Donald A. Steele.

New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950.
Brunner, H. Emil. The Christian Doctrine of God (Dogmatics., Vol. I) .

Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1950.
Farrer, Austin. Finite and Infinite. Westminster, London, Dacre Press^

1943.

. The Freedom of the Will. London, A. & C. Black, 1958.

Flew, Robert Newton. The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology.

London, H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1934.
Foss, Martin. The Idea of Perfection in the Western World. Princeton^

Princeton University Press, 1946.
Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. Christian Perfection and Contemplation.

St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1937.

Hartshorne, Charles. The Divine Relativity. New Haven, Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1948.

. Man's Vision of God. Chicago, Willett, Clark & Co., 1941.

. The Logic of Perfection. LaSalle, 111., Open Court Publishing

Co. (in preparation) .
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and

Edward Robinson, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1962.
Philo Judaeus. The Unchangeableness of God and The Account of the

World's Creation. In Philosophical Works. Loeb Classical Library

ed. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Temple, William. Nature, Man and God. New York, St. Martin's Press,

1953. Part I.
Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology. Chicago, University of Chicago

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Weiss, Paul. Modes of Being. Carbondale, Southern Illinois Univer-
sity Press, 1958.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality. New York, Humanities
1957, Part V,

149

INDEX

absolute infinity of possibles, 49
action, 17, 18, 48, 51, 59, 65, 75, 111,

114, 125, 134, 145

actuality, 26-27, 32, 38, 44, 46, 48,
57, 61, 66, 77, 79, 89, 106-107, 116,
134, 136, 140, 142

and self-sufficiency, 104-111
alienation, 55, 75

alternatives, 63, 67, 123-24, 132-33,
137, 142

genuine, 65, 111
logical, 65

freedom of, and alternatives, 125
Anselm, 36-42, 102
and creation,
by idea, 42
from nothing, 42
and immutability, 39-40
and infinity, 41
and non-temporality, 41
and omnipotence, 41
and ontological argument, 40, 56
and perfection, degrees of, 39
and predication of perfections, 40
and self-existent cause, 42
and supreme good, 41
and transcendence, 40-41
Appendix (Anselm), 41
Aquinas, Thomas, 43-53, 64, 68, 73,
78, 84, 89, 94, 102, 107, 109-111,
123-24, 133

and actuality, priority of, 46, 47

and contingency, 47
and eternity, 46

and existence as most perfect at-
tribute, 46

and faith as knowledge, 47
and grace, 46
and immutability, 46
and infinity, 44-47
and limitation, 46
and necessity, 68
and negative approach, 45
and possibles,

doctrine of, 47
infinity of, 47

and problem of knowledge, 47
and rest, 46

and reversal of Aristotle's concep-
tions of limitations and in-
completeness, 45
and simplicity, 45
and transcendence, 46, 48

rejection of, 45
and trinity, 45

Aristotle, 22-26, 37, 44-47, 58, 66,
73, 87-88, 90-91, 93, 98-99, 104-
106, 108-110, 112-15, 117, 123-24,
130-32, 139

and actual and potential, dis-
tinction between, 26
and actuality, priority of, 58
and the complete, 24, 35
and completion, 23-24

151

152 INDEX

Aristotle (Continued)

and contemplation, 25-26
and defimteness, 23
and eternity, 27
and forms, 22, 26
and infinite,
actual, 25

corporeal, denial of, 44
material, 25
potential, 25
and infinity,

as potentiality, imperfection

of, 44
compatible with form and

actuality, 45

rejection of, 25, 27, 45-46
and intelligibility, 23-24
and knowledge, theory of, 29, 117
and limitation, 23, 25, 26
and the limited, 24, 35
and motion, 24

rejection of, 23

and time and incompleteness,

26-27

and necessity, 24-25
and rationality, 25, 28
and rest, 26
and transcendence, rejection of,

28

and unity, rejection of, 26
and unlimitedness, rejection of,

25
and the unmoved mover, 24, 28-

29, 44Mtf
attributes, contradictory, 57

infinite, 60

Augustine, 29, 36-42, 44, 55, 65, 74,
102, 115, 124, 132-33
and change, as evidence of per-
fection, 37

and evil, doctrine of, 37
and foreknowledge, doctrine of,

37

and immutability, 37
and infinity, 38

and predestination, doctrine of,
37

and soul, doctrine of, 37

and time, 37-38
doctrine of, 38

and transcendence, lack of, 37

and trinity, 37, 38

and unity, as a secondary perfec-
tion, 37

and wisdom, 37-38

beauty, 23, 24, 91, 100

being, 29, 31, 33, 35, 46-47, 50-51,

63, 78, 92, 99, 101-103, 113, 116,

127, 143
being, transcendence of, see transcend-

cause, 67

immediate, of action, 37
self-existent, 42
ultimate, 115
cause-in-another, 33, 106
cause-of-itself, 33, 51, 60, 63, 106
change, 26, 37, 104, 105, 114, 140,

142, 143
Chaos, 78, 93, 95, 144

caused by indecision, 144
completion, 22-24, 35, 44, 88, 114
Confessions (Augustine), 115
connection, 57
consciousness, 73, 74
contemplation, 25, 26
contingency, 32, 51, 61, 67, 94, 110-

111, 114, 133-34, 143
contradiction, 56, 58, 95, 107
control, 23, 24, 111, 140

rational, 23
creation, 48, 51, 61, 64, 67, 79, 94,

109, 111, 115-16, 124, 129, 133-

34, 140, 143-45
creation, from nothing (ex nihilo) 3

42, 48, 66, 133
Critique of Aesthetic Judgement

(Kant), 70
Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), 70

Cusanus, Nicolas, 53-58
and actuality, 57
and attributes, contradictory, 57
and contradiction, as applicable

to God, 56, 58

and identification of infinite ac-
tualization with absolute pos-
sibility, 58
and learned ignorance, doctrine

of, 57

and negative approach, 55
and possibility, central! ty of, 58
and rationalism, extreme, 57
and realization of all possible per-
fections, doctrine of, 56, 58
and transcendence, 55-57
and unity, 55, 57

Darwin, 79
definiteness, 23
Descartes, 90
determinate, 38, 128
Dionysius, 29-35, 44, 46, 53, 57, 101-
102, 132

and Christian attributes, 34

and First Principle, as beyond
perfection, 35

and negative approach, 33

and personality, 34

and symbolism, 34-35

and transcendence of being and
reason, necessary, 29, 33

and trinitarian concept, 34

and unity, 29
division, 117-25, 136, 142

Eckhart, Meister, 53-58

and attributes, primary and sec-
ondary, 54

and disinterest, doctrine of, 54-
55

and emptiness, 54-55

and love and unity, 54

a neo-Platonist, 54

and nothingness, 55

INDEX 153

and quietude, 54-55
and trinity, 54
emptiness, 54
Enneads (Plotinus), 28
equality, 57
equivocation, 79, 146
essence, 46
eternality, 37, 46, 49
eternity, 27, 32, 38, 48, 62-63, 79,

121
evil, 33, 37-38, 62-68, 93-94, 116,

141, 144-45
existence, 46, 60, 61, 75, 119

most perfect of things, 46
existentialism, 7, 78, 131, 134

faith, 47
Feuerbach, 7
finity, 32

First Principle, 18-19, 29-35, 50, 109,
111, 113, 115, 117-19,123,131-32,
136, 140
Flew, R. N., 126
foreknowledge, 37, 127, 142
form, 23, 44, 4748, 88-90, 92-93,
96, 102, 104, 113, 118, 136, 138-39
and transcendence, 98-103
limiting qualities of, 124
infinity as lacking, 139
Forms, 22, 24, 31, 88, 107, 112, 123,

132

freedom, 32, 48-49, 51, 60-61, 63-64,
66, 68, 78, 94, 110-11, 126-43,
145

of action, 37
for God and man, contrasted, 127

God, conceptions of,

based on the way God acts, 19

epistemological, 18

in action, 1 7

metaphysical, 18
God, nature of,

difficulty of knowing, 17

disagreements over, 17-18

in theory, 18

154 INDEX

God (Continued)

theories about opposed to knowl-
edge of, 18
set apart from other natures by

perfection, 19

good, 51, 62-63, 65, 116, 127, 144
Good, the, 23 ? 28, 33, 92, 100, 120-

21

goodness, 46, 48, 64, 66, 133, 143, 145
grace, 46

harmony, 24, 91, 110, 120-21, 123,

125

Hegel, 7, 29, 53, 70-80, 89, 91-2,
96, 102-103, 107, 109-110, 124,
134

and Absolute, 73
and abstract and concrete, 75
and actualization of non-com-
possibles, 79
and alienation, 75
and history, unfolding of, 76, 79

as revelatory, 77, 79
and incarnation, 74

and death, 75
and inclusiveness, 72
and motion, 72
and personality, 74, 79
and philosophy of organism, 73
and process, 73, 76, 78

and struggle, 75
and pure soul, 72
and reason, not transcended, 73
and relations, 72
and Spirit, 74, 75
and substance as subject, 73
and suffering, necessity of, 78
and truth, coherence and system

as criteria of, 73
and unity, 75

and plurality, 78
Heidegger, 84
history, 76-77, 79
Hume, 69, 70-71, 76

Idea of Perfection in Christian The-
ology, The (R. N. Flew), 126
identity, law of, 3031, 35
Immutability, 37-40, 46
imperfection, 67
incompleteness, 25, 28, 114
indeterminacy, 25, 51, 63, 75, 95
infinite, 32, 41, 44, 62, 98, 144

compatible with form and ac-
tuality, 45, 47

infinity, 25, 32, 33, 38, 44, 46, 58,
66, 68, 77, 98, 101, 106, 117, 137-
39
absolute, 60, 62, 90, 118, 128

of kinds, 137-38
actual, 25, 47
corporeal, 44-45
incorporeal, 45
indeterminate, 48
in kind, 62, 90, 95
material, 25
intelligibility, 23-24, 99

Kant, 7, 70-80, 96, 102
and ethics, 71
and methodological criticism of

theology, 70

and possibility of direct state-
ments about the Divine nature,
71

and theology, metaphysically ag-
nostic, 77

Kierkegaard, 54, 78
knowledge, 23, 88
theory of, 29

language, 103, 146

poverty of, 10, 122, 128, 137
extraordinary uses of, 127
about God, 128

not factual, 130
not constant in meaning, 1 30
Leibniz, 59-68, 90, 107, 110-11, 123
and action, divine, subject to ra-
tional necessity, 59
and actuality, 66, 68

and alternatives, genuine and

logical, 65
and best of all possible worlds,

doctrine of, 65, 67
and creation, 64
and freedom, 64, 66, 68
and good and evil, 64, 65, 68
and inclination of the will, doc-
trine of, 67
and infinity, 68

and necessity, absolute, 6668
and non-contradiction, law of,

64, 66, 68
and possibles,

doctrine of, 68
infinity of, 68
non-compossible, exclusion

of, 66

unactualized, 64
and power, infinite, 68
and predestination, 65, 68
and universal harmony, principle

of, 66

and will, divine, rejection of, 59
limitation, 23-26, 44, 46-47, 88, 99,

140

limited, the, 24, 32, 35
love, 54, 91, 114

memory, 37

Metaphysics (Aristotle), 24, 44, 87,

105

miracle, as partial re-creation, 141
mixture, 24, 120-21
Monadology (Leibniz), 64
Monologium (Anselm), 39, 41
motion, 23-24, 26-27, 32, 48, 63, 68,

72-73, 78, 99-100, 104-105, 108,

110-11, 136, 140-42

and power, 112-116
motionlessness, see rest
multiplicity, 57, 92-93, 95-96, 117-

19, 121-22, 124

necessity, 24-25, 32, 49-51, 59-61,

INDEX 155

63, 110, 112, 124, 127, 133, 138-
39, 141

absolute, 66-68, 126
as protecting self-sufficiency, 109-

10, 112
lack of, 131

negative approach (or attribution),
30-31, 33, 39, 41, 45, 48, 52 S 55,
58, 64, 79, 101, 123, 145-46
neo-Platonism, 45, 53-55, 64, 93, 108,

110, 113
Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle), 25,

105

Nietzsche, 7

nominalism, see Ockham
non-being, 31, 33, 35, 52, 57, 63, 78,

143-44

non-contradiction, 50, 64 3 66
non-temporal, 41

Ockham, 43-52, 59, 64, 66, 95, 102,
107, 111, 117-18, 122, 124, 133
and cause-of-itself, 52
and First Principle, preferability

of, 50

and forms, rejection of, 49
and freedom and contingency, 51
and freedom of alternative action,

49

and indeterminateness, 51
and necessary action, 49
and necessity of non-contradic-
tion, 50

and nominalism, 49
and non-being, 52
and the non-existent sense object,

50
and possibles,

absolute infinity of, 49
unrealized, 51, 52
and the unlimited, 50
"Ockham's razor," 117
Of Learned Ignorance (Cusanus), 55
omnipotence, 39, 41, 46, 51, 112
On the Divine Names (Dionysius),
34-35

156 INDEX

On Ike Soul (Aristotle), 29
On the Trinity (Augustine), 36
ontological argument, 40, 56, 122

Parmonides, 29

Parmenides (Plato), 24, 29, 57, 145

passion, 132

Perfection,

degrees of, 39

as metaphysical, 20

as moral, 20

as religious, 20

secondary, in soul, 23

secondary, in unity, 37
personality, 32, 33, 45, 74, 79, 131,

134-35

Phaedrus (Plato), 108, 129
Phenomenology (Hegel), 73
Philebus (Plato), 23-25, 88, 120, 121
philosopher-king, 23
Physics (Aristotle), 44
Plato, 22-26, 37-38, 57, 64, 72, 78,
84-85, 88, 91-92, 99-101, 106-110,
112-14, 120-21, 123-25, 129, 131-
32, 139, 143, 145

and beauty, 23-25

and being, 29

and control, 23

and form., 23

and Forms, 22, 24 3 26, 31
doctrine of, 22

and Good, 23, 27, 121

and harmony, 24, 25

and infinity, 25

and knowledge, 23

and limitation, 25-26

and limitedness, 24

and mixture, 24, 121

and motion, 24

rejection of, 23

and necessity, 25

and pluralism, 29

and reason, 23

and rationality, 24

and soul, 23, 29-30

and time. 38

and transcendence, 23, 28
and unchangeableness, 23
and unity, as secondary, 121
and unity and plurality, 24, 29-

30

Plotinus, 23, 28-35, 37, 45, 53-55,
57, 72, 89, 92-93, 100-102, 105,
109-110, 115, 117-18, 121-25, 132,
334

and beauty, 54
and cause-of-itself vs. cause-in-

another, 33
and evil, 33
and First Principle (or Good),

29-32, 34-35

and freedom from rational struc-
ture vs. freedom of alternative
action, 132
and the good, 33, 54
and identity, law of, 30-31
and Intellectual Principle, 31-33
and negative approach, 30-31
and the One, 29-35, 56, 72
and perfection, motionless nature

of, 23

and perspective, duality of, 31
and power, 33
and quietude, 54
and simplicity, primacy of, 45
and soul, 23, 29, 72

non-material nature of, 29-

30

psychology of, 29
unity of, 29-31
and transcendence, 31-32

of being and reason, 28-29,

33

and unity, 30-31, 33
supremacy of, 29
pluralism, 29

plurality, 24, 26, 57, 63, 68, 78-79
positive approach (direct attribution),

38, 52, 79, 146
possibility, 49, 51, 58, 60, 94, 140

possibles, 47, 50, 66, 107, 112, 116,
125, 131, 133, 137-38

and compossibles, 123

noncompossible, 142

self-contradictory, 143

unactualized, 48, 123, 125
possibles, infinity of, 47, 68, 97, 123,

129-30, 140-41, 143
potential, 26, 32

potentiality, 46, 48, 63, 77, 115, 140
power, 33, 41, 51-52, 63, 68, 78-79,
91, 125, 133-34, 136, 140-43

infinite, 141-42

limitation of, 141

and motion, 112-16
predestination, 37, 65, 68, 115, 124
Pre-Socratics, 27
process, 73, 76, 78

and struggle, 75
Proslogium (Anselm), 39, 41
Pseudo-Dionysius, see Dionysius

quietude, 54

rationality, 24-25, 28, 37-38, 49 3 51,
73, 78

reality, 60

reason, 23, 104, 122, 125

reason, transcendence of, see tran-
scendence

Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone (Kant), 71

Reportatio (Ockham), 117

Republic (Plato), 23

responsibility, 127

rest, 23, 26, 32, 38, 46

salvation, 115, 133

Scotus, John Duns, 43, 49, 51, 59,

61, 64, 66, 111, 124
self-consciousness, 73-74, 78, 79
self-existent, 41
self-sufficiency, 32-33, 35, 46, 51, 62,

77, 101-103, 116, 118, 125, 132,

134, 136, 139-40, 142
and actuality, 104-111

INDEX 157

Sentences, 43

simplicity, 45-46, 67, 79, 136, 141-42

and division, 117-25
Sophist (Plato), 25, 113
soul, 23, 29, 30-31, 37, 55, 65, 92,

108, 113, 123, 132

Spinoza, 18, 31, 59-68, 74-75, 78-79,

84, 89, 90-91, 102-104, 106^107,

109-110, 118, 121, 125, 128, 133,

138

and action, divine, subject to

rational necessity, 59
and contingency, elimination of,

61

and Creation, elimination of, 61
and eternity, 74
and freedom as necessity, 60, 61,

63
and infinite attributes, doctrine

of, 60, 62
and infinity in kind, and absolute

infinity, 62

and motionlessness, 74
and necessity, 61

and possibility, elimination of, 60
and reality, identification with

perfection, 60

and reality of all possibles, 64
and substance,

absolute infinity of, 60
actuality of, 61
as transcendent and imma-
nent, 63
and will, divine, rejection of, 59,

61

Statesman (Plato), 78
substance, 60
Summa Contra Gentiles (Aquinas),

43-44

Summa Theologica (Aquinas), 43-44
symbol and symbolism, 34-35, 39, 57-
58

words as, 39

Theodicy (Leibniz), 6^-65
Tillich, Paul, 53

158 INDEX

Timaeus (Plato), 22 9 24, 120, 132
time, 26-27, 37-38, 48, 114-16, 121,
133

trinitarian aspect of, 38
transcendence, 23, 28-29, 31-34, 37,
40-41, 45-46, 48, 53, 55, 78, 92,
95, 110, 121, 127, 136, 138, 146
and form, 98-103, 131, 139
as the inaccessibility of infinite

possibles, 139

of comprehension, 58, 62, 78, 138
trinity, 34, 37, 45, 54
truth, 49 3 66, 73, 107

unchangeableness, 23, 124

unity, 26, 29, 30-31, 33, 37, 42, 46,
55, 57, 60, 63, 72, 78, 98, 101, 103,
117, 123, 125, 128, 136, 140, 141-
42

and infinity, 87-97
tension with plurality, 24

univocation, 79, 146

unknowabllity, 46, 96

unlimited, 25, 32, 50-51, 91, 94, 96

unmoved mover, the, 24, 29, 44-45,
106, 124
volition not applicable to, 132

value standards, 144, 145

via negativa, see negative approach

volition, 126-35, 136, 142-43

Whitehead, 87
wilderness, 55
will, 37, 51-52, 59, 61, 66, 91, 124-

25, 127, 142
wisdom, 37-39
world-maker, 23-24, 132

Comment on DIVINE PLK i . ; ; i ; \ :

"This book will be genuinely useful
to anyone who recognizes that spec-
ulative problems usually underlie
our practical differences concerning
God. Frederick Son tag provides a
basic account of the leading Western
conceptions of God from Plato to
Hegel. In addition, he makes an in-
dependent study of the divine at-
tributes from the standpoint of free-
dom and perfection. Even those who
cannot accept his position will profit
from his straightforward presenta-
tion of the main theories and his
defense of the value of making a
speculative approach to the divine
nature." JAMES COLLINS, St. Louis
University

THE AUTHOR

Frederick Sontag has taught philos-
ophy at Pomona College in Califor-
nia since 1952. He was Visiting
Professor of Philosophy at Union
Theological Seminary, in New York,
during 1959-60. He is a contributor
to religious and philosophical pe-
riodicals.

No. 0745B

134452